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Introduction

The availability and variety of financial instruments has grown
tremendously over the past decade. It is likely that this trend will
continue. The tax law has struggled to keep up with the development of
new financial instruments, responding to such instruments on an ad hoc and
piecemeal basis. Unfortunately, the lack of a uniform theory guiding the
development of the taxation of such instruments has led to rules that are
often haphazard , incomplete, and inconsistent.
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The shortcomings in the present tax treatment of fin ancial
instruments have high social costs. Uncertain rules increase compliance
costs, provide opportunity for abuse, and discourage the legitimate
development and use of financial instruments. Rules that are inconsistent
with the underlying economics of a transaction distort behavior, lead to an
inefficient allocation of resources, and have the potential of placing United
States financial institutions at a competitive disadvantage in the world
market.
Most, if not all, of these problems could be solved by ab andoning
our current realization system and adopting mark-to-market accounting for
financial instruments. 1 While there has been some movement in this
direction, it is unlikely that Congress (or the financial community) will
accept wholesale use of mark-to-market accounting. 2 Absent mark-tomarket accounting for financial instruments, there is a need to develop a
general framework for determining the timing of income with respect to
financial instruments within the overall confines of realization-based
accounting. In this Article, I propose such a framework.
In Part II, I set out my assumptions as to the basic normative goals
of the federal income tax. In particular, I assume that the tax system is to
be judged by standards of efficiency and equity. In Part III, using a series
of simple examples concerning the toss of a coin, I show how a pure
realization tax accounting system performs poorly against such standards.
In particular, equity and efficiency norms are violated by the deferral of
taxation implicit in a realization system because deferral lowers the
effective tax rate on financial transactions and, in addition, provides a
valuable timing option. Deferral also offers the opportunity for tax
straddles. 3
Part IV provides an overview of current provisions in the tax law
designed to deal with the problems inherent in a realization-based system
and discusses the weakness of such solutions.
In Part V, I propose a set of uniform rules to account for financial
instruments. In particular, I recommend (1) that such instruments be
divided into their component parts and (2) that each component accrue
income for tax purposes based on its expected future value. I refer to this
approach as expected value taxation.

1. A realization system is one in which gain and loss is not recognized until there is a realizati on
event, such as a sale or exchange of the instrument. A mark-to-market system is one in which gain
and loss are recognized on a periodic basis , such as annually, without regard to the existence of a
realization event. See infra text accompanying notes 7-12.
2. Mark-to-market accounting for tax purposes has been accepted in certain circumstanc es. See
infra note 9.
3. See infra text acco mpanying note 17.
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In order to explore expected value taxation, in Part VI, I apply this
approach to a series of increasingly complex wagers. In Part VII, I apply
expected value taxation to a selection of typical financial instruments. In
Part VIII, I discuss the weaknesses of my proposed approach, in particular
the difficulties caused by the information requirements of expected value
taxation.
II.

Normative Framework for the Analysis

The expected value approach to the taxation of financial instruments
is premised on two assumptions. First, the approach assumes that the
appropriate tax base is income4 and that the appropriate effective tax rate
is the statutory rate given the level of income. More particularly, I adopt
the Haig-Simons definition of income, which can be stated as the sum of
the value of the taxpayer's consumption plus her change in wealth over the
period of measurement. 5 Absent other considerations, under the HaigSimons definition of income, financial products, as with all other assets and
liabilities, would be valued periodically, and the holder would be taxable
on the change in value over the period. 6 I refer to such an approach as
"mark-to-market" or "full accrual. " 7 The desirability of any particular

4. If, for example, the income tax were to be replaced by a consumption or expenditure tax, there
would be no need to measure income with respect to financial instruments. Any investment in such
instruments would be deductible from the tax base, and any realized returns from such instruments not
reinvested would be includable in the tax base. Fluctuations in value would properly have no relevance
until such values were realized and converted to consumption. See, e.g., Michael J. Graetz,
Implementing a Progressive Consumption Tax, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1575 (1979); William D. Andrews,
A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 HARV. L. REV . 1113 (1974) . Our current
system is, of course, actually a hybrid, having characteristics of both an income and a consumption tax.
See Henry J. Aaron et al., Introduction to UNEASY COMPROMISE: PROBLEMS OF A HYBRID INCOMECONSUMPTION TAX 1, 1 (Henry 1. Aaron et a!. eds ., 1988) (hereinafter UNEASY COMPROMISE] ("In
practice, all tax systems are mixed or 'hybrid' systems that contain both income tax and consumption
tax features.").
5. See Robert M . Haig, The Concept of Income-Economic and Legal Aspects, in THE FEDERAL
INCOME TA.X I, 7 (Robert M. Haig ed., 1921) ("Income is the money value of the net accretion to
one's economic power between two points of time."); HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME
TAXATION 50 (1938) (stating that personal income includes "the change in value of the store of
property rights between the beginning and end of the period in question") .
6. The precise assessment period is also a relevant variable. In theory, continuous assessment
would be optimal. See Jeff Strnad, Periodicity and Accretion Taxation: Nom1s and Implementation,
99 YALE L.J. 1817, 1830-31 (1990) (arguing that continuous assessment taxation is superior to periodic
assessment taxation). In light of administrative considerations and the general use of the annual
assessment period, I assume that the annual assessment period is the appropriate norm.
7. More precisely, under a mark-to-market system, the holder of the instrument would be taxable
on the change in value of the instrument over the period, plus any cash and the value of any property
received, minus any cash and the value of any property paid. For example, assume that at the
beginning of the period an instrument was worth $100 and that at the end of the period the instrument
was worth $150. Assume also that during the period the holder of the instrument had received $15 and
had been obligated to pay $25. In that case, the holder's income for the period would be $40 (($150
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approach to the taxation of financial instruments is, accordingly, measured
against this norm. Deviations from the norm must be justified on the basis
of other considerations, such as equity, efficiency, and administrability. 8
Second, the expected value approach assumes that the financial
instruments in question will not in fact be taxed under such a full accrual
system. Thus, the expected value approach should be judged not against
the ideal of full accrual, but rather against other alternatives . The
assumption that financial products will not generally be taxed on a full
accrual basis is not meant to be an endorsement of this position. The tax
iaw has already accepted mark-to-market accounting for certain assets and
in certain contexts. 9 The question, therefore, is not whether mark-tomarket accounting can or should be used, but rather where the line should
be drawn. 10 Drawing the line to include all actively traded assets appears
attractive and warrants further study. 11

- $100) + $15- $25 = $40) .
8. Considerations of equity , efficiency, and administrability often conflict. In the final analysis,
tax policy involves an analysis of the extent to which any particular rule or set of rules deviates from
th~se norms and a weighing of the social costs of such deviations. See generally Boris I. Bittker,
Equity, Efficiency, and Income Tax Theory: Do Misallocations Drive Out lnequiries?, in THE
ECONOMICS OF TAXATION 19, 20-29 (Henry J. Aaron & Michael J. Boskin eds., 1980) (noting the
conflict between the normative efficiency and equity standards).
9. A very recent example of mark-to-market accounting being used as an acceptable method of
accounting is in the proposed regulations governing notional principal contracts that permit dealers and
traders in such contracts to elect mark-to-market accounting for their contracts and for all hedges of
th e contracts. Prop . Treas. Reg . § 1.446-4,56 Fed. Reg. 31350, 31361 (1991). For a description of
notional principal contracts, see infra notes 296-97 and accompanying text. Section 1256(a) has , since
1982, provided that certain financial contracts including reguiated futures contracts and certain foreign
currency contracts are to be taxed on a mark-to-market basis . I.R.C . § 1256(a) (1988). Treasury
Regulation § 1.471-5 has permitted securities dealers to use mark-to-market accounting for their
inventories since at least !958. Treas. Reg . § 1.471-5 (as amended in 1987). It offers securities
dealers three methods of inventory valuation: cost, market, and lower of cost or market. !d. As an
apparent quid pro quo for adopting mark-to-market accounting for notional principal contracts,
securities dealers are required to forsake the use of lower of cost or market on their securities and
co mmodity inventories. Prop . Treas. Reg.§ l.446-4(a)(3), 56 Fed. Reg . 31350 , 31361 (1991) . The
recent tax bill contained at least two additional mark-to-market provisions. See the Tax Fairness and
Economic Growth Act (the "Bill "), H.R. 4210, 102d Cong ., 2d Sess. (1992), passed by the House and
Senate, then vetoed by the President on March 20, 1992. Section 3204 of the Bill added new code
§ 475 which generally would have required dealers in securities to account for their securities inventory
on a mark-to-market basis. Section 4402 of the Bill added, inter alia, new code§ 1291 which would
have required certain owners of marketable stock in passive foreign corporations to recognize gains and
losses (to the extent of previously recognized gains) on a mark-to-market basis. New code§§ 475 and
1291 were again included in §§ 3001 and 4402, respectively, of the Revenue Bill of 1992, H.R . 11,
!02d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992), passed by the House on October 5, 1992, passed by the Senate on
October 8, 1992, and vetoed by the President on November 5, 1992. While these new mark-to-market
provisions were twice vetoed, it is likely that they will eventually become law.
10. See David J. Shakow, Taxarion Wirlwut Realization: A Proposal for Accnwl Taxarion , 134
U. PA. L. REV. 1111 (1986) , for a proposal of a broader use of a full accrual system.
II. The definition of "actively traded" would of course have to be fleshed out. See Prop. Treas.
Reg . § I .I 092(d)-1, 56 Fed. Reg. 31350, 31361 (1991 ) fo r a recent attempt to define " ac tively trad ed"
for purposes of the straddle rules.
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At the opposite extreme of a full accrual system is a pure realization
system. Under a pure realization system, gains and losses on financial
assets would be taxable only at the time of a realization event such as the
termination of the taxpayer's investment in the asset. 12
A pure realization system raises a number of problems. First, to
the extent that taxation of gains and losses are deferred, the effective tax
rate on such gains and losses is less than the statutory rate. 13 This
problem, which I will refer to as pure deferral, may be anticipated or
unanticipated. By anticipated deferral , I mean situations where, as of the
commencement of the transaction, there is an expected gain or loss from
the transaction, the taxation of which will be deferred . By unanticipated
deferral, I mean situations where on an a priori basis the expected value of
any deferral is zero, 14 while on an ex post basis there is in fact deferral
of gain or loss. 15

12 . The precise definition of a realization event is un-:lear and is beyond th e scope of this Article.
In general, gain or loss is realized o n the sale or other disposition of property. Treas. Reg. § I. I 00 Il(a) (as amended in 1972). A disposition generally includes an exchange for other property so long
as the other property differs materially in kind or extent. /d.; see Cottage Savings Ass'n v.
Commissioner, I I I S. Ct. 1503, 1508 (1991) (stating that a realization event for the "disposition of
property" only occurs if the properties exchanged are "materially different"). Frequently , despite a
realization event, the rec ognition of gain or loss is deferred. See, e.g., l.R.C. § 1031 (Supp. II 1990)
(deferring recognition for a like-kind exchange); id. § 1032 (1988) (deferring recognition for an
exchange of stock for property); id. § 1033 (1988) (deferring recognition for involuntary conversions);
id. § 1034 (West Supp . 1992) (deferring recognition for a rollover of gain on the sale of a principal
residence).
13 . This point is easily demonstrated . Consider an investment that has yielded a gain of $500 .
Assuming a 30% tax rate, the appropriate tax on the gain is $150. If the payment of the tax is deferred
for one year, the present value of the tax liability (assuming a 10% discount rate) drops to $136. In
present value terms, this is equivalent to an effective tax rate of only 27%. The longer the period of
deferral, the lower the equivalent effective tax rate. Similarly, the higher the discount rate, the lower
the equivalent effective tax rate. For example, a deferral of 20 years with a discount rate of 15%
would imply an effective tax rate of only 2%. The general formula is:
,Fr.
.
eJJectzve
tax rate

TR

=

(1

+

,

r)n

= nominal tax rate, r = discount rate, and n = number of years.
The "tax" on a loss is, of course, negative rather than positive. In other wo rds, it is a tax
savings, not a tax cost. If a $500 loss is deferred one year and the marginal rate is 30% the present
value of the $150 tax savings is only $I 36. That is equivalent to the current tax savings at a 27% tax
rate. Because 27% is less than 30%, the taxpayer has a lower effective tax rate on the loss and a
smalkr tax savings. Therefo re, the overall tax burden on the taxpayer has increased.
I 4. When I refer to the expected value of deferral as zero, I mean to include both situations where
there is no expected gain (or loss) and situations where there is expected gain (or loss), but it is
expected that there will be no deferral of tax liability on such gain (or loss). These are sufficient but
not necessary co nditions for the expected value of deferral to be zero. For example, the expected value
of deferral could be zero in a transaction in which there is expected to be deferral of both gain and loss,
but the present value of the deferral of the gain is equal to the present value of the defe rral of the loss.
I 5. The significance of deferral from a tax policy perspective may well depend on whether it was
where TR
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A second problem with a pure realization system is that, to the
extent that taxpayers have the ability to selectively recognize losses while
continuing to defer gains, the value of deferral is increased. I refer to this
phenomenon as the timing option. 16
Third, under a realization system taxpayers may be able to engage
in transactions that in the aggregate produce no gain or loss , but that can
be disassociated into two or more parts, one or more of which produces
gain and one or more of which produces loss. This type of transaction is
known as a tax straddle. 17
Although the problems of pure deferral, the timing option, and the
tax straddle are closely related, it is analytically useful to separate them
because it enables a clearer understanding of the weaknesses of a
realization approach and facilitates the development of alternative solutions.
In the next section, I further develop the concepts of pure deferral, the
timing option, and the tax straddle using a series of simple examples.
III.

Timing Problems Caused by a Realization System

This Part presents five examples of simple transactions involving
bets and deferred or accelerated payments. The examples are used to
demonstrate how, under a pure realization system, such transactions
provide opportunities for deferral, use of the timing option, and creation
of tax straddles. Finally, the efficiency and equity consequences of these
opportunities are discussed .

A.

Anticipated Deferral
1.
Example 1: Diva pays David $100 today, and, in exchange, David promises to pay Diva $121 in two years.

In Example 1, the value of Diva's right to payment is expected to
increase over the entire two-year period. 18 If the tax system fails to

anticipated or unanticipated. See infra subpart III(A) for a more complete discussion of anticipated and
unanticipated deferral.
16 . See Strnad, supra note 6, at 1879 (defining the timing option as "the ability to take los ses early
and defer any later matching gains"). Strnad cites George M. Constantinides, Capital Market
Equilibrium with Personal Tax, 51 ECONOMETRICA 611 (1983), as the source of the phrase " timing
option ." Strnad, supra note 6, at 1879 . See infra subpart III(B) for an explanation of the timing
optio n.
17. See JERRY W. MARKHAM, COMMOD!TlES REGULATION: FRAUD, MANIPUL<\TION & OTHER
CLAIMS§ 14.01 (1987) . See infra subpart III(C) fo r a more detailed discussion of tax straddles.
18 . The value of the right to receive future payments is equal to the present value of the furure
payment. In general, the present value of a future payment is equal to:
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account for this income as it is earned , the effective tax rate will be less
than the statutory rate on D iva's gain and on David 's loss. Assuming that
the value of David's obligation to pay $121 in two years increases on a
constant yield basis, 19 it will be worth $100 at the time Diva pays David ,
$110 in one year, and $121 at the end of the second year. D iva's income
is , therefore, $10 in the first year and $11 in the second year. Under a
pure realization system , however , Diva will be taxed on her $2 1 of gain
only at the end of the second year. She will therefore defer payment of tax
on $10 of income for one year. 20 Moreover, David and Diva know there

PV

FV
(1 +r(

where PV is th e present value, FV is th e amount of the future payment, r is the discount rate, and ti s
the time remaining until payment. Therefore, as long as it is assumed that th e di scou nt rate is constant
ri sk , th e value of the fu ture payme nt inc rea ses as the time to payment decreases . See genera lly
RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 29-41 (4th ed .
199 1) (expla ining the calculati on of present values). Example 1 is , of course, equival ent to a ze rocoupon bond.
19 . By "constant-yield basis," I mea n that th e di scount rate stays constant over the entire term of
the ob ligation .
20 . Such deferral is equivalent to a reduction in the effective tax rate. See supra note 13 .
This analysis assumes that both the pu re realizati o n and the fu ll acc n1 al system measure
income o n a ta xable year basis. It ignores the effect o f estima ted tax liab ility . More importantly, thi s
analysis ignores the effect of inflation. Assuming inflatio n, much of Diva's gain and David's loss is
pure inflationary gain o r loss. Under a perfectly ind exed ta x system, such ga in or loss w ould not be
taxed. Given that the current system determines ga in and loss with out regard to inflation, the effectiv e
tax rate o n capital transactions can be well in excess of th e statutory rate. For example, cons ider a
$100 investment held for one year and then sold for $105. Assume that the rate of inflation is fiv e
percent. In that case, the real gain on the transa ction is zero, while the nominal gain is five do ll ars.
If nominal ga ins are subject to tax at a rate of 20%, the tax li ab ility on the transaction would be one
dollar. As measured against the real gain of zero, the one dollar tax liability, or for that matter any
tax li ability, represents an infinite effective tax rate.
Inflati on is a se ri ous problem under both a full accrua l system and a pure realizati on system.
In either case, the appropriate so lutio n is basis indexation . Whil e basis indexation has been consid ered
at variou s times, it has always been rejected, primarily for admini strative rea sons. See , e. g ., DAVID
F . BRADFORD , U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX. REFORM 75 (2d ed. 1984) (arguing
that "inflation adjustment would introduce additional complexity "); 2 U.S. TREASURY DEP' T, TAX.
REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 152-72, 178-200 (198 4) [hereinafter
TREASURY I] (proposing a comprehensive indexation scheme, including depreciable property, capital
assets, inventories , and indebtedness); U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, THE PRESIDENT'S T A..X PROPOSALS TO
THE CONGRESS FOR FAIRNESS, GROWTH, AND SIMPLICITY 164-77 (1985) (elimi nating proposa ls in
TREASURY I for indexation of depreciable assets and indebtedness wh ile maintaining proposals to index
capital assets and inventories). A proposal for inde xing was passed by the House as part of the capital
gains provision in the 1989 Act. H.R. 3299, JOist C ong., 1st Sess. § 11961 (! 989) (adding new
§ I 022 of the Code providing for indexing of basis in certain circumstances). Representative Archer
introduced a similar bill in the i02d Cong ress. H.R. 246, 102d Co ng ., l st Sess. (1991 ) .
Because infl ation and deferral work in opposite di rections, deferral has been pointed to as an
ad hoc so lution to inflation. See Daniel Halperin & Eugene Steur!e, Indexing 1he Ta.x System for
Inflation , in UNEASY COi\!PROMISE, supra note 4, at 347, 356 (arguing that "almost all fo rms of capital
income rec eive some form of . .. ad hoc index ing under current law "). The implication of this
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will be deferral before they enter into the transaction. In other words, the
deferral is anticipated. By contrast, under a full accmal system, both
parties would be taxed as the value of the contract changed over the twoyear period.
2.
Example 2: Diva promises to pay David $121 in two
years , and David promises to pay Diva either $142 or $100 at
the same time depending on the toss of a coin. The coin toss
occurs at the end of the two years.

There is no deferral, either anticipated or unanticipated, in Example
2 ; Until the toss of the coin the bet is worth nothing. 22 It is only once
the coin is tossed that the value of the bet changes. The payoff, however,
is made immediately, and there is no opponunity for deferral. Under
either a full accrual or a pure realization approach, Diva would be taxed
at the same time. 23
2

3.
Example 3: Diva pays David $100 today, and David
promises to pay Diva $142 or $100 in two years depending on
the toss of a coin at the end of the two years.

In Example 3, 24 there is ex ante anticipated deferral of income,
despite the fact that ex post there may be a loss , not income, from the

argument is that, given inflation, deferral is not a problem. The relationship between deferral and
inflation is very loose, grossly overcompensating some taxpayers and grossly underc ompensati ng
oth ers. Moreover, such arguments fail to recognize the various manifestations of deferral, including
unanticipated deferral, the timing option, and straddles. For these reaso ns I believe it is unwise to rely
on the failure to index the tax system for inflation as a solution for problems caused by deferral.
On the other hand, to the extent the realization requirement is weakened and the tax code
moves towards full accrual accounting, the problem of inflation does become more significant and
begi ns to demand a solution. From a revenue point of view, the increased revenue that is likely to flow
from the adoption of accrual accounting could be used to pay for the likely revenue loss from
indexation.
21. In Example 2, the parties have entered into a current agreement for a future wager. It is
essentially a forward contract. T o see this more clearly, consider a commodity X; the price of X can
take on only two values, $100 or $142. A cash-settlement forward contract to purchase X in two years
at a price of $121 would have exactly the same payoff as the payoff in the coin toss in Example 2. See
infra text accompanying notes 258-60 for a discussi on of forward contracts, including cash-settlement
forward contracts.
22. I define the value of the bet to be the expected present value of the payoff from the bet. In
Example 2, there is a 50% chance that Diva will have to pay $21 in two years and a 50% chance that
she will receive $21 at the same time. The expected payoff in two years is, therefo re , zero. The
present value of the expected payment of zero is also zero.
23. Under a full accrual approach, the taxation would be triggered by the outcome of the coin to ss,
while under a pure realization approach, the taxation would be triggered by the payment (i.e., the
realization event). Because these two events are contemporaneous, taxation would occur at the same
time under either approach.
24. Example 3 is merely a combination of Examples I and 2, a loa n and a forward wage r.
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transacti on. The expected payment by David to Diva is $121 at the end of
two years. 25 In exchange for this expected payment, Diva pays $100
currently. · Diva thus has expected income of $21 accruing over the twoyear period . At th at time , Di va will have additional income of $21 (if she
wins) or a loss of $21 (if she loses) .
Anoth er way to see that Diva has an anticipated (and actual )
deferral of income, even though she may ultimately have no income on the
transaction , is to co nsid er what would happen if she sold her ri ght
immediately pri or to the coin toss . Immedi ately prior to the toss , the value
of her ri ght to recei ve payment should be approximately $121. 26 Because
sh e paid only $100 for this right, she has income of $21 , regardless of the
outcome of the subsequent coin toss . The new holder of the bet would
then have a gain or loss of $21 , depending on the outcome of the toss.
The result should be no different if Diva does not sell her rights: her bet
is still worth $121 immediately prior to the toss . Thus, in an economic
sense, she has income of $21 as of that moment. Her subsequent loss or
doubling of her income should not obscure the fact that she has already
earned the first $21 _27 Under a realization-based system, Diva would not
be taxed on her expected income prior to the end of the transaction. Under
an accrual system, she would be taxed over the term of the transaction as
the expected income accrued.
4. Example 2A: The facts are the same as Example 2 but the
coin toss occurs immediately after Diva and David enter into
the agreement. Payment is still made at the end of two years.
5.
Example 3A: The facts are the same as Example 3 but the
coin toss occurs immediately after Diva and David enter into
the agreement. Payment is still made at the end of two years.

Examples 2A and 3A differ from Examples 2 and 3, respectively,
in that the coin toss occurs immediately after the bet is made, rather than
at the end of the two-year period. Consider first Example 2A , an example
of unanticipated deferral. 28 As of the time of the bet, the expected

25. The expected pay ment is determined by multiplying each payoff by its probabili ty. See sup ra
note 22. In this example, there are two possible payo ffs, $100 and $142 , each with a probability of
50 %. The expected payoff is thu s $121.
26 . The exact value of her right would , of course, depend on the market. Assuming that there
was a large enough market fo r such bets, the market price should be driven to $121, the expected
payoff. All of the examples assume that there are no transa ction costs.
27. The fa ct that there is anticipated deferral in Example 3 should come as no surprise given th e
observation that Example 3 is merely a combination of Exa mp les 1 and 2 . In Example 1 Diva has
anticipated deferral and in Exa mple 2 Diva has no offsetting ac celeration of inco me, th erefore it mu st
be the case tha t Diva has anticipated defe rral in Exa mpl e 3 .
28. Wh ereas Exa mple 3 is made up of a loan followed by a wager, Exa mpl e 2A is essentially a
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income from the bet, as in Example 2, is zero . Once the coin is tossed,
however, the situation changes . As sume that Diva wins the coin toss. She
has economic income as of the ti me of the toss by virtue of David's
obligation to make a net payment of $21 in two years. The amount of the
economic income can be determined by discounting the future payment.
Assuming a discount rate of ten percent, the present value of the future
payment and, therefore, the amount of current economic income would be
$ 17 .36. 29 In addition, D iva wou ld have addi tional interest income of
$3.64 accruing over the two-year period lead ing up to the payoff. In a full
accrual system, Diva would be taxed on the $1 7.36 of income at the time
of the coin toss and would accrue the remaining $3.64 over the two-year
period. In a pure realization system, she would be taxed on the entire $21
at the end of the two years. 30 As a result of the deferral, the effective tax
rate on her gain is reduced.
An essential characteristic of Example 2A is that it is not possible
to determine whether the deferral will be in favor of the taxpayer or against
the taxpayer at the time the transaction is entered into. If the taxpayer
wins the wager, she will have income, the taxation of which will be
deferred. If she loses the wager, she will have a loss, the taxation of
which will also be deferred. In expected value terms , the amount of
deferral is zero. 31
Example 3A is the most complicated. As with Example 3, Diva has
expected income of $21 over the two-year period. To see this resu lt,
consider Diva's position. If the coin toss is in her favor, she will own
David's promise to pay $142 in two years , which will be worth approximately $117.36. 32
She will thus have immediate income of
$17.36 33 and additional "interest" income of $24.64 over the two
years. 34 If she loses, she will be owed only $100, which will be worth
$82.64. 35 She will thus have an immediate loss of $17.36 and will earn
$17 .36 in interest income over the two years. 36 Therefore, whether she

wager followed by a loa n.
29. $17.36 is $21.00 disc ounted at 10% for two years.
30. At this stage, it is assumed that there is no realization event prior to the time of payment at
the end of the two-year period . For the results when this assu mption is relaxed, see the discussio n of
the effect of the timing option, infra subpart III (B) .
31 . Because the expected income is zero, the expected deferral must also be zero. See supra note
14. This result is the key difference between Example 2A and Examples I and 3.
32. $117.36 is $142 discounted at 10% for two years .
33. $17 .36 = $117.36- $100.00 (present value- cost).
34 . $24 .64 = $142.00- $117.36 (future value - present value). I use the term "interest income"
to distinguish income from the passage of time as opposed to income from the outcome of the wag er.
I do not mean to suggest that a portion of the income should or should not be characterized as income
for fed eral income ta x purposes. Questions of character are generally beyo nd the scope of this Article.
35. $82.64 is $100 discounted at 10 % for tw o years .
36 . $17.36 = $100.00- $82.64 (cost- present val ue).

1992]

Taxation of F in anc ial Instruments

255

wins or loses , she will earn interest income. The expected amount of
interest income sh e will earn is $21, exactly the same as in Exam pl e 3. In
addition to the expected deferral of $2 1, Diva will also have actual deferral
of the $ 17. 36 gain or loss. The expected amount of th is later gain or loss
is, however , zero. Accord ingly, there is no expected deferral w ith respect
to such gain or loss. In summary, Example 3A invol ves both anticip ated
and unanticipated deferr al.

B.

The Timing Option

The timing option refers to the taxpayer's ability to selectively
recognize gains and losses. 37 Under a full realization system, the timing
option exists because the taxpayer generally has the ability to force a
realization event with respect to a loss by disposing of the property while
deferring realization of gain by continuing to hold the property. 38 Under
a lull accrual system, there is no timing option because both gain and loss
are recognized each period without regard to a realization event or other
action of the taxpayer.

37. See supra note 16 (defining the timing op tion). The importance of th e timing option is well
known to tax practitioners. In addition, its imp orta nce has also been recog nized in the academic
literature. See generally Joseph E. Stiglitz, I11e General171eory ojTa.x Avoidance, 38 NAT'L TAX J .
325 , 325 (1985) [hereinafter Stiglitz, I11e General I11eory] (stating that the "[p ]ostponement of taxes"
is the first "basic principle[] of tax avoidance," and explaining that the "present discounted value of
a postponed tax is much less than that of a tax currently paid"); Joseph E. Stiglitz , Some Aspecrs oj rh e
Taxation of Capiral Gains , 21 J. PUB. EcoN. 257, 259 (1983) [hereinafter Stiglitz, Some Aspecrs]
(listing investment strat eg ies that, assuming a perfect capital market and the absence of anti -abuse rules,
would enable an individual to avoid paying any income tax under a realization-based system); Strnad,
sup ra note 6, at 1825-30 (discu ssing th e impac t of timing on a simple hypothetical tran sacti on) .
38. This Article generally focuses o n reducing the effective rate of taxation by deferring gains and
accelerating losses. It is important, how ever, not to lose sight of the fact that for some taxpayers it
may be important to accelerate gains and defer losses . For exa mple, a taxpayer with exp iring net
operating losses would wish to extend th e use of the losses by realizing current inco me and deferred
gain, thereby usi ng the current expiring losses and creating new losses with a fresh carryover period.
Thus, for some taxpayers, deferral has value when it is loss, rather th an gain, that is bei ng deferred.
This consideration is equally tru e for all of the manifestations of deferral discussed in this Article.
One of th e problems with many of the conventional approaches to the timing rules is that they
lose sight of the fact that acceleration of income is a two-edg ed sword. See , e.g., Virginia Iron Coal
& Coke C o . v. Commissioner, 37 B.T.A. 195 (noting that the taxpayer argued that the option premium
should be taxable in the year paid, not in the year when the option expired unex erc ised), aff'd, 99 F .2d
919 (4th Cir. 1938) , cert. denied, 307 U.S. 630 (1939); Martin D. Ginsburg, 17ze National Office
Mission, 27 TAX NOTES 99 , 100 (19 85) (" [E]very stick crafted to beat o n the head of a taxp ayer will,
soo ner or later, metamorphose into a large green snake and bite th e Co mmissi o ner on the hind part.
Nothing, you see, works one way in th e tax fi eld. Those folk out there are exceedingly ingenious .
If, in aid of particular mayhem, you espouse an interpretation too narrow or too broad or just plain
skewed, before you can turn around th e tax bar wi ll do you in .") . In part, the recognition of this
symmetry lies behind the balanced app roach taken with respect to noti o nai principa l contracts in Prop.
T reas. Reg.§ 1.446-33 , 56 Fed. Reg. 31350 , 31354 (1991 ), and its predecessor, I. R. S. Notice 89-21,
1989-1 C.B. 65i.
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The effect of the timing option is to lower the effective tax rate on
gains relative to the effective tax rate on losses and, therefore, the expected
effective tax rate on the transaction as a whole. 39 Consider Example 3A.
Immediately after the coin toss, Diva has either a gain or loss of $17.36.
Assume th at she has a loss and immediately disposes of the asset.
Assuming a thirty percent tax rate, she will have an immediate tax savings
of $5 .21 and her effective tax rate on the loss will be thirty percent, the
full statutory rate. By contrast, assume that she has a gain and holds onto
the bet until the end of the two-year period. In that case, her tax
obligation of $5.21 on the gain will be deferred two years. 40 In present
value terms, her obligation will cost her only $4.31. 41 The effective tax
rate on her gain is, therefore, only twenty-five percent. 42 In other words,
the effective tax rate on a gain is only eighty-three percent of the effective
rate on a loss. 43
The timing option is also present in Example 2A. Consider Diva,
who has promised to pay $121 in exchange for either $100 or $142 . Once

39. The timing option is available only if the party with the loss is able to recognize the loss
without adverse tax consequences to the party with the gain as would be the case if, fo r example: (I)
the loser was able to recognize her Joss without a corresponding recognition event for the winner; (2)
the winner was non-taxable; or (3) the winner was already taxed on the gain because of its method of
accounting (e.g., mark-to-market). If the recognition of a loss by the loser forces a taxable recognition
by the winner, a potential investor will exp ect that gain as well as Joss will be recognized immedia tely
after the coin toss, and there will be, in effect, no timing option.
A numb er of different tax rules have the effect of requiri ng gain recognition by the winner
as a price for Joss recognition by the loser. These rules include I.R.C. § 46J(h) (1988). See infra
notes !55-56 and accompanying text (explaining the addition of the requirement of econom ic
performance to the all events test for determining when an item of deduction may be accrued). Anothe r
such rule is Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-3(e)(6)(ii) , 56 Fed. Reg. 31350, 31360 (1991) (stating th at both
parties to such a notional principal contract recognize gain or Joss upon the assignment of the contract).
Both of these rules rely on the presence of a taxable counterparty for their effectiveness. Th e rule in
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-3(e)(6)(ii) is weakened by the availability of a mark-to-market election under
Prop. Treas . Reg.§ 1.446-4,56 Fed. Reg. 31361 (199 1). See infra note 223 (stating that a mark-tomarket election allows either party to recognize a loss without imposing a tax cost on the other party).
40. If she holds on to the bet for two years, she will have an additional gain of $3.64 as the value
of th e bet increases from $17.36 to $21. She will have a tax liability of $1.09 on the add itiona l gain.
Similarly, in the case where she loses the coin toss, if she borrows $17.36 to fund her current loss, she
will have an additional deductible interest expense of $3.64 over the two-year period .
41. $4.31 is the present value of $5.31 discounted at 10% for two years.
42. 25% = $4.31 7 $17.36.
43. 83% = 25% 7 30%. In general, the effective gain rate as a percentage of the Joss rate
depends on the discount rate and the number of years a gain is deferred relative to a loss. The form ula
IS:

Gain Rate
Loss Rate

(1 +r)"

where r is the discount rate and n is the number of yea rs of deferral. In this example the disc ount
rat e is I 0% and the number of years of deferral is two. Th erefore, the ga in rste as a percentage of
the Joss rate is 83% (83 % = I 7 (I + .10) 2).
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the coin is tossed, she knows with certainty whether she has a gain or a
loss. If she has a gain, she can choose to defer the gain for two years. If
she has a loss, she can take it immediately. The timing option is not,
however, available in Examples 1, 2, or 3. Example 2 has no deferral ,
either anticipated or unanticipated, and, as a result, there can be no timing
option. Examples 1 and 3 both have anticipated deferral, but no unanticipated deferral. 44 While anticipated deferral has the effect of lowering
the effective tax rate, it does not present the timing option. 45
C.

Straddles

The problem with the timing option from a taxpayer's point of view
is that it is merely an option , rather than a certainty. The fact that it is an
option does not mean that it is unimportant, without value, or w ithout cost
to the system, but merely serves to limit its value. If, however, a taxpayer
can place herself on both sides of a transaction, she can convert the option
into a certainty, thus ensuring a realizable loss where there is no loss on
the overall transaction. For example, consider a taxpayer who engages in
two transactions similar to the transaction described in Example 2A. In the
first transaction, the taxpayer bets on the coin coming up heads. In the
second, the taxpayer bets on tails. Regardless of the coin toss, the
taxpayer will have an equal gain and loss, enabling the current realization
of a loss and the deferred realization of a gain without any risk of
economic loss. 46 In essence, the taxpayer has converted the timing option
into a certain deferral.

44. The statement that Examples I and 3 have no unanticipated deferral is not strictly true.
Consider Example 1, the exchange of $100 today for $121 in two years. I have assumed that the
income from the exchange accrues along an expected path during the two-year period . Assume,
however, that immediately after the $100 payment is made, interest rates drop to o ne percent. As a
result, the right to receive $121 in two years would immediately be worth approximately $119 a nd the
remaining $2 in income would acc rue over the remaining two years. To the extent that this actual
accrual path exceeded the expected accrual path, there would be unanticipated deferral in addition to
the anticipated deferral.
45. As Example 3A shows, anticipated deferral and the timing option are not P.lutually exclusive.
See supra text accompanying note 36. In other words, a transaction can have both anticipated deferral
and the timing option. The point is only that anticipated deferral does not itself present the timing
option. The transaction must have unanticipated deferral for the timing option to exist. Paradoxically,
a reduction in anticipated deferral due to the accrual of expected income can have the side effect of
creating unanticipated deferral and, therefore, the timing option. See infra note 181 (demonstrating that
accruing expected inco me can create an opportunity to take advantage of a taxable loss that would
otherwise not exist).
46 . See infra text accompanying notes 161-72.
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Efficiency Consequences

There are both efficiency and equity consequences to deferral, the
timing option, and tax straddles. This subpart focuses on the efficiency
consequences. As discussed above, anticipated deferral lowers the effect ive
tax rate on a transaction.~
The reduced effective tax rate distorts
investment decisions in two ways: by encouraging overinvestment in the
transactio n relative to other transactions and by encouraging investment by
high-bracket taxpayers relative to low-bracket taxpayers. The first effect
occurs because the after-tax yield on the transaction will be higher than
similar transactions where the yield is taxed currently. The second effect
occurs because as the tax benefit becomes capitalized in the price of the
investment, the pre-tax yield on the investment drops. As the pre-tax yield
on the investment drops, it becomes less attractive to lower-bracket taxpayers.48 Thus , the existence of investments for which there is expected
deferral leads to an inefficient allocation of resources. 49
The efficiency consequences of unanticipated deferral differ from
the efficiency consequences of anticipated deferral. First, consider unanticipated deferral assuming that there is no timing option. 50 In the
absence of the timing option, the effect of unanticipated deferral is to lower
the effective tax rate on losses and gains equally. Reducing the effective
tax rate has the effect of increasing the variance of returns from the
transaction, without affecting the mean return. 51 In other words, it
increases the risk of the transaction relative to a fully taxed investment. 52
Consider again Example 2A in which Diva promises to pay David
$121 in two years in exchange for David's payment to Diva of either $100
7

47. See supra text accompanying notes 13-15.
48. Capitalization of tax benefits occurs in a variety of contexts. The classic example is taxexempt municipal bonds. In theory, because of their tax-free returns, the price of municipal i.Jonds is
bid up until, for the marginal investor, the after-tax yield on municipal bonds is equal to the after-tax
yield on al ternative investments . As a result, th e pre-tax yield is below the pre-tax yield on comparable
corporate investments. This, in tum, provides a disincentive for tax-exempt and low-bracket taxpayers
to invest in municipal bonds. To the extent that municipal bond yields are less than taxable yields, the
value of the tax benefit is passed from the holder of the bond to th e issuer. If the tax-free yield is equal
to the after-tax yield o n corporate bonds, all of the tax benefit is being captured by the issuer and the
holder receives no benefit. See Bittker, supra note 8, at 22-23. Historically, the benefit of the taxexemption has generally been split between the municipalities and high-bracket holders. See MICHAEL
J. GRAETZ, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES266 (2d ed. 1988).
49. An additional source of inefficiency may come from the effect of taxation of alternative
financial instruments on the choice of the financial structure of a business entity.
50. For example, assume that the UIX rules are such that any loss must be deferred until such time
as the gai n would otherwise be recognized.
51. Remember, the expected value of the deferral is zero. See supra note 14 and accompanying
text.
52. The risk borne by a taxable investor in an investment with unanticipated deferral is, however,
still less than the risk borne by a tax-exempt investor.
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or $ 142, based on an immediate coin toss. After th e co in toss, D i .:a will
have either an asset or a li ab ility worth approximately $ 17. 36. Under a
pure realization system with a thirty percent marg inal rate, Diva would be
liable for a tax of (or wou ld receive a refund of) $6.30 in two years . In
present value terms, she would have an after-tax gain or los s of $12 . 15 .53
Under a full accrual system , however, she would have an after-tax gain or
loss of o nl y $ 11.20. 54 Because the deferral is unanticipated, under both
a pure realization and a full accrual system , the expected after-tax value is
zero. 55 T he difference is in the range of the outcomes. In other wo rds,
the di fference in the tax reg imes affects the r isk inherent in the transaction,
but not the expected return. By increasing the risk, a pure deferral system
wo uld be likely to decrease the demand for such transactions. 56
O nce the timing option is considered , the effect of unantici pated
deferral is more significant. The timing option operates through its
differential effect on losses and gains. 57 For instance, in Example 3A th e
tax benefit of a loss on the bet is $5.21 while (in present value terms) the
tax cost of a win on the bet is only $4.31 .58 T he expected tax payment

53. $12.15 = ($21.00- $6. 30) 7 (I+ .!OJ.
54 . Th e afte r-ta x value is determined by discounting at the 10 % discount rate her payments
(refund s) of tax and her receipts (payments) on the bet. It assumes that a tax wou ld be payable
immedi ately on the gain (loss) and at one-yea r interval s the reafter. The following table shows the va lu e
of the contract at each period-assuming a win-and the resulting tax liability.

I

Yea r

II

I

Value

I

Income

T ax Liability

0

$17.36

$17 .36

$5.2 1

I

19.09

1.73

0.52

2

2 1.00

1.91

0 .57

I

The aft er-tax present value of the co ntra ct is th e present value of th e payment under th e
contract minus the present valu e of th e tax liab ilities. Thus, und er a full accrual system the after-tax
present value would be:

$11.20

=

$17.36 - $5.21 -

0 52
$ ·
(1 + .10)

$0.57
(1 + .10)2

55. See supra notes 14- 15 and accompanying text.
56. The demand for risky transactio ns w ill depend on the level of risk aversion a nd the correl ation
between the ri sks in the transaction and oth er ri sks in the economy. T o th e extent th at a particular
risky transacti on can be used to hedge other risks , enteri ng into such transactions may lo wer th e overall
level of ri sk in th e economy.
57. See supra text accompanying notes 37-39 (noting that a taxpayer will have an inc entive to
accelerate losses but defer gains).
58. See supra note 40. Th ese amounts are the tax benefit and cost of the loss o r ga in at the tim e
of the coin toss. Because the payment is deferred, there w ill be additiona l gain if the bet is held to
maturity and, consequ ently , add itiona l tax cost. Similarly, th ere will be additional interest expense if
the loss is funded out of borrowing.
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is, therefore, -$0.45. 59 Absent taxes the expected value of the bet is
zero. With taxes, the expected value of the bet is $0.45, the tax savings.
Note that $0.45 is the expected value to each side of the bet. What has
started out as a zero-sum game has become a positive-sum game, with the
fisc providing the ante . The availability of the timing option is equivalent
to a direct subsidy for such activities and, in general, leads to an inefficiently large amount of investment in activities that provide a timing option. 60
The value of the timing option increases with the va riance in the
return on the transaction, that is, with risk. Obviously, if there is no
variance in the return, any deferral is fully anticipated and there is no
timing option. As the variance increases, the potential gain and the
resulting deferral increase, and, therefore, the value of the timing option
increases. 61 A timing option, therefore, increases investment in risky
activities. 62
The value of the timing option also increases with the ratio between
the maximum holding period of the investment given a gain and the
minimum holding period given a loss. 63 For instance, in Example 2 there
is no time between the determination of the amount of gain or loss (the
coin toss) and the necessary realization of any gain (the payment under the
transaction). Accordingly, there is no timing option. On the other hand ,
in Example 2A there is a two-year period between the coin toss and the
payment, permitting a two-year difference between gains and losses. Thus,
the timing option encourages investment in transactions in which gains can
be held for long periods of time while losses can be realized quickly.
The efficiency consequences of permitting straddle transactions
derive primarily from the transaction costs of the straddle transactions.
Since the essence of a straddle transaction is a perfectly balanced position,
a straddle involves no 11et investment and no risk. Thus, straddles will not
59. -$0.45 = ($4 .31- $5.21) X .50 chance.
60. Cf. Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Govemment Policy: A
Comparison with Direct Governm ent Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705, 725 (I 970) (noting that tax
incentives constitute subsidies which "push or pull in unneutral directions").
61. The relatio nship between the value of the timing option and risk is equivalent to the fact that ,
all else equal, the value of an option increases with the variance in the underlying prices. See JOHN
C. COX & MARK RUBINSTEIN, OPTIONS MARKETS 217,219 (1985).
62. Of course, there are other aspects of tax law , such as the Jack of refundability of losses and
the capital loss limitation, that tend to discourage investment in risky assets. See, e.g., GRAETZ, supra
note 49, at 678 (1988) (arguing that "[t]he limitations on the deducti on of capital losses . . . actually
discourages risky investments"). It is unclear whether the net effect of the tax code is to encourage
or discourage risk .
63. For example, a gain on a three-month cash-settlement forward contract can be deferred for at
most three months, while the gain on a long position in stock can be held open indefinitely. Deferring
the payment of taxes o n gains for extended periods of time will increase the value of the timing op ti on
to the extent that losses may be recog nized without deferral.
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generally have the effect of encouraging misallocation of resources by
virtue of the substance of the transactions. Nevertheless , substantial
resources may be expended in promoting, entering into, and managing
straddle transactions. Additionally, by reducing tax revenues, straddles
require additional taxes to be levied on other transactions. 64
Such
replacement taxes will generate additional inefficiencies. Thus, although
the direct efficiency costs of straddles are small, the indirect costs are
significant.

E.

Equity Consequences

Deferral has significant equity as well as efficiency consequences.
In general, the seriousness of the consequences will depend on the extent
to which market prices respond to the presence of deferral.
Consider first anticipated deferral, and assume that market prices
have not responded to the deferraL In other words, assume that the pre-t<Lx
yield on the investment with deferral is equal to the pre-tax yield on a
similar investment without deferral. Without price adjustment the deferral
will, as discussed above, lead to a lower effective tax rate and a higher
after-tax rate of return to holders of investments with deferral as compared
to holders of similar investments without deferral. The divergence between
economic income and taxable income has both horizontal and vertical
equity consequences. Principles of horizontal equity are violated because
taxpayers with equal economic income and thus presumably equal ability
to pay are taxed differently depending on whether the income is derived
from financial instruments that have anticipated deferral or from other
sources that are not tax-favored . 65 Principles of vertical equity are
violated to the extent that such instruments are not evenly distributed

64. As part of the Economic Recove ry Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 26 U .S.C.), Congress has enacted a series of provisions intended
to reduce the availability of tax straddles. These provisions include: l.R.C. § 263(g) (1988) (allowing
no deduction for interest and carrying charges of a straddle); id. § I 092(a)(2) (allowing loss deferral
when one leg of a straddle is disposed of); id. § 1256 (using mark-to-market accounting for certain
contracts); see also infra text accompanying notes 161-75 (describing the current restrictions on tax
straddles). At the time of the legislation , the Joint Committee on Taxation estimated that the revenue
gain from the entire package of tax straddle rules was approximately $2.4 billion for the period June
23, 1981 through December 31, 1986. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 97TH CONG., !ST
SESS., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE EcONOMIC RECOVERY TAX ACT OF 1981, at 381 (Comm. Print
1981) (Table: Summary of Estimated Revenue Effects of the Economic Recovery Act of 1981 (H.R.
4242) , Calendar Years 1981-1986). The revenue estimate for fiscal years 1981 through 1986 was
approximately $1.7 billion. !d. at 380 (Table: Summary of Estimated Revenue Effects of the Econo mi c
Recovery Act of 1981 (H.R. 4242), Fiscal Years 1981-1986). David Burnham estimates that
commodity tax straddles were costing the government $3 to $4 billion a year in lost revenue. DAVID
BURNHAM, A LAW UNTO ITSELF: POWER, POLITICS, AND THE IRS 214 (1989).
65. See GRAETZ, supra note 48, at 17 (describing horizontal equity as treating equally thos e with
equa l ability to pay).
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throughout income classes. 66 Even without considering the bias introduced by preferential taxation, it would seem reasonable to assume that
higher income individuals are likely to receive a greater proportion of their
income from financial instruments than are lower income individuals .
The foregoing as sumes that markets have not adjusted to the
existence of the anticipated deferral. The analysis changes dramatically if
the market has adjusted to take into account the benefit of deferral.
Ass ume that th e entire tax benefit has been capitalized into the price of the
in vestment. 67 In that case, the after-tax yield on the investment is the
same as the after-tax yield on alternative investments without anticipated
deferral. 68 Accordingly, a ho lder of the tax-favored instrument is, on an
after-tax basis, treated no better than a holder of an instrument that is not
tax-favored, and , consequently, there is no violation of equity considerations.69
In summary, the degree of inequity that flows from
anticipated deferral depends on the degree to which the market is able to
adjust to the existence of the deferral. 70
The equity implications of unanticipated deferral are different from
those of anticipated deferral. To begin with, consider the effect of
unanticipated deferral in the absence of the timing option. Unanticipated
deferral differs from anticipated deferral in that the expected value of the
deferral is zero. 71 As a result, the market price cannot adjust to reflect
the deferral. 72 Accordingly, the market cannot be relied on to reduce

66. See id. (describing vertical equity as a concern for fairness requiring persons with greater
ability to pay higher taxes).
67. See supra note 48 for a general discussion of the capitalization of tax benefits.
68. Note that the capitalization of tax deferral into the price of the instrument compensates the
party to the transaction with the expected loss as well as imposing an implicit tax on the party to the
transaction with the expected income. The amount of the compensation will be correct only if the
ho lder faces the same tax rate that is implicit in the market capitalization. For a general discussion of
the market ' s ability to impose a sub stitute tax on parties to transactio ns with expected deferral , see
Daniel I. Halperin , Interest in Disguise: Taxing th e "Tim e Value of Money , • 95 YALE L.J. 506 (1986).
69. While there may be no actual benefit to the ho lder of the tax-favored instrument, there may
be an appearance of a benefit that may be as destructive to the tax system as an actual benefit. !d. at
511 n.21.
70. The degree to which the market will actually adjust is a complex question turning o n a variety
of factors, including the relative imp ortance of taxable and non-taxable players in the market. To the
extent that all market participants were ta xable at the same rate, it would be surprising if the market
did not quickly adjust. To the extent that there are significant market participants, both on the demand
and supply side, wh o have lower or zero tax rates, the degree of adjustment becomes much more
uncertain.
71. See supra text accompanying notes 50-56 (explaining that unanticipated deferral increases the
variance in the expected returns fro m an instrument but does not add value to the instrument when it
is executed).
72. It is possible that the market will adjust somewhat to reflect the increased after-tax risk
inh erent in the transacti ons. It is diffi cult, however, to predict the directi o n of any such adjustment.
See supra note 56 and accompanying text (arguing that unanticipated defe rral increases the variance of
outcomes, which increases the risk of the transactio n, but that it is unclear how the mark et will adjust
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inequity. On the other hand , because the expected value of deferral is
zero, the expected tax rate on the income (or loss) is the same as the
statutory rate. Accordingly, on an ex ante basis, no equity concern is
raised. 73 On an ex post basis, however, the holder of an instrument with
unanticipated deferral is taxed at an effective rate less than the statutory
rate .74 The question is then raised whether we should be concerned with
ex post fairness or only ex ante fairness. In the extreme, it is unlikely that
we would be content with a system where ex post effective tax rates
diverged vastly from ex ante rates. For example, consider a tax system
where all investments in corporate stock were taxed based on the average
yield of ali corporate stock, rather than on the actual performance of the
taxpayer's stock holding. While such a system is arguably fair on an ex
ante basis, it is unlikely that it would be thought of as acceptable from an
equity point of view. 75 Assuming this intuition is correct, it would
suggest that we tend to think of equity more on an ex post basis than an ex
ante basis .76

to the increased risk) .
73. As a practical matter, even if the sole policy concern is ex ante fairness, a policy of current
taxation of gains or losses, whether anticipated or unanticipated, is likely to enhance fairness because
it will capture instances of anticipated gain or loss that have been misclassified as unanticipated gain
or loss.
74. In the case of a deferred gain, the holder is undertaxed, and in the case of a deferred loss , the
holder is overtaxed. In either case, the problem is that the effective rate is too low.
75. The system would be unfair on an ex post basis because ·although each taxpayer would be
taxed on the same amount (the average yield of all corporate stock), the system would fail to account
for inevitable differences in the gains or losses of each taxpayer's po rtfolio. As described, such a
system would also be unfair on an ex ante basis because it would fail to take into account the relative
risk of different corporations. One can imagine, however. correcting the proposed system to account
for ri sk. Even such a corrected approach is unlikely to be perceived as fair.
76. Professor Michael J. Graetz , in discussing a possible consumption tax , has argued strenuously
that equity must be viewed on an ex post basis:
[A]n ex ante approach to taxation requires a major restructuring of the classic
conceptions of tax equity. Ho rizontal equity , the most widely accepted notion of
fairness in taxation, requires that persons in similar circumstances pay similar
amounts of tax. Although the tax literature is replete with disputes over whether
"similar" or "different" circumstances are being compared, the noti on th at similar
circumstances should be evaluated ex ante in present value terms seems quite a
radical departure. Regardless of the precise contours of the definiti on of income
or consumption, it seems clear that horizontal equity must be an ex post concept.
Circumstances should be considered as similar only after results are known; iucky
gamblers are not the same as unlucky gamblers.
An ex ante approach is even mo re troubling with reference to the vertical
equity criterion. . . . Certainly , if one accepts a vertical equity criterion which
relates the distribution of the tax burden to "ability to pay," ex post rather than ex
ante circumstances would be relevant.
Graetz, st<pra note 4, at 1600-0 I (footnotes omitted)One could , however, argue the other way . For example, as a matter of horizontal equity,
consider two persons each of whom was permitted to choose a certain salary of $50,000 or a risky
salary of eith er $20,000 or $80,000, depending on the profitability of the business. It could be argued
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In summary, unanticipated deferral generally produces a timing
option that raises additional equity concerns. The existence of the timing
option alters the nature of unanticipated deferral. Absent the timing option,
the expected tax benefit of unanticipated deferral is zero. Given the timing
option, however, the expected value of unanticipated deferral is positive. 77
Moreover, it is positive for both sides of the transaction. As a result, in
general, the market price will not reflect the tax benefit. 78 Therefore, the

that given their equality of opportunity, it is fair to demand an equal contribution to the federal
government.
The current Code takes a mixed approach. The basic mle is Ll-)at income is determined on
an ex post basis. Thus, for example, individuals are taxed on actual salary, not on some average or
expected salary. On the other hand, income on zero~coupon bonds is taxed on an expected basis, with
a catch~up (in nominal, but not present value, terms) at maturity. l.R.C. §§ 1271~1274 (1988).
Congress has recently considered expected versus actual outcomes in the area of annuities.
Under § 72, each payment under an annuity is divided into a portion representing income and a portion
representing a non~taxable return of capital using a fixed ratio based on the expected life of an
annuitant. l.R.C. § 72(b) (1988). Until 1986, an annuitant who lived longer than expected continued
to exclude a fixed portion of the annuity despite the fact that she had already recovered her entire
investment in the contract. On the other hand, an annuitant who died prematurely was not permitted
to take a loss for her unrecovered basis. Thus, annuitants recovered their capital correctly (in total
amount, not as a timing matter) on an ex ante or expected basis, but not on an ex post or actual basis.
As part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, § 72 was amended to provide that an annuitant who died
prematurely could take a loss equal to her unrecovered basis and an annuitant who lived longer than
expected could no longer recover more than her initial investment. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub.
L. No. 99~514, § 1122(c)(2), 100 Stat. 2467. With some apparent irony, Professor Graetz has
suggested that the change was undesirable. GRAETZ, supra note 48, at 210 ("It is extremely difficult
to discern any good reason for this 1986 change in policy.").
In contrast to annuities, term life insurance is taxed approximately correctly on an ex ante
basis, but incorrectly on an ex post basis. In general, term life insurance premiums are non~deductible,
and the proceeds of term life insurance are not included in income. l.R.C . § 10l(a)(1) (1988).
Assuming that the expected payment under a term life contract is equal to the premiums, the current
system of taxation is essentially equivalent to permitting a deduction for the premiums and including
as an offsetting amount the expected payment under the poi icy, which is correct on an ex ante basis.
On the other hand, after the expiration of the term of the insurance, the policy holder has either
survived or not. If he has survived, he should be entitled to a deduction for the premiums paid . If he
has not, he (or his estate or beneficiary) should be taxed on the net insurance proceeds. Thus, the
current taxation of term insurance is consistent with an ex ante, but not with an ex post approach. Of
course, it is easy to justifY the exclusion of life insurance proceeds from income for reasons other than
the non~ deductibility of premiums-sympathy for widows and orphans ranks high on the list.
77. Strnad offers a computation of the effect of the timing option on asset values. See Strnad,
supra note 6, at 1883 (providing a table of marginal tax rates and corresponding calculated
"proportion[s] of asset value attributable to timing option") .
78. To the extent that the benefit to one side of the transaction is capitalized in the price of the
transaction, the benefit to the other side of the transaction is increased . Moreover, the benefit to the
other side of the transaction becomes one of anticipated deferral, not just the timing option. To see this
outcome, consider a minor variant on Example 2A. In Example 2A, Diva promises to pay David $121
in exchange for a 50-50 chance at either $100 or $142. If Diva was forced to pay, for example, $125
to reflect the benefit of the timing option, the expected value of the payoff to David would be $4,
instead of zero. Thus, David would have income at the time the bet was entered into of approximately
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timing option raises questions of ex ante equity because certain types of
mcome are treated more favorably than others on an expected value
basis. 79
As an ex post matter, the equity consequences turn on whether the
holder of the instrument is a loser or a winner. If she is a loser, she will
realize her loss immediately and be taxed at the statutory rate on the loss.
If she is a winner (i.e., she has a gain on the transaction), she will choose
to defer the gain and secure the value of the deferral. In other words, a
loser will be taxed correctly on the loss; a winner wiil be undertaxed on
the gain.
Of the problems with deferral discussed above, the most serious
horizontal and vertical equity concerns are raised by straddles. 80 Pure
deferral and the timing option merely reduce the effective rate of tax on the
specific transaction, but straddles permit deferral of taxation on unrelated
income. 81

$3.31 (the present value of $4). Under a pure realization approach, however, David would not be
taxed on that income until the time of the payoff. Thus, David would h!!ve: (I) the advantage of the
timing option on the basic bet; (2) an additional receipt of $4; and (3) deferral of the tax due on the
receipt of the $4.
79. Note that a system of pure ex ante taxation (with no correction upon realization) would
eliminate the timing option and tax straddles . Even conceding that equity should generally be viewed
on an ex post basis, it is theoretically possible that the advantages of pure ex ante taxati on would
outweigh the equity advantage of ex post taxation. lt is unlikely, however, that in most contexts a pure
ex ante approach would be politically or administratively acceptable. In particular, a pure ex ante
app roach places too much reliance on estimates of future income that are inherently unreliable and
subject to abuse outside of narrow contexts like annuities and life insurance. See supra note 76
(discussing conceptions of equity under ex ante and ex post approaches for annuities and life insurance).
80. This statement is meant to cover only deviations from a full accrual system that are discussed
in this Article . There are other provisions in the tax law that rai se equally serious equity concerns.
For example, the step up in ba sis at death, I.R .C . § 1014 (1988), has long been cited as one of the
most serious loopholes in the tax code. See, e.g., SIMONS, supra note 5, at 212 (proposing that gai n
shou ld be taxed at death). While Simons recognized the importance of taxing gains at death, he did
not recognize the importance of loss limitations to deal with the timing option and straddles. See id.
("Full deduction should be allowed for all realized capital losses . . . . " (emphasis in original)).
In addition, the most serious distortions often come from a combination of provisions. For
example, in a pure realization system with perfect capital markets, the combination of deferral on
capital gains, a current interest deduction , and the step up in basis at death can be used to insure that
no taxes are paid o n any income. See Stiglitz , Some Aspects, supra note 37, at 262-65 (demonstrating
how one can avoid paying any tax given the above conditions); see also Stiglitz, 11re General11reory,
supra note 3 7, at 326-28 (discussing methods of tax avoidance). Strnad discusses the interaction of the
timing option with the step up in basis at death. See Strnad, supra nOie 6, at 1883 n.l91.
81. Any deviation from economic measurement of income arising from a transaction is magnified
to the extent that the taxpayer is able to leverage her investment in the transaction. While this problem
of tax arbitrage is beyond the scope of this Article, it should be noted that, to the extent that economic
income is correctly measured, there is generally no need to restrict leverage o r, mo re particularly, the
interest deduction. Most of the Internal Revenue Code restrictions on the deductibility of interest arise
out of the failure to tax economic income. The following cha rt offers some examples .
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In this Part, I discuss a variety of ways in which the current taJc law
deal s with deferral and related prob lems. 82
A.

JS

Restrictions on Anticipated Deferral

In the area of financial products, the tax law's response to deferral
varied and complex, 83 and often differs depending , among other

Interest Restrictions Responding to Tax Arbitrage

~<em•l R'"'""' Cod<
I

I

II

Nature of Limitation

Ju stification

§ 163 CdJ

Investment interest

Failure to accrue income on
investments

§ 163(h)(l )

Perso nal interest

Failure to tax imputed inco me
on consumer durables

§ 263(g)

Interest cost of carrying a
straddle

Failure to accrue income to
other parts of the straddle

§ 263A(f)

Uniform ca pitalization rul es

Failure to accrue inco me on
self-produced assets

§ 264(a)(2)

Interest on debt to carry
certain annuity contracts

Failure to properly accrue
income on annuity contracts

§ 265(a)(2)

Interest on debt to carry taxexempt obligations

Failure to tax income o n taxexempt ob ligations

§ 469

Passive interest

Failure to properly determine
income on passive activities
(e.g., accele rated depreciati o n)

§ 1277

Interest expense of carrying
market discount bonds

Failure to accrue market discount

§ 1282

Interest expense of carrying
certain short-term bonds

Failure to accrue discount o n
certain short-term obliga ti o ns

I

I

For a more complete discussion of tax arbitrage, see generally Stanley A. Koppelman, Tax Arbitrage
and th e Interest D eduction, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1146 (1988); David J. Shakow, Confronting the
Problem of Tax Arbitrage, 43 TAX L. REV . I (1987).
82. The following description of current law is not meant to be exhaustive either in the sense of
covering all provisions of the federal income tax laws affecting deferral or in the sense of fully
describing those provisions mentioned. Rather, the description is intended to illustrate the effect of
deviatio ns from a pure realization model on the problems discussed above. Additionally, by noting that
a particular provision has the effect of restricting deferral, I do not necessarily mean to suggest that the
drafters of the provision had such an int ent, only that the provision has such an effect .
83 . See, e.g., Halperin, supra note 68 , at 519-24 (discuss ing defe rred payme nts of compensation
a nd the tax law's imp osi tion of a matching requirement to p reve nt !2x avoidance).
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facto rs, on whether the deferral is anticipated or unanticip ated and the
extent to which the payments are certain or uncertain .84 Although it is
difficult to generalize, to the extent that the payments are certain , the tax
law often requires accrual of the expected income .SS Correspondingly,
when the payment is uncertain , the tax law generally defers recognition at
least until the time the uncertainty is resolved. 86
1. Treatment of Noncontingent Payments Under the OlD
Rules.- The primary example of the treatment of deferral with certainty is
the treatment of debt instruments providing for fixed payments under the
original iss ue discount ("OlD ") and related rules. 87 Under these rules,
the holder of an OlD instrument is generally required to accrue income on

84 . By certainty I am referring to the payments as determined und er the terms of the relevant
contract. I am not referring to cred it risk. It is, of co urse, possible to view credit risk as creating a
co ntingency in the same manner as a SUited contingency, but generally this approach is not taken und er
current law . See, e.g., I.R. C. § 1273 (a) (1988) (stating that the amount of orig inal issue discount that
must be acc rued is based o n the stated redempti on pric e of maturity, which is defined by reference to
the amount specifi ed und er the debt instrument, without regard to credit risk); Prop. Treas. Reg.
§ l.l 275-4(b)(i ) , 51 Fed. Reg. 12020, 12087 (1986) ("A payment [under a debt instrument] shall not
be considered a co ntingent payment merely because the amount of or the liability for the payment may
be imp aired by insolvency or default."); I.R.C . § 585(c) (1988) (stating that large banks are not
permitted a reserve fo r bad debts). But cf I.R. C. § 163(e)(5) (Supp. II 1990) (denying credito rs a
deductio n for a portion of the original issue di scount on certain ob ligations with a yield in excess of
the applicable federal rate plus five pe rcentag e points); I.R.C. § 585(a) (1988) (stating th at small ba nks
are permitted a bad debt rese rve based on experience) .
85 . The term "expected income" is used loosely . At best, e xpectations will have to be based o n
objective ma rket factors and w ill often have to be determined using significant approximations. As
discussed below, a prime examp le of the requirement to accrue expected inc ome is the original issue
discount rule s. More generally, acc ru al basis taxpayers are required to accrue expected receipts of
income when such amounts can be determined with reasonable accuracy. See Treas. Reg . § !.446l(c)(l)(ii) (as amended in 1987) (" Ge nerally, under an accrual meth od, inco me is to be included fo r
the ta xab le year when all the events have occu rred which fix the right to receive such inc ome and the
amo unt thereof can be determined with reasonable accuracy."); see also Treas. Reg . §§ 1.451-l (a) (as
amended in 1978); !.461-l (a)(2) (as a mend ed in 1967) .
86. A prime example of the failure to accrue uncertain expected inc ome is th e treatment of
contingent interest und er th e OlD rules. Se e infra section IV(A) (2). The generalizations in the text
of this Article deal with the ta xation of fin ancial instruments, but this is not the o nly applicab le arena.
See Halp erin , supra note 68, at 519-24 (d iscussing the issue of deferral outside of the fin ancial products
area) . In particular, Hal perin shows how th e tax code deals with the problem of deferred and
accelerated payments through a combination of direct, indirect, and sub stitute taxation. See id . at 51539 (a naly zi ng accelerated payments, deferred payments, and premature accruals, and weighing the
approp riateness of three methods accounting for this investment inc ome: direct ta xati on by imputing
interest, indirect taxation by denying an otherwise allowable deduction, and substitute ta xa tion by
denying a substitute party a deduction for interest).
87. The OlD rul es are contained in I.R .C. §§ 1271-1275 (1988) (discussing the treatment of the
hold er); id. § ! 63 (e) (S upp . II 1990) (di scussi ng th e treatment of the issuer) ; id. § l63(e)(5) (discussing
the special rules for high-y ield ob ligati ons). Related rules include l.R.C. §§ 1276-1278 (1988)
(di scussi ng the treatment of market di scount) ; id. §§ 1281 - 1283 (di sc ussing th e treatme nt of short-term
ob ligations); id. § 1286 (d iscu ssi ng the treatment of st ripp ed bonds).
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a daily basis , 88 and the issuer is required to accrue a corresponding item
of expense. 89 The amount to be accrued with respect to each period is
determined under a constant y ield methodology. Under this approach, a
single yield is determined for the instrument, and income is presumed to
accrue based on that yield. 'X)
For instance, in Example 1 where Diva pays David $ 100 tod ay in
exch ange for $ 121 in two years, Diva would be required to acc rue the $21
of income over the two-year period . In the example, the yield on the
instrument is ten percent. 9 1 Therefore , Diva would be required to accrue
$10 in the first year and $11 in the second year. 92
The taxation of such an investment can be viewed as taxing
expected income on the assumption that interest rates will remain constant
throughout the life of the instrument. 93 In other words, if interest rates
remain constant at ten percent, the investment will be worth $110 in one
year. Under a full accntal system , Diva would be taxed on the $ l0
increase in value. Thus, the OlD rules are equivalent to a full accrual
system under the constant yield assumption.
To the extent that interest rates change or otherwise diverge from
the constant yield assumption, actual income will diverge from expected
income as will the amount of income under the OlD rules relative to a full
accrual system. For example, assume that by the end of the first year the
interest rate has dropped from ten percent to five percent. In that case, the
value of the investment will be approximately $115 at the end of the first
year. Diva will have earned $15 of income, not the $10 on which she is
being taxed. 94

88 . l.R.C. § 1272(a)(l) (1 988).
89 . !d. § 163 (e) (Supp . II 1990) .
90 . !d. § 1272(a)(3) (1988).
91 . Assuming an annual accrual pe riod, the y ield may be determined by solvi ng fo r r in th e
following equatio n:

$100

$121

so

r -

~

121 - 1 - 10%.
100

92. In the lang uage of th e OlD rules, the issue price of the obligation would be $100 and the stated
redemption price at maturity w ould be $121. See l.R .C . § 1273 (1988). There would th erefore be $21
in orig inal issue discount, and th e yield to maturity would be 10 %. See id . The OlD for the first
accru al period would be the issue price times the yield to maturity, or $10 . Th e adju sted issue price
would then be the issue price plus the OlD fo r the acc rual period, or $110. The OID fo r the second
(and final) period w ould be th e adjusted issue price times the yield, or $11.
93 . Mo re precisely, the OlD rules are consistent with ta xing expected income if, as of th e time
of issuance , th ere is a level y ield curve over the relevant term and then , w ithin th at term, th e yield
curve is expected to remain co nstant. See infra text ac companying note 311.
94. Alternatively, if interest rates have increased to 15 %, th e valu e of the investment will be
app rox imately $ 105 and th e proper inco me accrual would be approxi mately $5 .
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Thus, even in the most basic case of debt instruments that provide
for a predetermined fixed stream of payments , the OID rules tax on the
basis of expected income, not actual income. As a result, in the case of
noncontingem debt, the OID rules solve the problem of anticipated
deferral, but do not solve the problems of unanticipated deferral and the
timing option.
2.
Treatment of Contingencies Under the OlD Rules.- Where
payments under a debt instrument are contingent, the OID rules are
considerably less successful at accruing even expected income. Until
recently, in the case of debt instruments issued for cash or publicly traded
property, the contingent interest rules were divided into two parts. 95 The
first set of rules governed instruments under which the total noncontingent
payments (regardless of whether designated as interest or principal) are
equal to or greater than the overall issue price of the instrument (the
"Paragraph (e)" rules). 96 The second set of rules governed instruments
under which the total noncontingent payments are less than the issue price
(the "Paragraph (f)" rules) .97
Under the Paragraph (e) rules, an instrument is divided into its
noncontingent and contingent parts. 98 The noncontingent payments are
then treated as a separate debt instrument with an issue price equal to the
issue price of the overall debt instrument. 99 The contingent payments are
treated as interest in the taxable year in which they become fixed. 100 In
other words, none of the issue price is allocated to the contingent payments, thereby minimizing the amount of income accrued with respect to
the noncontingent payments. At the same time, the contingent payments
are not accrued until they become fixed.

95. Prop . Treas. Reg.§ 1.!275-4(e)-(f), 51 Fed. Reg. 12022, 12090-94 (1986). The proposed
regulations provide for an entirely different set of rules when the only contingency is that the interest
payments are based on a qualified variable rate. Such variable rate debt instruments are essentially
taxed on an expected value basis. See Ui. § 1.1275-5, 51 Fed. Reg. 12094 (1986) (providing rules for
the treatment of variable interest payments); U1. § 1.1275-4(b)(l), 51 Fed. Reg. 12087 (1986)
(providing that qualified variab le payments of interest are not treated as contingent payments). Where
contingent debt instruments are issued for nonpublicly traded property, the instruments are governed
by id. § 1.1275-4(c)-(d), 51 Fed. Reg. 12087-90 (1986).
96. !d.§ 1.1275-4(e), 51 Fed. Reg. 12090-92 (1986).
97. !d. § I. 1275-4(f), 51 Fed . Reg. 12092-94 (1986) . The differences between the Paragraph (e)
and the Paragraph (f) rules are more apparent than real. In particular, in the case of a debt instrument
where the noncontingent payments exactly equal the issue price of the instrument, both sets of rules
give precisely the same pattern of income accruals.
98. Jd. § 1.1275-4(e)(l), 51 Fed . Reg. 12090-91 (1986).
99. !d. § 1.1275-4(e)(2), 51 Red. Reg. 12091 (1986).
100. Id. § I . 1275-4(e)(3)(i), 51 Fed. Reg. 12091 (1986). If the contingent payment has become
fixed but is not due within six months, only the present value of the contingent payment is taken into
income. Id. § 1.1275-4(e)(3)(ii), 51 Fed. Reg. 12091 (1986). See infra Appendix C for a further
discussion of these rules.
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Under Paragraph (f), the instrument is again divided into noncontingent and contingent payments, but the contingent payments are treated
as a return of principal. 101 As each contingent payment becomes fixed ,
it is treated first as interest to the extent that interest would have accrued
on the instrument if it bore interest at the applicable federal rate and then
as principal to the extent of any remaining payment. 102
The proposed contingent interest rules were recently modified to
come closer to accruing expected income in certain circumstances (the
"Paragraph (g)" rules) . 103 The Paragraph (g) rules apply to any debt
instrument that (1) is issued for cash or publicly traded property; (2)
provides for noncontingent payments equal to or greater than the issue
price; and (3) provides for one or more contingent payments determined,
in whole or in part, by reference to the value of publicly traded stock,
securities, commodities, or other pub! icly traded property. 104 Under
Paragraph (g), as with Paragraph (e), the instrument is first divided into
noncontingent and contingent payments, with the noncontingent payments
being treated as a separate noncontingent debt instrument. 105 Unlike
under Paragraph (e), the issue price of the overall instrument is allocated
between the noncontingent and contingent payments in proportion to their
respective fair market values. 106 Thus, at least with respect to the
noncontingent part of the instrument, the correct amount of income is
accrued. The contingent payments are then treated "in accordance with
their economic substance as payments pursuant to one or more options or
other property rights. " 107

101. Prop. Treas. Reg.§ 1.1275-4(f)(l), 51 Fed. Reg. 12022, 12092 (1986).
102. !d. § 1.1275-4(f)(2), 51 Fed. Reg. 12092 (1986). The total amount treated as principal is
limited to the issue price of the overall debt instrument. Once this limit has been reached, any
remaining contingent payments are treated entirely as interest. The ordering rule is reversed for
payments at maturity that are first treated as principal to the extent of unpaid principal and then treated
as interest. If, at maturity, less than the entire issue price has been accounted for, the holder of the
instrument is entitled to a loss to the extent of unrecovered principal. ld. § 1.1275-4(f)(3), 51 Fed.
Reg. 12092-93 (1986).
As with the Paragraph (e) rules, if a contingent payment is to be paid more than six months
after it becomes fixed, only the present value of the payment is taken into account when it becomes
fixed. !d.§ 1.1275-4(f)(2)(v), 51 Fed. Reg. 12092 (1986).
103. /d.§ 1.1275-4(g), 56 Fed. Reg. 8310-11 (1991).
104. !d.§ 1.1275-4(g)(1), 56 Fed. Reg. 8310 (1991).
105. !d . § 1.1275-4(g)(3), 56 Fed. Reg. 8311 (1991).
106. !d.
I 07. !d. § 1.1275-4(g)(4)(i), 56 Fed. Reg. 8311 ( 1991 ). One of the significant differences between
the Paragraph (e) (and Paragraph (f)) rules and the Paragraph (g) rules is that under the former, a debt
instrument is bifurcated solely for the purpose of determining the timing of income, while under the
latter, the bifurcation applies for purposes of character as well as timing. See id. § 1.1275-4(g)(5), 56
Fed. Reg. 8311 (1991) (providing an example of the application of the Paragraph (g) rules). The
question of character is more acute than it might have once been because of the Supreme Court's
decision in Arkansas Best Corp. v. Commissioner, 485 U.S. 212 (1988). Prior to Arkansas Best, it
is lik ely that, at least from the borrower's point of view , gain or loss would have been ordinary under
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To see the difference between the Paragraph (e) and the Paragraph
(g) mles , consider their application to Example 3. In Example 3, Diva
pays David $100 today in exchange for David's prom ise to pay Diva $142
or $100 in two years, depending on the toss of a coin at that time.
Ass uming that the obligation would be treated as a debt instrument, it
would be viewed as an obligation with a principal amount of $100 and
co ntingent interest of either $0 or $42. 108 Under Paragraph (e), the
instrument would be bifurcated into a noncontingent and contingent
instrument. The noncontingent instrument would have an issue price of
$ 100 and a stated redemption price at maturity of $100 and, therefore,
would be treated as having no original issue discount. As a result, no
income would accrue and the $100 payment at maturity would be treated
as a return of basis . With respect to the contingent payment, no income
would accrue on the obi igation until the amount of the contingency was
fixed. 109 Therefore, Diva would not be required to accrue any income
until the end of the two years. At that time, if she won the coin toss she
would take the $42 into income as interest, and if she lost the coin toss she
would have no gain or loss. 110 In general, when payments under a debt
instrument are contingent, the Paragraph (e) rules fail to accrue expected
income. 111
As an alternative, assume that the contingency in Example 3 is
determined by reference to the value of publicly traded property and that,
therefore, the Paragraph (g) rules apply. Under Paragraph (g), the $100
issue price of the debt instrument would be divided between the noncontin-

an expansive reading of the Com Products doctrine. See Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. Commissioner, 350
U.S. 46, 50 (1955) (holding that the company's futures transactions "were vitally important to the
company's business as a form of insurance against increases in ... price," so the gain and loss derived
from them was ordinary). After Ark£msas Best, it is far more likely that gain or loss would be capital.
See Arkansas Best, 485 U.S . at 217 ("The broad definition of the term 'capital asset' explicitly makes
irrelevant any consideration of the property's co nnection with the taxpayer's business . . . . ");see also
Edward D. Kleinbard & Suzanne F . Greenberg, Business Hedg es After Arkansas Best, 43 TAX L. REV.
393, 414-40 (1988) (comparing the decisions of Arkansas Best and Com Products).
The magnitude of the problem from the issuer's point of view may, however, be overstated.
If the issuer ha5 fully hedged the risk on the imbedded derivative product using nonimbedded derivative
products, any gain or loss on the imbedded derivative products will be offset by gain or loss on the
nonimbedded derivative products. Accordingly, the character of the gain or loss will be irrelevant.
108. See Prop. Treas . Reg.§ 1.1275-4(b), 51 Fed. Reg. 12022, 12087 (1986).
109. See id . § 1.1275-4(e)(3)(i), 51 Fed. Reg . 12091 (1986).
110. ld.
Ill. While in general the contingent imerest rules defer expected income, there are instances
where they accelerate expected income. In particular, when the contingency is resolved currently, but
relates to future periods, the contingent interest rules accelerate the accrual of income. This point is
discussed further in Appendix C.
While the OlD rules do not generally require or permit accrual based on the expected
amounts of contingent payments, the rules do provide for accrual based on the expected time of
payments where the timing of such payments is uncertain. See infra Appendix C.
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gent promise to pay $100 and the contingent promise to pay either $0 or
$42 . The fair market value of the right to receive $100 in two years is
approximately $83 112 and the fair market value of the right to receive the
contingent payment is approximately $17. 113 Therefore, the holder of the
instrument would be treated as if she had paid $83 for the right to receive
$100 in two years, plus $17 for the right to receive the contingent payment
of $42. She would then be required to accrue $17 of original issue
discount with respect to the noncontingent instrument.
The contingent instrument would be treated as an option with an
issue price of $17 and a payoff of either $0 or $42. No accrual would be
required with respect to this option. 114 At maturity, if she received $142,
she would have an additional $25 of income on the option, and if she
received $100, she would have a loss of $17. 115 Thus, under the Paragraph (g) rules some but not all of the expected income is required to be
accrued. 116

3.

Treatment of Anticipated Deferral Outside the OlD Rules.-In
the case of financial products not covered by the OlD rules, taxpayers are
generally not required to accrue expected income because taxation of the
products is governed by the realization requirement. 117 For example, in
the case of an option, neither the purchaser nor the seller of the option has
income prior to the exercise or expiration of the option. 118 This failure

112. $83 == $1001 (1+.1W.
113. Assuming that there is an equal probability of receiving either $0 or $42, the future value of
the right is $21. The present value is approximately $17.
114. See infra note 118 for a discussion of the treatment of an option.
115. Her loss would be equal to the amount of her basis allocated to the contingency.
116. Under the Paragraph (g) rules , she is required to accrue $17 of income. Her expected
income over the term of the bet is $21. See supra text accompanying note 25.
117. See supra text accompanying notes 1-2.
118. In general, the purchaser of an option to purchase property (a call option) is required to
capitalize the premium, thus resulting in no items of income or deduction from the initial purchase of
the option. The purchaser is not required to accrue any income, nor is she permitted to accrue any
deductions while she holds the option. If the option expires worthless, she is permitted a loss at that
time. If she exercises the option, she recognizes no gain or loss and takes a basis in the property
purchased equal to the option premium plus the strike price (the price paid above the initial cost of the
option). The seller of the option treats the initial receipt of a premium as an open transaction. If the
option is later exercised, the premium, along with the strike price, is treated as part of the saie
proceeds. If the option expires unexercised, the premium is taken into income at that time. See
Virginia Iron Coal & Coke Co. v. Commissioner, 37 B.T .A. 195 (ruling that payments received under
a call option, which were to be applied to the purchase price if the option were exercised and retained
if the option were not, should be considered income in the year in which the option was surrendered),
a.ff'd, 99 F.2d 919 (4th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 307 U.S. 630 (1939).
Similarly, the premium paid by the purchaser of an option to sell property (a put option) is
a nondeductible capital expense. If the put expires worthless, the payor is permitted a loss at that time.
If the put is exercised, the premium is subtracted from the amount realized from the sale of th e
underlying property. The writer of the put does not include the premium received in income at the time
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to accme expected income occurs even in the context of debt instruments
19
(e.g., market discoune and discount on short-term obligations12l) and
debt equivalents (e.g., deferred annuities 121 ).

4.

Alternatives

to

Accruing

Expected

Income. -Although

substantial deferral is permitted due to the general failure of the tax system
to accme anticipated deferral, there are a variety of provisions that limit
taxpayers' ability to exploit this failure. 122 Many of these provisions
operate by deferring interest deductions as a means of indirectly imputing
income. 123
The principal provtston along these lines is section
124
163(d).
Section 163 (d) I imits the deduction of investment interest to
net investment income. Thus, for example, if a taxpayer makes a single
debt-financed acquisition of an investment asset, the interest on the
indebtedness will only be deductible to the extent that income is recognized
with respect to that asset.

of receipt. If the put expires, the premium is taken into inco me at such time. If the put is exercised,
the premium reduces the writer's basis in the property purchased. See Rev. Rul. 78-!82, 1978-1 C.B.
265 (stating that the cost of a put option is a nondeductible capital expense); Rev. Rui. 58-234, 1958-1
C.B. 279 (stating that the amount paid by the issuer for granting a put option that is not exercised
constitutes ordinary income for the taxable year in which failure to exercise the put becomes final).
BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, 2 FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, EsTATES AND G!FT.S § §
40.8.3, 41.2.3, 51.8 (2d ed. 1990).
119. I.R .C. §§ 1276-1278 (1988) . In general, the market discount tax accrues market discount
as interest, but only upon disposition or repayment (including partial repayments). /d. § 1276.
120. See id. §§ 1281-1283 (stating that discount on short-term obligations must be currently
accrued only in the case of specified taxpayers).
121. !d. § 72. A deferred annuity is an annuity for which the tirst payment is deferred to some
future date. See supra note 76 for discussion of taxing mortality risk in life annuities.
122. See Halperin, supra note 68, at 523-24 (discussing the use of indirect and substitute taxation
in place of direct taxation of deferral); see also Thomas L. Evans, TI1e Evolution of Federal Income
Tax Accounting-A Grov.-ing Trend Towards Mark-to-Market, 67 TAXES 824, 827-28 (1989) (explaining
how the interest capitalization rules in I.R.C. § 263A(f) serve to impute a return to equity and thereby
limit deferral).
123. In its simplest form, consider an investment that yields $10 of deferred income in the taxable
year. Deferring a $10 deduction is roughly equivalent to taxing the income currently. In theory, it
makes no difference what deduction is disallowed. The advantage of choosing the interest deducti on
is that, if properly defined, the amount of the associated interest deduction is correlated with the amount
of the deferred income. Cf. Evans, supra note 122, at 825-33 (discussing the use of I.R.C. § 263A(f)
as a proxy for accruing income on self-constructed assets).
In the case of individuals, the equivalence between including one dollar in income and
denying one dollar of deduction is exact only in the case of deductions permitted in computing adjusted
gross income (generally trade or business deductions). See I.R.C. § 62 (1988). In the case of other
deductions, including deductions for investment interest, disallowing one dollar of deduction will
generally be less onerous than including one dollar of income because of a variety of provisions that
have the effect of imposing additional tax liability based on adjusted gross income. See, e.g., id . § 67
(requiring a two percent floor on miscellaneous itemized deductions); id. § 68 (Supp . II 1990)
(requiring a phase-out of itemized deductions); id. § 151(d)(3) (requiring a phase-out of personal
exemptions); id. § 469(i) (1988) (requiring a phase-out of passive activity losses).
124. I.R.C. § 163(d) (1988).
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As an alternative to accruing income on investments, section 163(d)
has a number of weaknesses. 125 First, it operates on an aggregate, not
on an asset-by-asset or a transaction-by-transaction basis. As a result,
interest expense properly allocable to one investment may be used against
income from a second investment. 126 Second, section 163 (d) operates
only when investments are debt-financed; investments financed out of
equity are not affected. Third, section 163(d) requires allocating interest
expense to investments before the interest expense can be subject to
disallowance. 127
The regulations under section 163(d) provide for
allocating interest expense according to use of the debt proceeds determined
under a tracing approach. 128 The allocation rul es are administratively
complex and easily circumvented. 129 Fourth, section 163(d) applies only
to individuals. 130 Fifth, the provision is overly broad because it disallows
interest expense in the case of a real economic loss. 131 Finally, section
163(d) is overly narrow in that it operates by stacking interest expense first
against realized income. For example, assume that a taxpayer with no
other investments or debt has the opportunity to finance the acquisition of

125. Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986, § !63(d) was substantially weaker, permitting the
deduction of up to $10,000 in investment interest expense over and above the amount of investment
income. J.R.C. § 163(d)(l)(A)-(B) (1985), amended by J.R .C. § !63 (d)(1) (1988).
126. Consider the foll owi ng example. Rigel borrows $2000 at 10% and uses the proceeds to
purchase two assets for $1000 each. The first asset is expected to appreciate by 10% per year, but to
pay no current income. The second asset is expected to pay 10 % current income.
Assuming that both assets perform as expected.§ 163 (d) works properly. Rigel has gross
economic income in the first year of $200, $100 from each asset, and interest expense of $200. Her
net economic income is, therefore, zero. Absent§ 163(d) , however, her gross taxable income would
be only $100 (from the current asset), and her taxable income would be -$100. Under§ 163(d), her
$200 of investment interest would only be allowed to the extent of investment income, or $100, and
her taxable income would be zero.
If, however, the current asset performs better than expected, § i63(d) does not work
properly. For example, assume that the current asset generates income of $200 in the first year. Rigel
now has investment income at least equal to her investment interest and § 163(d) would not act to
disallow any of the investment interest. In other words, the income from the current asset is being used
to offset the interest expense of the deferred asset.
Additionally, § 163(d) does not work properiy if the deferred asset performs bette~ than
expected. Assume the deferred asset grows at 20% per year. In that case, Rigel would have economic
income of $100 ($200 + $100 - $200) and taxable income of zero.
127. J.R.C. § 163 (d)(3)(A) (1988).
128. See Temp. Tress. Reg.§ 1.163-8T(l987).
129. See Section of Taxation, American Bar Ass'n, Commel!ls on Temporary and Proposed
Regulations on Allocation of Interest Expense Among Expendimres, Tax Notes Today, Jan. 29, 1988 ,
available in LEXIS, FedTax Library, TNT File; Tax Section, New York State Bar Ass'n , Report on
Proposed Regulations Under Section 163 Dealing with the Allocation of Interest Expense, Tax Notes
Today, Nov. 30, 1987, available in LEXIS, FedTax Library, TNT File.
130. J.R.C. § 163(d)(l) (1988) .
131. For example, assume that the taxpayer makes a debt-financed purchase of stock and has no
other debt or investments. Assume that the stock pays no dividends and after one year is sold for its
purchase price and the proceeds are used to retire the debt. Under§ 163 (d), the entire interest expense
on the debt would be disallowed, despite the fact that there was no deferral of income.
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an investment with debt. Ass ume that the interest rate on the debt is ten
percent and the yield on the investment is twelve percent, of which ten
percent is paid currently and two percent is deferred. Under these
circumstances, section 163(d) would not limit the taxpayer's interest
deduction at all, because the ten percent current interest expense would be
stacked first against the ten percent current income from the investment and
would, therefo re, be fully deductible.
Wh il e it is easy to point out the flaws in section 163(d) , it is not so
easy to suggest remedies. For example, stacking investment interest
expense first against deferred income would require measuring the amount
of deferred income. Once deferred income is measured, it is hard to
justify not taking the additional step of taxing the deferred income on a
current basis. At that point, however, section 163(d) becomes totally
unnecessary and should be repealed rather than merely modified.
In addition to section 163(d), there are a variety of interest deferral
and disallowance provisions that operate only with respect to certain classes
of deferred income. For example, section 1277 defers the deduction of
certain interest payments on obligations incurred or continued to purchase
or carry market discount bonds. 132 The principal weakness in such
provisions is the difficulty of allocating interest to particular investments.
As a result, such provisions tend to have limited application, serving
mostly to prevent the marketing of tax shelters. 133

5.

Restrictions on the Timing Option.- There are a variety of

provisions in the tax law that restrict taxpayers' ability to take advantage
of the timing option by deferring or disallowing losses or other deductions.
These provisions include, among others, the capital loss limitation/ 34 the

132. I .R .C. § 1277 (1988). Other examples include§ 1282, which requires the deferral of interest
expense allocable to short-term debt instruments with acquisition discount, and § 264(a)(2), which
denies an interest deduction with respect to indebtedness incurred or continued to purchase or carry a
single-premium life insurance, endowment, or annuity co ntract. See id. § 1282; id. § 264(a)(2).
Sectio n 1282 responds to the iimited scope of§ 128 i, which requires current accrual of acquisition
discount only by certain taxpayers. /d . § 1282 . Section 264(a)(2) responds to the failure to currently
tax income from annuity and insurance contracts. /d. § 264(a)(2); see supra note 76 (describing th e
taxati on of annuities under § 72).
133. Such provisions share other weaknesses associated with § 163(d). For example, they have
no effect where the investment is fin anced out of equity. See , e.g., I.R.C . § 1277 (1988) (requiring
deferral of interest deduction allocable to accrued market discount); id. § 1282 (requiring deferral of
interest deduction allocable to accrued discount on short-term obligations). These provisions also
permit interest expense to be allocated against current income and thereby deducted before deferred
income. While this aspect is probably necessary in the case of§ 163(d) because of the difficulty in
measuring th e deferred income, it is harder to justifY in the case of§ 1277 and § 1282 because the
amount of defetTed income is presumed to be known.
134. !.R.C. §§ 12 11-1212 (1988).
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wash sale rules, 135 restrictions on losses on sales to related parties, 136
and the requirement of economic performance. 137
The principal limitation on the timing option is the capital loss
limitation, which generally limits the deductibility of capital losses to the
amount of realized capital gains. 138 The capital loss limitation serves as
a broad overall constraint on taxpayers' ability to utilize the timing option .
The limitation is , hmvever, both overinclusive and underinclusive. It is
ovcrinclusive because it does not permit taxpayers to utilize losses whose
timing has not been affected by the timing option. 139 The limitation is
underinclusive because, if the taxpayer has other capital gains, it permits
those gains to offset accelerated losses. 140
Another major weakness of the capital loss limitation is that it is
limited to losses from sales or exchanges of capital assets. 141 This
restriction causes two problems. First, it relies on the existence of a sale
or exchange, leaving open L1e possibility that taxpayers will claim that the
loss has been realized without such a sale or exchange, such as through the
extinguishment of a contract. 142 More importantly, the capital loss

135. !d. § 1091.
136. !d.§ 267.
137. !d.§ 461(h).
138. See Strnad, supra note 6, at 1886 (describing the capital loss limitation as a restriction on the
timing option). In the case of a corporation, § 1211 (a) allows capital losses only to the extent of capital
gains. !d. § 121l(a). Section 1212(a) permits a three-year carryback and a five-year carryforward of
unused losses. !d. § 1212(a). In the case of noncorporate taxpayers, § 1211 (b) permits up to $3,000
in capital losses over and above the amount of capital gains. !d. § 12ll(b). Section 1212(b) permits
an unlimited carryforward of unused losses. !d. § 1212(b). For a discussion of the importance of the
capital loss limitation to the overall integrity of the tax code, see Stiglitz, Some Aspects, supra note 37,
at 268-70; Stiglitz, The General I7zeory, supra note 37, at 326-29 (both describing various tax
avoidance schemes and noting that the capital loss limitation restricts a taxpayer's ability to implement
these strategies).
139. Consider, for example, the purchase of a six-month cash-settlement option to purchase gold
that expires worthless at the end of the period. Since any gain on the option would have to be
recognized no later than the end of the six-month period, the taxpayer is not benefiting from the timing
option if he is permitted to recognize the loss at the expiration of the option. Of course, if he sells the
option at a loss prior to the end of the six months, it would be reasonable to defer his loss until the end
of the option period. At that point, concern over the timing option does not justifY further deferral of
his loss. Strnad, for example, suggests limiting the capital loss limitation to assets that may be held
for long periods of time. Strnad, supra note 6, at 1888.
140. See id. (arguing that low-risk assets will produce capital gains that can be used to offset
capital losses on high-risk assets); see also Michael C. Durst, Inflation and the Tax Code: Guidelines
for PolicymaJ..."ing, 73 MINN. L. REV. 1217, 1228 n.24 (1989) (noting that § 1211 and § 1212 "do not
wholly eliminate the advantages that taxpayers can enjoy by pursuing a policy of realizing losses
currently but deferring gains indefinitely").
141. I.R.C. § 1211 (1988).
142. See, e.g., Fairbanks v. U.S., 306 U.S. 436 (1939) (holding that redemption of corporate
bonds is not a sale or exchange); Commissioner v. Starr Bros., 204 F .2d 673, 674 (2d Cir. 1953)
(holding that a manufacturer's payment to a dealer in exchange for extinguishment of their exclusive
agency contract was not a sale or exchange of a good); Rev. Rul. 56-531, I 956-2 C. B. 983 (stating that
the relinquishment of simple contract rights and the release of certain leasehold interests in real property

1992]

Taxation of Fi nanci al Instruments

277

limitati on relies on the definition of a cap ital asset . Unfortunately, the
defi nition of " capital asset " is fo rced to serve two different functions.
F irst, it delineates th ose gains and losses netted for capi tal loss limitation
pu rposes . 143 Second , it identifies those assets potentially eligible for
favo rab le capital gains taxation . 144 Tnis need to serve two distinct
purposes has made the search for a capital gains definition much mo re
difficult and the realization of an ultimately satisfactory so lution unlikely.l45
Wh ii e the capital lo ss limitation deal s with the timing option with
a broad brush, a number of other provisions deal with more specific abuses
of the timing option. One such type of abuse occurs when the taxpayer has
disposed of the property as a legal matter, but maintains an economic
interest in the property. For exam ple, section 267 generally disallows any
deduction for losses from the sale or exchange of property between related
persons. 146 One justification for this provision is that there has been an
insufficient di sposition of the property. Whil e th e taxpayer has divested
herself of legal ownership, she is presumed to still have equitable
ownership-or at least control-of the property. 147 Similarly, the wash

const itute proceeds fro m the sale of a capital asset and are not o rdina ry income); Rev. Rul. 58-394,
1958-2 C.B . 374 (stating that the sale of a partnership interest organized for managing an insurance
compa ny constitutes the sale o f a capital asset). In th e case of ce rtain contracts, I.R.C. § 1234A (1988)
prov ides that an extinguishment shall be treated as a sale.
143. See I.R.C. § 1211 (1988); see also Strnad, supra note 6, at 1888 (discussing the definition
of "capital asset").
144. For taxable years beginning after December 31, 1990, in the case of an individual taxpayer,
capital gains are nomi nally taxed at a maximum rate of 28%, see l.R.C . § I (h) ( 1988), while ordinary
income is nominally ta xed at a max imum rate of 31 % , .>ee id. § I (a)-(d). The effective tax rates on
both fonns of inco me may be considerably greater due primarily to the phase-out of itemized
deductions and personal exemptions. !d. §§ 68 , 151 (d)(3). Prior to 1987, individuals were entitled
to a dedu cti o n for 60% of their net long-term cap ital ga in. !d. § 1202, repealed by T ax Refo rm Act
of 1986, § 301(a), Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stal. 2085, 2216 (1986). Thu s, for example, fo r a
taxpaye r in fl 50% b ra c ket, the ra te on capital gair:s was only 20% (20% = (1 - .60) X .50).
145. Compare Arkansas Best Corp. v. Com mi ssione r, 485 U.S. 2 12,214 ( 1988) (finding agai nst
a taxpayer who sought to deduct proceeds on the sale of subsidiary stock as ordinary rath er than capital
loss) with Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U. S . 46, 48-49 (1955) (finding against a
taxpayer who sought to treat its hedging gains from corn futures as capital, rath er than ord inary , gains).
146. Section 267(b) defines the necessary sets of relationships, which includ e both familiai (e .g. ,
moth er-dau ghter) and economic (individuals and contro ll ed entities). l.R .C. § 267(b) (1988).
147. See , e.g., McWilliams v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 694, 699-700 (1947) (noting that such
transactions often occur at times wh en ~he rea l party in interest can reduce her tax liability while
allowing he r to keep substantial co ntrol of the assets being traded or exchanged). Of course , the
assumption of beneficial ownership or control may be wrong with respect to ar.y particular transacti o n.
The fact that the provision operates o n an irrebuttable presumption can be justified by administrative
co nsideratio ns and valuation co ncerns. See Wyly v. United States , 662 F .2d 397, 402 (5 th Cir. Nov .
1981) (recog nizing that § 267 takes a "blanket approach reliev[ing] the taxing authorities of many
comp li cated and melio ristic decisions in family tra nsactions " and noting that the ease of administration
or simplicity "can be a va lid cong ress ional rationale for banning tra nsac tions of this type" (ci ting
M erritt v. Com mi ssioner, 400 F.2d 417,421 (5 th Cir. 1968))). In rel ated party sales th ere is a wellfounde d fear that the sale wi ll not be at fn ir m~rket value . The refu sal to permit a loss tak es the
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sale rules limit the ability of taxpayers to take losses while maintaining an
interest in the same or similar property. 148 As with disallowance of
losses on sales to related parties, the wash sale rules can be justified on the
basis of a concern for the substance over the form of the transaction. In
a wash sale, the taxpayer has not, in substance, disposed of the property.
Therefore, no realization event sufficient to trigger a loss has occurred. 149
Section 461 (h) provides yet another limitation on a taxpayer's
ability to take advantage of the timing option. In general, under the
accrual method of accounting, a taxpayer is entitled to deduct an expense
when all the events have occurred that establish the fact of the liability
giving rise to such deduction and the amount thereof can be determi ned
with reasonable accuracy. 150 Thus, for example, if the loser of the bet
described in Example 2N 51 employs an accrual method of accounting,
she would be permitted to deduct the loss for the taxable year in which the
coin is tossed, rather than having to wait for the year of payment. 152
Moreover, she would be permitted to take the deduction without regard to
a realization event. 153

pressure off monitoring such transactions.
148. In general, § 1091, the wash sale provision, disallows the loss from the sale or other
disposition of stock or securities if within 30 days before or after the date of such dispositi o n the
taxpayer acquires, or enters into a contract or option to so acquire, substantially identical stock o r
securities. See I.R.C . § 1091 (1988).
149. One significant difference between the related party and the wash sale rules is that in the
former, the loss may be permanently disallowed, while in the latter, the loss is merely deferred.
Compare I.R.C. § 267(d) (1988) (reducing future gain, but not increasing future loss, by the amount
of any disallowed loss from a related party transaction) with id. § 109l(d) (stating that the basi s of
property subject to the wash sale rules is increased or decreased by the difference between the price
at which the property was acquired and the price at which substantially identical property was sold).
150. Treas. Reg. § 1.461-l(a)(2) (as amended in 1967). This determination is made under the
rubric of the "all events test." Treas. Reg. § 1.446-l(c)(l)(ii) (as amended in 1987).
!51. See supra text accompanying note 28 .
!52. The amount of the deduction would be the iace amount of the liability ($21 ), not its present
value (approximately $17).
!53. Cf. Mooney Aircraft, Inc. v. United States, 420 F .2d 400, 406, 409-10 (5th Cir. 1969)
(disallowing a deduction for a future expense that meets the all events test on the ground that permitting
the deduction would not clearly reflect income within the meaning of I.R.C. § 446(b)). The flip side
of the rules for accruing deductions are the rules for accruing inco me . Under Treas. Reg. § 1.4461(c)(l)(ii), "income is to be included for the taxable year when all the events have occurred which fix
the right to receive such income and the amount thereof can be determined with reasonable accuracy. "
Treas. Reg.§ 1.446-l(c)(l)(ii) (as amended in 1987).
Because the accrual rules require the face amount, rather than the present value, of an item
of income or expense to be accrued , the accrual rules can have the effect of accelerating income and
expense. The principal opportunity for abuse comes from taxpayers ' ability to organize their affairs
so that items of deduction will tend to be accrued prior to items of income. See generally Mooney
Aircraft, 420 F.2d at 410; Daniel I. Halperin & William A. Klein, Tax Accouming for Fwure
Obligations: Basic Principles Revised, 38 TAX NOTES 831, 832 (Feb. 22, 1988); William A. Klein,
Tax Accounting for Future Obligations: Basic Principles, 36 TAX NOTES 623, 627-28 (Aug. I 0, 1987);
Halperin, supra note 68, at 525-34 .
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Section 461 (h), however, adds the requirement of "econom ic
performance" to the all events test. Under the regulations, if the liab ility
of a taxpayer is to provide, inter alia, an award, prize, jackpot, or other
similar payment to another person, economic performance occurs as
payment is made to the person to whom the li ability is owed. 15-l Thus,
under section 461 (h) the loss would not be dedu ctib le prior to the end of
the two-year period of the bet even if the loser were to pay a third party
to take over the liability.155
The latest weapon in the Internal Revenue Service's arsenal of
devices des igned to combat the timing option is the treatment of termination payments under the proposed notional principal contract regulations.156 A party wishing to terminate a notional principal contract has
two choices. She can negotiate with her counterparty for a termination, or
she can assign her rights and obligations under the contract to a third party.
Where the two parties to a notional principal contract agree to terminate the
contract in exchange for a termination payment by one party to the other,
the proposed regulations provide the unremarkable rule that the termination
payment is recognized by both parties in the year of termination . 157 The
rule is , of course, merely a restatement of the realization requirement. 158
The more remarkable rule is the one dealing with an assignment.
If a party to a notional principal contract assigns her contract to a third
party in exchange for a termination payment (in either direction), the
termination payment must be recognized by both of the original parties in
the year of payment. 159 Therefore, the assigning party is unable to

Section 46J(h), described below , is one of the responses to this problem. See I.R.C .
§ 461 (h) (1988). Other resp onses include: id. § 467 (providing special rules to account for rent under
certain leases); id. § 468 (creating special rules for mining and solid waste reclamatio n and closing
costs) ; id. § 468A (creating special rules for nu clear deco mmissi o ning costs) ; id. § 468B (creating
sp ecial rules for de signated settle ment funds).
!54_ Treas . Reg.§ L461-4(g)(4) (1992).
!55. Note that § 46J(h) creates an asymmetry in the opposite direction from that generally
provided by th e timing option. In particular, § 46J(h) modifi es the all events test for deductions, but
not for inclusi on of income. Thu s, income must still be accrued without rega rd to economic
performance. This sort of one-sided approach ofte n comes back to haunt th e Treasury. See Ginsburg ,
supra note 38 (desc ribing how "every stick crafted to beat on the head of a taxpayer wi!I, sooner or
later, metamorphose into a large green snake and bite the Commissioner on the hind part"); see also
supra note 38 (enlarging on the a rgument)_
!56_ See Prop. Treas. Reg. § L446-3 (e)(6) , 56 Fed_ Reg . 31350 ,3 1360 (!99! ).
157. See id_ § L446-3 (e)(6)(ii), 56 Fed . Reg. 3!350, 31360 (1 99!) (discussing the treatment of
termination payments); id. § 1.446-3 (e)(6)(i), 56 Fed. Reg. 31350, 31360 (1991 ) (defi ning termination
payment).
!58_ Note that the rul e chosen was not the o nly possible rule. Putting as ide the question of
authority, the Treasury could have chosen a rule under which the termination payment would have been
recognized over the remai ning life of the contract. The latter rule would have eliminated the timing
op ti on by making income recogniti on independent of the action of the parties.
159. P rop. Treas . Reg.§ !.446-3(e)(6) (i i), 56 Fed. Reg. 31350, 3!360 (1 991). Th e third party
treats the termination payment as a nonperiodic payment under the contract. fd_ § !.446-3(e)(6)(iii),
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recognize a loss without triggering gain recognition by her counterparty.
If both parties face the same tax rate on gains and losses from the contract,
the timing option effectively disappears. 160

B.

Restrictions on Tax Straddles

Given well-develo ped markets, straddles represent one of the most
serious threats to the integrity of a realization-based system. 161 The
primary responses to the problem of straddles were the enactment of the
straddle rules 162 and the mark-to--market ru!es. 163
As discussed above , a straddle consists of two positions whose
values are expected to change in equal but opposite amounts. 164 For
example, a straddle can be created by simultaneously entering into a
forward contract to buy gold at $400 per ounce and a forward contract to
sell gold at $400 per ounce with the same maturity. As long as the price
of gold either rises or falls, one of the positions will fall in value and the
other will rise. The loss position can then be disposed of in .the current tax
year while the gain position can be held and disposed of in a future tax
year. 165 The straddle rules attack straddle transactions by deferring
recognition of any realized loss on the straddle to the exten~ of any
unrecognized gain. 166
The straddle rules are, of course, unnecessary to the extent that the
loss would be a capital loss actually restricted by the capital loss limitation.167 By deferring losses if and only if there is unrecognized gain, the
straddle rules represent a more precise and effective approach to straddles
than does the capital loss limitation. This precision, however, necessarily
comes at the expense of administrative complexity. The operation of the
capital loss limitation requires looking only at recognized gains and losses.
The straddle rules, on the other hand, require the identification of a

56 Fed. Reg. 31350,31360 (1991).
160. Of course, if the counterparty is tax-exempt, neither termination rule works to restrict the
timing option. Similarly, if the counterparty has elected to be taxed under a mark-to-market approach,
the timing option remains available. See id. § 1.446-4(a), 56 Fed. Reg. 31361 (1991) (detailing criteria
for mark-to-market election); see also infra note 223 (describing the value of the timing option when
one party is indifferent to the occurrence of a realization event).
161. See supra note 64 and accompanying text (describing the billions of dollars lost by the
Treasury due to the costs of tax straddles).
162. I.R .C. § 1092 (1988).
163. !d. § 1256.
164. See supra subpart III(C).
165. Once the loss position is disposed of, the straddle is, of course, destroyed , and the taxpayer
is subject to real gains and losses on the remaining pos:tion. The taxpayer cJ.tn, however, protect
against such losses by entering into a new offsetting positi on.
166. I.R.C. § 1092(a)(l)(A) (1988).
167. See supra text accompanying note 138.
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specific straddle and measurement of the amount of unrecognized gam m
the remaining leg of the straddle. 168
While the straddle rules are an effective means of Iimiting the
timing option in the case of straddles , it should be emphasized again that
the timing option exists whether or not there is a straddle. The essence of
the straddle probiem is the ability to take advantage of the timing option
without the assumption of economic risk. 169 If the taxpayer is willing to
assume risk , the opportunity to take advantage of the timing option
remains . For example, consider a taxpayer who invests in a diversified
portfolio of risky assets, the returns on which are not perfectly correlated. 170 It would seem clear that the portfolio is not a straddle within
the meaning of section 1092. 171 Any other result would have the effect
of substantially broadening the straddle rules beyond their intended scope .
Nevertheless, it is clear that the taxpayer expects, with a substantial degree

168. See l.R.C. § 1092(a) (1988) (setting out the definition of "unrecognized gain" to be used to
offset the loss leg of the straddle). The measurement of unrecognized gain implicitly requires marking
the unrecognized leg to market. Thus, the straddle rules can be viewed as a partial mark-to-market
rule. Under the straddle rules, gain on unrecognized legs is marked to market to the extent of
recognized loss on the loss leg. This need to value the unrecognized leg of a straddle provides one
justification for limiting the straddle rules to property for which there are active markets. In addition,
an effective tax straddle requires the ability to di spose of the loss leg with relatively low transaction
costs, which provides another justification for limiting the scope of the straddle rules to property for
which there are active markets. The actual limitation in the statute is to "property of a type which is
actively traded." /d. § !092(d)(l). The term "actively traded" has been interpreted so as not to
require conventional markets. See Prop. Tress. Reg. §§ 1.1092(d)-1(b) to (c), 56 Fed. Reg. 31350,
31361-62 (1991) (stating that a f!Otional principal contract is actively traded property if it is similar to
contracts with respect to which dealers, brokers, or traders regularly disseminate price quotations).
! 69 . For purposes of§ J 092, a straddle requires the reduction, but not the elimination, of all risk.
Section 1092 detines a straddle as offsetting positions with respect to personal property. I.R.C.
§ 1092(c)(l) (1988). Under§ 1092(c)(2), a taxpayer holds offsetting positions with respect to personal
property if there is a substantial diminution of the taxpayer's risk of loss from any position by reason
of his holding one or more other positions. /d. § 1092(c)(2).
Section 1092(c)(3) identifies a number of indicia of straddle tran sacti ons, any one of which
establish a rebuttable presumption that a straddle exists. The indicia include: (I) the positions are in
the same property (whether or not in a substantially altered form); (2) the positions are in debt
instruments of a similar maturity; (3) the positions are sold or marketed as offsetting positions; and (4)
the aggregate margin requirement for such positions is lower than the sum of the margin requirements
for each such position if held separately. ld. § I 092(c)(3). Section I 092(c)(3)(vi) provides authority
for the Treasury to issut! regulations establishing additional subjective or objective presumptions.
170. Diversification can potentially eliminate unsystematic risk. Diversification will not reduce
market risk. BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 18, at 137.
171. The Joint Committee explanation of the straddle provisions noted that:
Although the concept of offsetting positions is not narrowly defined in the statute,
certain cases fall outside its scope. For example, risk reduction through mere
diversification usually would not be considered to substantially diminish risk for
purposes of this Act, if the positions are not balanced. Thus a taxpayer holding
several types of securities but holding no short positions generally would not be
considered to be holding offsetting positions.
STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra no te 64, at 288 . Presumably the modifiers "usually"
and "generally" were added out of an abundance of caution.
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of certainty, that he will have both winners and losers in his portfolio and
thus will be able to take losses currently while deferring gains.
It is only where the taxpayer has but a single investment, or a
portfolio of perfectly correlated investments , th at there is no straddle
opportunity. 172 Nevertheless, even in these 1imited ci rcumstances , the
timing option remains. In general, as long as the investment is risky in the
sense that there is a chance of either a gain or a loss, the timing option
exists and increases the expected return from the investment.

C.

Comprehensive Solutions-Section 1256

The ultimate solution to the straddle problem as well as all of the
other problems discussed above is the adoption of full accrual, or mark-tomarket accounting. 173
Congress has been willing to adopt such a
solution, but only for certain transactions involving limited classes of
assets. In particular, section 1256 provides that certain contracts not used
as part of an identified hedging transaction are marked to market at the
dose of each taxable year. 174 Accordingly, the holder of such a contract
is taxed on any gain or loss without regard to any realization requirement.
Section 1256 contracts include regulated futures contracts, certain foreign
currency contracts, nonequity options, and dealer equity options. 175 As
discussed above, marking the contracts to market solves the problem of
deferral in all of its manifestations by taxing gains and losses as they occur,
rather than waiting for a realization event. 176 Consequently, the treat-

172. This might arise, for example, when most of an individual's net worth is in the form of
ownership of a closely held corporation or similar real estate within a particular geographical area.
173. The one problem that marking to market fails to deal with is inflatio n. In fact, by removing
the benefit of deferral , it has the tendency to exacerbate the effect of inflation . On the other hand, an
indexation scheme is probably easier to administer in a full accrual system than in a realization system,
because there is no need to track the effect of inflation over long periods of time. N ote also that the
adoption of mark-to-market accounting could be used to pay for the adoption of indexation. See supra
note 20; Reed Shuldiner, Indexing the Federal Income Tax 18 (1990) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with Texas Law Review).
174. I.R.C. § 1256(a)(l) (1988).
175. !d. § 1256(b)(1)-(4). As first enacted in 1981, § 1256 applied only to regulated futures
contracts. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub . L. No. 97-34, § 503(b), 95 Stat. 172, 328
(1981) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 1256 (1988)). Section 1256 was expanded in 1982 to include
certain foreign currency contracts and in 1984 to include nonequity options and dealer equity optio ns.
Technical Corrections Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-448, § 105(c)(5)(B), 96 Stat. 2365,2386 (1982);
Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No . 98-369, § 102(a)(2), 98 Stat. 494, 620 (1984) (codified
as amended at I.R.C . § 1256 (1988)).
176. It is interesting to note that although mark-to-market rules have been adopted for certain
financial instruments, Congress has not necessarily taken the additi onal step of removing th e capital loss
limitation . This can perhaps be explained, at least in part , by reve nue conside rations. Compare I.R .C .
§ l256(a)(3) (1988) (treating mark-to-market gain or loss as 60 % long-term capital gain or loss and
40% short-term capital gain or loss) with proposed I.R.C. § 475(d)(3), H .R . I i , supra note 9 (treating
mark-to-market gain or loss as ordinary inco me or loss), and proposed l.R .C. § 129l (c) , H.R . 11 ,
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ment of section 1256 contracts comes closest to meeting the ideal of the
Haig-Simons definition of income.

D.

A Summary of Current Law Modifications to the Realization
Requirement

A pure realization system presents unacceptable opportunities for
deferral and use of the timing option. The tax law has responded using a
variety of approaches. The most comprehensive approach is, of course,
the total abandonment of the realization system and the adoption of markto-market accounting . Less radical approaches can be divided into two
classes. The first class operates by attempting to accelerate the accrual of
income. Sometimes the acceleration of income is done directly, such as
through mandatory accrual. At other times the acceleration of income is
indirect, such as through the disallowance of an interest deduction. A
second class of half-way measures operate by deferring loss, thus limiting
the value of the timing option. 177 Absent significant broadening of markto-market taxation, the tax laws will inevitably remain a potpourri of
seemingly ad hoc regulations designed to limit the consequences of the
realization doctrine.
V.

Proposed Uniform Rules to Tax Financial Instruments

As shown in Part IV, a pure realization tax system suffers to an
unacceptable extent from deferral and its related problems. Existing
attempts to deal with the problems of deferral are inconsistent and
uncertain. They rely to a great extent on categorizing instruments178

supra note 9 (treating mark-to-market gain as ordinary income, but treating mark-to-market loss as
ordinary loss only to the extent of previously included gains).
177 . Another approach, not discussed in this Article, involves permitting the deferral of gain, but
imposing an interest charge on the deferral. Current provisions that take this approach include I.R.C.
§ 453A (1988) (charging interest on deferred tax liability from certain nondealer installment sales) and
id. § 1291 (charging interest on deferral relating to passive foreign investment companies). For a
criticism of§ 453A, see Evans, supra note 122, at 842-43 & n.165 (criticizing § 453A because it
allows taxpayers to elect whether to treat the government as a lender, which the taxpayer will only do
if the government interest rates are lower than prevailing market rates). The use of an interest charge
to compensate for the effect of deferral has been recommended by a number of commentators. See,
e.g., Ala n J. Auerbach, Retrospective Capital Gains Taxation, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 167, 169 (1991)
(proposing eliminating the incentive to defer capital gains by effectively charging interest on past gains
when realized); Fellows, supra note 140, at 737-38 (proposing that tax liability be retroactively
calculated for each period between the purchase of an asset and its realization event, and then adjusted
for the time delay of the payment); Cynthia Blum, New Role for the Treasury: Charging Interest on
Tax Deferral Loans, 25 HARV. I. ON LEGIS. 1, 6 (1988) (evaluating "using an interest charge to
compensate for delay in income reporting") .
178 . The categorization takes many different forms. For example, the timing rules often depend
on whether an instrument is a debt instrument, an optio n, an annuity, a forward contract, or a noti onal
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rather than looking at the underlying economics of the transaction to
determine the timing of the income from the transaction. 179
The solution is, of course, full accrual of gains and losses. Such
an app roach would solve both the direct and indirect problems of deferral.
Most, if not all, of the provisions of the tax law described in Part IV wouid
become unnecessary. Nevertheless, as discussed above, I assume that such
an approach will not be adopted .180 The task, therefore, is to develop
approaches that minimize the problems caused by realization-based
accounting without adding significant additional problems.

A.

Expected Value Transaction

The first step is to minimize the availability of anticipated deferral.
The solution is , of course, to accrue expected income. Merely accruing
expected income, however, does not deal with the timing option. 181 In
order to limit the timing option, it is necessary to make certain that the
income accrued at any point in time is as close as possible to the actual
income from the instrument, not merely the expected income. This

principal product. Different timing rules are provided for capital and ordinary income. The
deductibility of payments depends on whether the payment is characterized as interest or as other
ordinary income.
179. Obviously, the tax law has already made significant steps in this direction. For example, the
original issue discount rules for noncontingent instruments determine the timing of income based on
the timing of payments, without regard to their characterization as interest or principal. Prop. Treas.
Reg.§ 1.1272-1,51 Fed. Reg. 12022, 12049 (1986). Section 467 attempts to apply similar rules to
leases. See I.R.C. § 467 (1988) (providing that deferred rent shall be currently accrued based on
present value concepts and imputing interest on such deferred rents).
180. More precisely, I assume that the tax law will proceed slowly to embrace more mark-tomarket taxation, but that in the meantime, there will be continued need for the development of rules
to deal with financial instruments not taxed on such a basis. See supra note 9 (discussing recent
attempts to expand mark-to-market taxation).
181. The timing option applies only where there is unanticipated deferral. See supra notes 44-45
and accompanying text. Paradoxically, accruing expected income can actually make the timing option
more, not less, valuable. Consider the zero-coupon bond in Example 1 where Diva pays David $100
today in exchange for $121 in two years. The expected value of the bond in one year is approximately
$110, and, therefore, under an expected value approach, Diva would have to accrue $10 in income over
the first year. (This assumes a constant yield.) Diva would then have a basis in the bond of $110.
Assume, however, that interest rates have increased to 15%. The value of the bond after one year
would then be only $105.22. Diva would, therefore, have an incentive to dispose of the bond and
recognize her loss of $4.78. On the other hand, if interest rates had fallen to 5%, the bond would be
worth $115.24, a gain of $5.24 that Diva would be able to defer.
Consider, by contrast, the treatment of Diva if her expected income was not taxed. In that
case, her basis in the bond at the end of the first year would still be $100, her cost. The expected
vaiue of her bond as of the end of the first year would be $110. Therefore, assuming that rates did
not change, she would have a deferred gain of $10. If, however, interest rates rose to 15%, her bond
would be worth $105.22 and she would still have a gain, albeit a smaller gain, that she would be able
to defer. It would not be until interest rates rose over 21% that she would have an actual loss. Thus,
within a broad range of interest rates (0 to 21 %), the failure to accrue expected income deprives Diva
of her timing option.
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requires having realization events occur as frequently as possible. 182 In
order to have realization events occur as frequently as possible, without
requ iring revaluation of the instruments, and to accrue expected income as
closely as possible, I suggest the following rules:
1. instruments should initially be split into sep arate co mponents
each with a single contingency; 183
2. income should be accrued with respect to each separate component according to that component's expected future value determined as of the time the transaction is entered into; and
3. gain or loss should be recognized whenever a contingency is
resolved.
I refer to this approach as "expected value taxation. " In Part VI, expected
value taxation is further developed using a series of examples concerning
wagers. Before doing so, however, it is worthwhil e to make several
points.
First, the discussion in this Article is intended to deal only with the
timing issues inherent in complex financial instruments. It is not intended
to deal with questions of character or source. By using the term "character " in this context I mean not only the question of ordinary income versus
capital gains, but also any other consequence that flows from the peculiar
For example, whether income or expense is
nature of income. 184
characterized as interest or as some other form of ordinary income or expense can be extremely important. 185
Second, this Article is not intended to provide a set of rules that can
be immediately and simply applied to all financial products. Rather, it is
intended to provide a uniform benchmark against which other rules can be
tested. The expected value approach is to be contrasted with the frequently
employed approach that I will call the "multiple paradigm" approach.
Under the multiple paradigm approach, there are a variety of different
approaches used in a variety of contexts. 186 Every time a new financial

182 . In the extreme this policy would , of course, require full accrual accounting, a step that has
already been ruled out. See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text (assuming full accrual will not be
used because of administrative complexities).
183 . See infra subpart V(A) for a further di scussi on of the issue of bifurcation of financial
instruments .
184. In some ways it is impossible to separate questio ns of character from questi ons of timing.
For example, the most fundamental character di stincti on in the Code is the di sti nction between ordinary
income and capital gain. At the same time, one of the most fundamental timing rules in the Code is
the capital loss limitation, which is obv iously tied to the character of the income. Nevertheless, I th ink
it is important to separate, at least at the theoretical level, questions of timing and characte r. Once
ap propriate timing rul es are determined, they can be integrated with the character rules.
185 . For example, an interest expense may not be deductible, see I.R .C. § 163(d) (1988), while
a noninterest expense may be deductible under so me other secti on. See supra note 81 fo r a partial list
of interest restrictions.
186. Edward Kleinbard uses the term "cubbyh ole" to refe r to the existing ta x paradigms. Edward
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instrument is introduced , there is an attempt to analogize the new
instrument to the existing paradigms. It is then argued that the instrument
should be taxed in the same manner as the other instruments within the
chosen paradigm. The principal justification for this approach is one of
consistency-similar transactions should be taxed in a similar fashion. 187
The flaw in the multiple paradigm approach is that a new instrument can
generally be analogized to more than one existing instrument. Thus, the
approach is not well defined. Moreover, the creators of new instruments
are able to design instruments to be arbitrarily close to the line between
any two (or more) paradigms. 188 Thus, to the extent that the paradigms
offer different timing rules, the timing of income becomes elective and the
goal of consistency is not met. Similarly, a particular financial instrument
can generally be created using a variety of different instruments as building
blocks. 189 There is, however, no guarantee that the taxation of the
combination of the various building blocks will be the same as the
combined taxation of the individual building blocks. 190 On the other
hand, if there is a uniform benchmark against which each new product can
be measured, it is possible to create a situation in which there is a much
greater level of consistency, predictability, and accuracy in the timing of
income. 191
Third, it is sometimes argued that the timing of income with respect
to a transaction is relatively unimportant as long as both sides to the
transaction are taxed in the same manner. 192 The principal fallacy in this
argument is that one can never assume that both sides of the transaction
will face the same tax rate. To the contrary, one may usually assume that
taxpayers will arrange themselves so that the side of the transaction that
accelerates income is held by a person in a low or zero bracket, and the

D. Kleinbard, Equity Derivative Products: Financial Innovation's Newest Ozallenge to the Tax System,
69 TE.X. L. REV . 1319, 1320 (1991) .
187. Randall Kau calls this the "matching principle." See Randall K.C. Kau, Carving Up Assets
and Liabilities-Integration or Bifurcation of Filzancial Products, 68 T A.XES I 003, I 007 (1990).
188. See David P. Hariton, The Taxation of Complex Financial Instruments, 43 TAX L. REV. 731
(1988) (analyzing the ambiguities in the treatment of complex financial instruments under current tax
law).
189. For example, Kau lists 13 different ways to borrow money using a combination of debt and
different financial products. See Kau, supra note 187, at 1004-05.
190. For example, prior to the recent revision in the OlD regulations , a contingent debt instrument
made up of a noncontingent debt obligation and a cash-settlement option was taxed differently than a
separate noncontingent debt obligation and cash-settlement option. See supra section IV(A)(2).
191. See Jeff Strnad, Taxing New Financial Products (July 1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with the Texas Law Review) (discussing the application of "spanning" theory to the taxation of financial
products).
192. See, e.g., Halperin, supra note 68, at 510-11 (suggesting that overtaxation of one side of a
transaction can compensate for undertaxation of the other side of the transaction);GRAETZ, supra note
49, at 944 (arguing "that the Internal Revenue Code may, to some extent at least, be indifferent to the
timing of income or deductions so long as no tax advantage results").
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side that defers income is held by a person in a high bracket. 193 In addition, the symmetric treatment may often be more apparent than real. For
example, if one side of the transaction is able to force a realization event
for itself without forcing a realization event for the other side, any
acceleration of income can be neutralized through a realized loss, while the
corresponding acceleration of loss remains unaffected.
In light of these concerns, I believe that it is a mistake to rely solely
on symmetry to provide appropriate tax rules. On the other hand, the rul es
that I advocate are symmetric.
Their symmetry, however, follow s
naturally from the symmetry inherent in the economics of the underlying
transaction, rather than being driven by an arbitrary choice of rules. 194

B.

The Bifurcation and Integration of Financial Instruments

When faced with a financial instrument, there are at least three
general approaches to determining its taxation. First, it can be viewed as
a single unified instrument. Second, it can be "bifurcated" into its
component parts .195 Third, it can be integrated with one or more other
financial instruments to form a new instrument. For example, an interest
rate swap could simply be taxed as a swap. 196 Alternatively, it could be
broken down into a series of forward contracts. 197 Finally, it could be
integrated into a debt instrument to form a new debt instrument with
different terms.
The tax law takes no consistent approach to the question of unified,
bifurcated, or integrated treatment. For example, consider the original
issue discount rules. The basic approach of the OlD rules is one of
treating the debt instrument as a single unified instrument, as seen, for
example, in the use of a single yield for purposes of computing the accrual
of discount. 198 In certain circumstances, however, the OlD rules take a

193. See, e.g., GRAETZ, supra note 48, at 515 ("Over the years, one of the major tax planning
techniques has been to shift income from persons or entities to whom it wou ld be taxed at high
marginal rates to persons or entities subject to low or zero rates of tax.") ; see also Halperin, supra note
68, at 512; Kau, supra note 187, at 1004.
194. Obviously, a full accrual system would be perfectly symmetric.
195. The term "bifurcation" is routinely used to describe the process of dividing financial
instruments into their component parts. See, e.g., Edward D. Kleinbard, Beyond Good and Evil D ebt
(and Debt Hedges): A Cost of Capital Allowances System , 67 TAXES 943, 947 (suggesting that
deconstructio n would be a better term); Kau, supra note 187, at 1005 (describing bifurcation).
196. Prior to the notional principal contract regulations, no one knew for sure exactly what that
meant, but sensible tax practitioners assumed it meant pretty much what it now means under the
regulations . See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-3(e)(2), 56 Fed. Reg. 31350, 31351 (1991) (regarding
generally th e timing of periodic payments made under a swap contract) .
197. See infra section Vll(D)(2) .
198. See I .R.C. § 1272(a)(3)(A)(ii) (1988) (describing the use of a single yield to maturity). Other
examples of a unified approach are the treatment of uni fie d put and call options under Prop. Treas.
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bifurcation approach. For example, the issue price of an investment unit
must be allocated among the elements of the unit on the basis of relative
fair market value. 199 Another area where the OlD rules take a bifurcation approach is the treatment of contingent interest. 200 Finally, in
other circumstances, the OID rules take an integration approach, requiring
independent debt instruments to be aggregated for purposes of determining
the accrual of discount 201
The same tension between these approaches is apparent outside of
t~e OlD rules. For example, the proposed regulations on notional principal
contracts take the overall approach of treating a notional principal contract
as a single instrument. 202 When a financial instrument is composed of
two or more notional principal contracts, however, the proposed regulations require bifurcation of the instrument into separate contracts?03 On
the other hand, in the case of hedged notional principal contracts, the
regulations take an approach closer to integration.ZCl4
In the area of international taxation, there has been a general
For
movement toward integrated treatment of hedged transactions.
example, section 988(d), added by the 1986 Act, provides authority for the
Treasury to write regulations providing for integrated treatment of currency
hedging transactions. 205 Under this authority, regulations now permit a
foreign currency borrowing that has been hedged to preserve a U.S. dollar

Reg. § 1.1272-l(f)(4), 51 Fed. Reg . 12052 (1986), and the treatment of convertible debt under id.
§ 1.1273-2(e), 51 Fed. Reg. 12062 (1986).
199. I.R.C. § 1273(c)(2) (1988).
200. Where the sum of the noncontingent payments is greater than or equai to the issue price of
the overall instrument, the instrument is bifurcated into separate contingent and noncontingent debt
instruments. Prop. Treas. Reg . § 1.1275-4(e), (g), 56 Fed. Reg. 8308, 8310-11 (1991). See supra
section IV(A)(2).
The Code also takes a bifurcation approach in the case of certain long-term high-yield
corporate OlD obligations . l.R.C. § 163(e)(5), (i) (Supp. II 1990) (requiring that OlD instruments be
bifurcated into a disqualified and a deferred portion).
201. Prop. Treas. Reg .§ 1.1275-2(d), 51 Fed. Reg . 12022, 12085 (1986) (as amended in 1991).
202. /d.§ 1.446-3(e), 56 Fed. Reg. 31350, 31355-61 (1991) .
203. See Prop. Treas . Reg.§ 1.446-3(e)(4)(i), 56 Fed. Reg . 31350,31359 (1991) (specifYing the
treatment of compound and disguised notional principal contracts). Given the fact that almost any
notional principal contract can be described as the combination of two other notional principal contracts,
the scope of this bifurcation rule is unclear. See infra section VI1(D)(2) (describing how any multiperiod notional principal contract is really just a series of single-period contracts); see also Prop . Treas.
Reg.§ 1.446-3(e)(4)(iii) & (iv), 56 Fed. Reg. 31350, 31359 (1991) (requiring bifurcation of certain
notional principal contracts into a notional principal contract and a loan).
204. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-3(e)(4)(ii), 56 Fed. Reg. 31350, 31359 (1991) (permitting the
Commissioner to require that hedged contracts be treated in a manner consistent with the economic
substance of the transaction as a whole). Although the regulations do not provide for integrated
treatment as such, the effect of taxing the hedge in a manner consistent with the transaction as a whole
should provide timing results that are consistent with integration. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.4463(e)(4)(v) example 4, 56 Fed. Reg. 31350, 31360 (1991) (requiring integration of two swap contracts
into a single loan).
205. See I.R.C. § 988(d) (1988).
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equ ivalent to be treated as a single integrated dollar-denominated borrowing. 206 Similarly, the 1986 Act added section 864(e), which, inter
alia, provided regulatory authority for integrated treatment of financial
transactions for purposes of interest allocation. 207 A final exampl e of the
increased use of integrated treatment is section 1092, which has the effect
of treating both legs of a straddle as a single transaction for purposes of
loss recognition. 208
At first glance, expected value taxation appears to rely on bifurcation of the financial instruments. In fact, that is not the case . The
purpose of bifurcation is simply to assist in the estimation of expected
future values of each component and to help delimit the points where
income should be realized based on the outcome of contingencies. An
alternative approach that is analytically equivalent would be to simply
determine u1e expected future value of the entire instrument at each point
in the future and to accrue income based on the overall expected value.
More importantly, one of the goals of the expected value app roach is to
reduce the importance of the debate over bifurcation by making the taxation
of a given instrument independent of whether or not it is bifurcated or
integrated into another financial instrument. If each component of a
financial instrument is taxed according to its expected future value, in
theory, it should make no difference whether an instrument is bifurcated
or integrated with another instrument. The aggregate income recognized
under the transaction should be the same. 209
The proposal for expected value taxation does not, however, solve
the problem of the timing option or the related problem of tax straddles.
Accordingly, it will make a difference whether related transactions are
integrated for purposes of loss recognition. To the extent that the timing
option remains, integrating related transactions has the benefit of reducing
the opportunity for loss recognition on one part of a transaction while gain
is unrecognized on another part of the transaction. 210

206 . See Treas. Reg.§ 1.988-5 (1992).
207. l.R.C . § 864(e) (1988). The Treasury has responded with T emp . Treas. Reg . §§ 1.861-9T,
-lOT (1992).
208. I.R.C. § 1092 (1988); see supra subpart TV (B) (discussing the restrictions on tax straddles).
209. A full accrual system, such as I.R.C . § 1256 (1988), would make the questi on of bifurcation
or integration entirely irrelevant except to the extent that the aggregate value of two separate
instruments differed from the value of the combined instrument. Assuming perfect capital markets ,
there should be no such difference in values. See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 18, at 128-29. In
practice, there would likely be differences. See id. at 412.
210. See, e.g., I.R.C . § 1092 (1988) (requiring loss deferral on one leg of a straddle to the extent
of unrecognized gain on another leg of the straddle).
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An Illustration of Expected Value Taxation Through Wagers

Even the most complex financial instrument can be thought of as a
combination of certain and uncertain cash flows. In turn, uncertain cash
flows can be thought of as the payoffs from simple wagers. Given this
equivalence, it is possible to study an approach to the taxation of financial
instruments by analogy to the taxation of wagers . In this Part, I pose a
series of hypothetical wagers and use these wagers to develop and test
expected value taxation.
A.

Single Bets

Examples 4 through 6 deal with a single wager. In Example 4, the
wager is a fair wager with no prepayment being made by either party.
Examples S and SA introduce a form of prepayment whereby one party's
payment under the bet is placed in escrow. In Example S interest on the
escrow account is paid to the depositor, while in Example SA interest is
paid to the other party. Finally, Example 6 analyzes a bet where one
party's obligation is prepaid.
1. Example 4: No Prepayment.-Consider a bet on whether
a Democrat or a Republican will win the 1992 presidential election.211 Assume that because of my fondness for the underdog, I bet that a Democrat will win. You, being strictly
rational, bet that a Republican will win. Not being a fool, I
insist on odds and we settle on a $1000 bet with 4-to-1 odds
(i.e., if a Democrat wins you will pay me $4000, and if a
Republican wins I will pay you $1000).212 We shake hands
and await the outcome.

211. To put Examples 4 through 10 in historical perspective, the author would like to note that
the examples were originally written in 1989: before Mr. Perot had entered the race as an independent,
before President Bush had broken his no new taxes pledge, and before the odds on the 1992 election
had radically changed.
212. Odds and probabilities are alternative ways of expressing the same concept. In particular,
the statement that the odds are 4-to-1 in favor of a certain outcome is equivalent to the statement that
the probability of the outcome is .8 or 80%. More generally, if the odds of a particular outcome are
x toy, the probability of the outcome is:

X

(x+y)

1992]

Taxation of Financial Instruments

29 !

Initially, there should be no tax consequences arising out of o ur bet .
O ur bet was an arm's length transaction. Therefore, it is reason abl e to
assume that our mutual obligations have the same value and that neither of
us has income. Thus, even under a pure accrual system , there would be
no accrual of income.
Of course, it is possible that one or both of us are better o ff and in
a strict economic sense have income. For examp le, I may have been
\villing to settle for 3-to-1 odds and you may have been willing to go as
high as 5-to-1. In that case, we would both perceive that we had made a
good bargain , and, in that sense, we would both be better off. in theory,
it could be argued that it would be appropriate to increase our tax li ab ilities
based on our perceived increase in well-being. 213
Even if it were
desirable, however, it would obviously be impractical to tax us o n our
perceived increase in welfare.
The only conceivably administrable
approach would be to tax us based on objective market valuations. 2 14
Even market valuations, however, should not be enough to impose
a tax at this point. For example, assume that the market "price" for such
bets is 3-to-1. In that case, I would have a favorable bet as judged against
the market. If the bet were immediately marked to market, the bet would
have a positive market value, and I would have taxable income. 215 While
in theory it would be appropriate to tax this income at this time, it would,
in general, be unwise from an administrative point of view. The cost of
discovering and valuing such off-market transactions would usually

213. For example, it can be argued that the appropriate tax base is ability to pay and that income
is merely a proxy for ability to pay. See , e.g., GRAETZ, supra note 48, at 17 (stating that tax equity
presumes those "persons with equal ability to pay taxes should pay equal amounts of tax"). The further
argument can then be made that ability to pay should be based on the subjective valuation of one's wellbeing, rather than on objective market valuati ons. But cf Haig, supra note 5, at 5 (questio ning whether
"satisfactions are really the proper theoretical basis for apportioning tax ~ ). Determining the tax base
on the basis of subjective valuations is equivalent to an argument th at consumer surplus should be
taxed. See Shaviro, supra note 326 , at 119i (noting that consumer surplus theoretically constitutes
inco me, but is immeasurable).
214. Cf. Haig, supra note 5, at 5 (arguing that "everyone will agree that [subjective valuations]
constitute an entirely impractical basis") .
215 . The value of the bet can be determined by the following argument: I could immediately enter
into an offsetting bet at the 3-to-1 market odds. In particular, I could enter into a bet whereby I would
be paid $1250 if a Republican won, and I would pay $3750 if a Democrat won. I would then have a
certain payment of $250 at the co nclusion of the bet. (lf a Democrat won, I would be paid $4000 on
the first bet and would pay $3750 on the second bet. If a Republican won, I would be paid $1250 on
the second bet and would pay $1000 on the first bet.) Because the payment would be deferred for
approximately a year, the value of the pair of bets would be the present value of $250, o r $227. The
second bet, however, is a market bet and therefore has a zero value. Acco rdingly, the first bet must
be worth approximately $227.
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overwhelm th e benefit. 2 16 lt seems much better to adopt th e assumption
that arm's length transactions give rise to no immediate income.
The foll owing day, George Bush admits that he has again misread
his own lips and proposes increasing taxes again by getting rid of the
fifteen percent tax bracket. Th e odds on th e 1992 election shift to 3-to-1.
Our bet is now worth $227 to me, and you have a corresponding unrealized loss of $227. 217 Under a full accrual system , the bet would be
marked to market, and we would each recognize our gain and ioss. As
discussed above, however, I have assumed that. mark ing to market is
un acceptable.218
The failure to mark to market means that, absent a realizati on event,
I am being undert<L'<ed on my economic income from the bet wh ile yo u are
being overtaxed on your economic loss. The mistaxation of our bet is
caused by unanticipated deferral. 219 There is no anticipated deferral
because the expected value of the bet, at the time we entered into it, was
presumed to be zero.
The potentially greater problem is the timing option-the ab ility of
the losing party to recognize its loss while the winning party defers its
gain. It is the ability to manipulate realization that lowers the expected
effective tax rate on the entire transaction. 220 The value of the timing
option can be minimized by having realization events occur as frequently
as possible. 221 In Example 4, however, there is no logical time to value
the bet prior to its conclusion. In other words, there is no practical way
to subdivide the bet into components so that the income on each piece of
the instrument can be individually assessed at an earlier date .

216. The benefit of taxing such transactions would be small. To begin with, little, if any, revenue
would be collected because of the fact that any gain on one side of the transaction would be countered
by loss o n the other side of the transaction. Furthermore, there would be little opportunity for
taxpayers facing different margina l rate s to align themselves on the "correct " side of the transacti o n.
See supra text accompanyi ng note 193 (desc ribing how taxpayers with different marginal rates may
increase the tax benefits arising from a transaction) . It is therefore diffi cu lt to argue that any serious
efficiency implications arise from failing to properly tax such gains and losses. Thu s, the only
argument for taxing such gains and losses would seem to be one of equity . The equity concerns,
however , would generally be insufficient to warrant the administrative cost.
217. See supra note 215 fo r the computation o f this a mount.
218. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
219. See supra text accompanying notes 50-51.
220. Example 4 is reaily a modifi cation of Example 2A. See supra text accompanying note 28.
In Examp le 2A, all of the contingencies were resolved once the coin was tossed . In Example 4, th e
contingency is not resolved until the conclusion of the bet (i.e., the 1992 election), but the probabilities
continu ally change.
221. Increasing the frequency of realization events is not the only soluti on . Another approach is
to defer loss beyond the time of a rea lization event. Loss deferral is the approach adopted by, for
example, I.R.C. §§ 1211 - 1212 (1988) (the capital loss limitation rules); id. § 1091 (the wash sa le rule);
and id. § 461 (h) (the economic performance rule) .
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Note also that to the extent that a market exists for the bet, the
problem is much greater. If you, as the current loser, have no choice but
to hold on to the bet, then there is de facto no timing option. Even in the
absence of a market, however, it would ordinarily be possible to terminate
the contract by mutual consent (i.e., you should be able to pay your
counterparty to terminate the contract, thus forcing a recogmtton
event). 222 Of course, termination of the contract would force recognition
by both parties, thus potentially eliminating any net value to the timing
option. 223
Assume now that Bush wins a second term, and I pay you $1000
as required by the wager. As all contingencies have been resolved and
payment has been made, there is no reason to further delay recognition of

222. The ability of a party to a contract to terminate the contract at a "market" price in the
absence of a formal market will vary greatly depending upon the circumstances. Factors that will tend
to make termination el!sier include: (I) the ease of valuing the contract; (2) the extent of ongoing
relationships with the counterparty; and (3) the availability of other potential counterparties.
223. Even if both parties face the same marginal rate, there may be value to the timing opti on if
one party is indifferent to the occurrence of a realization event. For example, the proposed regulations
permit dealers in notional principal contracts to elect to account for such contracts under a mark-tomarket system. Prop. Treas. Reg.§ 1.446-4, 56 Fed. Reg. 3!350, 31361 (1991). Consider a swap
contract between Townbank, a swap dealer, and LBM, an industrial corporation. Under the terms of
the contract, LBM has agreed to pay Townba!lk a fixed interest rate times a notional principal amount,
and Townbank has agreed to pay LBM a variable rate times the same amount. Assume that Townbank
has made the election to mark the notional principal contracts to market under§ l.446-4(a). See id.
If fixed rates rise, LBM will have a gain on the contract, and Townbank will have a loss. Townbank
will, however, be able to recognize its loss without forcing a realization event, thereby permitting LBM
to defer its gain. If fixed rates fall, LBM will have a loss and Townbank will have a gain . LBM can
then recognize its loss by terminating the contract and making a termination payment to Townbank.
!d. § 1.446-3(e)(6)(ii), 56 Fed. Reg . 31350, 31360 (1991). While ordinarily the making of such a
payment would cause Townbank to recognize gain, Townbank will recognize no further gain because
it will have already recognized gain under its method of accounting. In summary, LBM will get the
advantage of the timing option while Townbank will be taxed neutrally.
The mark-to-market election under § 1.446-4 is particularly interesting in light of § 1.4463(e)(6) of the proposed regulation. Paragraph (e)(6) provides, inter alia, that when a contract is
assigned, the assignment is a recognition event for both the assigning party and its counterparty (the
"symmetric recognition rule"). See id . The effect of the symmetric recognition rule is to limit the
timing option where both parties to a swap contract are taxable and neither party makes the mark-tomarket election. Each party retains the timing option, but its effect on the fisc is neutralized, because
when one party exercises the timing option, the other party must immediately recognize his income or
Joss from the transaction . When one party, however, is a dealer electing mark-to-market treatment,
the symmetric recognition rule has no effect when the nondealer counterparty assigns the contract and
triggers early recognition of the loss. Thus, the effect of the mark-to-market election is to neutralize
the symmetric recognition rule. Similarly, when the dealer has a loss, it will be able to recognize its
loss without triggering gain for the nondealer.
More perversely, LI-Je combination of the mark-to-market election and the symmetric
recognition rule potentially permits a nondealer party to recognize its loss without the nondealer having
to assign the contract. In particular, if the nondealer can convince the electing dealer to assign the
contract, the nondealerwill recognize its loss under the symmetric recognition rule without any adverse
tax consequences to the dealer.
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my loss and your gain. 224 Moreover, the amount of the loss and gain are
correctly measured by the cash payment made at the termination of the bet.
2.
Example 5: Escrow Account (Depositor Receives
Interest).-Consider now the same bet as in Example 4 except
that you decide that anyone who would bet that a Democrat will
win a presidential election must be unreliable and, therefore, a
credit risk. You insist that I post collateral. I do so by
depositing $1000 in an escrow account from which I receive the
interest.

Ideally, the tax consequences of the bet in Example 5 should be
exactly the same as the consequences of the bet in Example 4. 225
Whether or not you have security should not affect your income when the
bet is first entered into, nor does it militate in any significant way for
interim marking to market of the contract.
3.
Example 5A: Escrow Account (Depositor Does Not Receive
lnterest).-Assume the same bet as in Example 5, except that
we agree that you receive the interest from the escrow account.
Now, we have significantly changed the terms of the bet. In
essence, I am loaning you $1000 on an interest-free basis.
Assuming we end up with the same economic bet, I will insist
that I only deposit the present value of $1000, or $909.226
You should be indifferent because you will have $1000 at the
time of the election. I will be indifferent because I will have
an asset that is expected to be worth $1000 at the same time.
Of course, if I win the bet, you will pay me $5000.227 If I
lose, I will get nothing back, but I will have satisfied my
obligation to pay $1000. In either case, the asset is worth
$1000.

Under these circumstances, the tax consequences of the arrangement
in Example SA should be different from that of the previous bets. I have

224. In Example 4, payment is made at the time the contingency is resolved. This result is not
meant to suggest that payment is either a necessary or a sufficient condition for gain recognition.
Compare Prop. Treas. Reg.§ 1.1275-4(e)(3)(ii), 51 Fed. Reg. 12022, 12091 (1986) (providing for gain
recognition without payment when contingent interest on a debt obligation becomes fixed and is payable
in more than six months) with id. § 1.1272-l(e)(2)(ii), 51 Fed. Reg. 12022, 12051 (1986) (providing
for payment without recognition of income when amounts other than qualified periodic interest are paid
with respect to an installment obligation).
225. For purposes of exposition, I assume away credit risk in the previous wager and assume that
the escrow covers any credit risk in this wager. I ignore credit risk in the subsequent wagers.
226. I am assuming that we can borrow and lend at a rate of 10% and that the election is in one
year.
227. $4000 for winning the bet plus $1000 refund of my deposit.
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acquired an asset for $909 that is expected to increase in value in one year
to $1000. It is appwpriate to tax the expected income from the deposit in
the same manner as a zero-coupon bond. As with the zero-coupon bond,
I, as the " holder," should be required to accnt e $91 of income over the
intervening year. Correspondingly, you, as the "issuer," should be entitl ed
to an equal deduction over the same period . At the time of the election,
if I win, I would have additional income of $4000. 228 If I lose, I would
have a loss of $1000. The consequence of failing to accrue the $91 in
expected income is that there would be anticipated deferral on the bet. 229
While the expected income of $91 should be taxed on an accrual
basis, the actual income or loss should continue to be deferred until the termination of the bet or some earlier realization event. Note that the taxation
of the bet in Example 5A is the same as the taxation of an economically
equivalent arrangement whereby instead of placing the $909 in an escrow
account, I purchase from you a zero coupon bond with a ten-percent yield
for $909 with the bond pledged as collateral for the bet.
4.
Example 6: Prepayment.- You offer to enter into a bet
whereby if a Democrat is elected you will pay me $5000, and
if a Republican is elected I will pay you nothing. Since it is
not a fair bet, you insist I pay you $909 to enter into the bet .
I do so. 230
The first question is whether the $909 should be income to you and
a loss for me at the time the bet is entered into. The correct answer must
be that you should have no taxable income merely by entering into the
transaction and receiving payment. 231

228. My basis in the bet should be my initial payment of $909 plus the accrued $91 in interest.
My gain would therefore be the $5000 cash receipt minus $1000 basis , or $4000.
229. See supra text accompanying notes 49-49 and 65-70 for a discus sion of the undesirable effects
of anticipated deferral.
230. I will sometimes refer to a bet that requires an initial payment as an off-market bet.
231. Note that it can be argued that this result is inconsistent with Schlude v. Commissioner, 372
U.S . 128 (1963). Schlude concerned the taxation of dance instructors using the accrual method and
held that the Commissioner had not abused his discretion under the § 446(b) clear reflection of income
requirement by requiring the taxpayer to recognize income upon the receipt of prepayments for future
dance lessons . Schlude, 3 72 U.S. at 133-37. Schlude can be read fo r the proposition that an accrual
method taxpayer has income at the earlier of the time that an item of income accrues or the receipt of
payment. A better reading of the case, however, is that the courts will give the Commissioner
significant latitude in determining when a method of accounting clearly reflects income. This latter
reading of the case is consistent with the approach taken in proposed regulations on notional principal
contracts . See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-3(e)(3), 56 Fed. Reg. 31350, 31357 (1991), and its
predecessor, I.R.S . Notice 89-21, 1989-1 C.B. 651 (stating that up-front payments in notional principal
contracts must be amortized over the life of such contracts); see also Rev. Proc. 71-21, 1971-2 C.B.
549 (stating that under specified circumstances, an accrual basis taxpayer may defer the inclusion of
payments received in one taxable year for services to be performed in the succeeding taxable year
where such treatment is consi stent with th e ta xpayer's book accounting) ; Treas. Reg . § 1.451 -5 (as
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There are several reasons for the conclusion that there should be no
immediate tax consequences of the initial payment. First, in economic
terms you have no income. You are no better off after entering into the
transaction than you were before entering into it. This is because the $909
increase in your assets has been offset by your liability, which has an
expected value of $909. 232 Second, to accept any other answer would
permit taxpayers to manipulate their income in a manner that would invite
wholesale tax avoidance. For example, it might permit complete avoidance
of the limitations on the carryforward period for net operating losses, 233
as well as the limitations on loss carryforwards in corporate acquisitions.234 Finally, assuming that the payor is not permitted an equal
and offsetting loss, the effect of treating the payment as income is to
overtax the transaction. Overtaxing the transaction is generally inefficient,
leading to an alteration in the form of the transaction (with presumably
greater transaction costs) and to a reduction in the number of such transactions.235 Just as there should be no income from the receipt of the $909
payment, there should be no deduction. The reasoning parallels that just
given on the income side. 236
The next question is whether there should be any income or
deduction over the life of the bet (i.e., up until the moment before the
election). There are several aspects to this question. First is the issue of
whether the bettors should have income or loss during the life of the bet
resulting from changes in the expected outcome of the wager. In this

amended in 1986) (expounding similar rules for sales of property).
232. The existence of an offsetting liability is the usual justification given for not including
borrowed funds in income. See, e.g., Commissionerv. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 307 (1983) ("When a
taxpayer receives a loan, he incurs an obligation to repay that loan at some future date. Because of this
obligation, the loan proceeds do not quality as income to the taxpayer."); GRAETZ, supra note 48, at
216 ("In Henry Simons' terms, there is no change in the net worth of either party [to a loan]. The
increase in funds to the borrower is offset by an equivalent liability to repay . . . . ").
233. For example, consider a taxpayer with an expiring net operating loss of $909. The taxpayer
could enter into two bets. In the first bet, she would receive $909 immediately and would be required
to pay $5000 in one year if a Democrat is elected. In the second bet, she would receive $4000 in one
year if a Democrat is elected and would pay $1000 in one year if a Republican is elected. Therefore,
taken together, the bets would produce receipts of $909 immediately and outlays of $1000 in one year.
If the receipts were immediately taxable, she would have $909 of income in the current taxable year
and $1000 loss in the next taxable year, effectively refreshing her net operating loss for another 15
years. See I.R.C. § 172(b)(1)(A)(ii) (Supp. II 1990) (providing that net operating loss can be carried
forward to each of the 15 taxable years following the taxable year of the loss).
234. See id. § 382. Attempts to use up-front payments to avoid§ 382 may also be prevented by
treating subsequent payments under the transaction as built-in losses. !d. § 382(h)(6). It is, however,
better to directly attack the mismeasurement of income, rather than to try to foresee every possible use
by taxpayers of such mismeasurement.
235. See supra subpart III(D) for a discussion concerning efficiency consequences.
236. On the deduction side, it is much easier to see the opportunities for tax avoidance, since the
circumstances in which taxpayers prefer tax losses without economic losses overwhelm the
circumstances in which taxpayers prefer taxable income without economic income .
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respect, however, Example 6 is no different than Examples 4 or 5 and
should be treated the same. In other words, it should be assumed that the
probability of the outcomes is unch anged and there is no gain or loss. 237
A separate issue is whether the payor of the $909 should be
permitted to amortize the payment and , correspondingly, whether the payee
should be required to take the payment into income over the same period .
In general , the payor should be permitted to amortize her payment if and
only if the value of the asset is expected to decline over the period. m
Here, the payor has no such expectation and, accordingly, no amortizati on
should be permitted.
The final issue is whether the payor should be required to take any
imputed income into account over the life of the bet. In this regard, the
prepayment in this example is equivalent to the deposit in Example SA.
The payor has purchased an asset which is expected to increase in value to
$1000 over the next year. In order to avoid creating a transaction with
anticipated deferral, it is necessary to tax the payor currently. Accordingly, the payor should have imputed income of $91 from the bet. As of
the election, she would have a $1000 basis and either a $1000 loss (if the
Republicans won) or a $4000 gain (if the Democrats won). Note that
under the approach described above for Examples 5A and 6, the incidence
of taxation on each party is the same whether the payment is denominated
a security deposit or an up-front payment for entering into an off-market
bet.

B.

Multiple Bets

Examples 4 through 6 dealt with the taxation of a single bet. The
following four examples demonstrate how the problem becomes more
difficult when multiple bets are introduced. Example 7 introduces a simple
series of two bets in which each bet is on-market. Example 8 expands
Example 7 by introducing prepayments while assuming that the odds on the
underlying bets are unchanged.
Example 9 demonstrates that with
prepayments the underlying economics of a series of bets, and thus the
desired taxation of the bets, is not determined solely by the terms of the
bet. This point is demonstrated by showing that the pattern of cash flows
in Example 8 is consistent with different underlying odds. Finally,
Example 10 demonstrates that the inability to determine the underlying bet
in the case of prepayment extends to the case in which there appears to be

237. See supra text accomp anying notes 215-16 (adopting the assumpti on th at ann's length
transactions give rise to no immed iate income) .
238. Th e statement in t.'1e text is essentially present law for depreciable assets. See I.R.C. § 167
(1988) (a llowing as a dep recia tion deduction a reasonable allowance for th e exhaustion and wear and
tear of property used in a trade or business or held for the production of income).
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no prepayment. The case of a hidden prepayment is demonstrated by
comparing the bet in Example 7 to a new bet with identical odds and
identical payment times , but different payment amounts.
1.
Example 7: No Prepayment.-Consider a so mewhat more
complicated bet. Rath er than betting onl y on th e next election ,
we bet on th e next two elections. Assume th at th e odds are 4to-1 and 3-to-1 on th e first and second elections, respectively.
Thus , if a Democrat wins the first election , you will pay me
$4000, and if a Republican wins, I will pay you $1000. If a
Democrat wins the second election you will pay me $4000, and
if a Republican wins I will pay you $1333. 239

Initially, for the same reasons as in the case of the single bet, there
should be no income to either party. Similarly, we begin with the
assumption that the bet will not be marked to market prior to the first
election. The question of the appropriate taxation becomes more difficult
once the outcome of the fi rst election is known. Assume that a Democrat
wins the first election. In a pure mark-to-market system, I would have
income of $4000 from the first part of the bet plus or minus the value of
the remaining part of the bet. Assuming, as before, that we are unwilling
to mark the bet to market, there are a variety of alternatives.
One possibility would be to treat the payment as an open transaction
and wait until the completion of the bet (the second election) to determine
gain or loss. Under this alternative, no immediate tax consequences would
flow from the outcome of the first bet or the resulting receipt of $4000.
The primary problem with this approach is that by extending the period
before realization the timing option is made more valuable.
A second possibility would be to mark the bet to market at the time
of the first election?40 There is no reason, however, to believe that it is
any easier to value the second part of the bet at the time of the first
election than it would be at any other time . Thus , this alternative suffers
from the same sort of administrative problems of any mark-to-market
approach.
A third possibility would be to value the contract at the time of the

239. Example 7 is similar to Strnad's dual lottery example, except th at the odds of the seco nd part
of the bet are affected by the outco me of the first part. See Strnad, supra note 6, at 1910.
240 . Marking to market at the time of the first electio n differs from a pure accrual system in that
the accrual is triggered by a specific event internal to the bet (o r fin ancial instrument) rather than being
triggered by the passage of time, e.g., every year .
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first election using the conditionai probabilities as determined at the time
the contract was initially entered into. 241 • For example, assume that as of
the time the bet was first entered into we agreed that if the Democrats won
the first election, the odds against their winning the second election would
become 2-to-1 rather than 3-to-1. In that case, assuming that the probabilities have not otherwise changed , once the Democrats win the first election,
my 3-to-1 bet for the second election has a known value, approximately
$291. 242 Thus, using the initial conditional probabilities, I would have
income of $4291 243 and you would have an equal loss.
The problem with valuing the bet based on the conditional
probabilities is that it requires knowing the conditional probabilities . In
general, it is likely to be more difficult to determine the conditional
prob abiliti es than it would be to simply value the second bet at the time of
the el ection . It is thus unlikely that this would prove to be a fruitful
approach. 244
A fourth approach, and the one that I believe is most attractive, is
to treat the two bets as independent for timing purposes and to tax each bet
in the same manner as a single bet. Under this approach, at the time of the
first election I would have income of $4000 on the first bet, but would wait
until the outcome of the second election to determine the taxation of the
second bet. This approach strikes a balance between the highly accurate,
but administratively costly, full accrual system and the open transaction
approach with the problems of deferral and the timing option that it
presents. 245
2.
Example 8: Prepayment.-As a variant of the previous
pair of bets, assume that I pay for my side of the bets up front.
In that case, I would make a payment of $1737 246 and you

24i. See infra Appendix D (describing the treatment of correlated events).
242. The expected value of the payoff in four years is $427 (I /3 x $4000 - 2/3 X $1333). The
bet is worth the present value of $427, or $291.
243. $4000 from the first part of the bet plus $291 from the second part of the bet.
244 . Where the outcome of the earlier contingency determines the later contingency with certainty,
it would generally be appropriate to take that fact into account in determining income at the time that
the first contingency is resolved. For a more complete discussion, see infra Appendix D. See infra
Appendix C for a discussi on of Prop . Treas . Reg. § 1. 1275-4(e)(3)(ii) & -4(f)(2)(v) (explaining the
treatment of contingencies that have been fixed but are payable more than six months in the future).
245. Note, however, that the bifurcation of the transaction into two independent bets may not be
as simple as it appears. In particular, the bifurcation approach assumes that the two bets were each
correctly priced. As discussed below, there is generally no reason to believe that this holds true . See
infra text accompanying note 251 .
246. $1737 is equal to the present value of a $1000 payment in one year plus the present value
of a $1333 payment in five years .
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will pay me $5000 if there is a Democratic victory in the first
election and $5333 if there is a Democratic victory in the
second election.

The taxation of the bet in Example 8 follows easily from the rules
suggested above. The overall bet should be separated into the two
individual bets and the prepayment should be allocated among the bets
based on the fair market value of each bet. The first bet has a payoff of
$5000 in one year with a probability of twenty percent. Its value is,
therefore, $909 . The second bet has a payoff of $5333 in five years with
a probabi lity of twenty-five percent. Its value is $828. Accordingly, I
would be treated as paying $909 for the first bet and $828 for the second
bet, for a total of $1737 . I would then be required to accrue income on the
two bets as shown in the table below.
Table 1: Imputed Income from Series of Bets with Prepayments
Total income
accrued

1

$91

$83

$174

2

0

91

91

3

0

100

100

4

0

110

110

5

0

121

121

$91

$505

$596

Total Income
Purchase Price

I

Income
accrued from
second bet

Income
accrued from
first bet

Year

Final Basis

I

II

909
$1000

I

I

828
$1333

I

I

1737

:

I

I

During the first year, I would accrue $174 in income, of which $91
would be attributable to the first bet. 247 As of the end of the first year,

247. Note that the income in each year from the bets with prepayments in Example 8 is the same
as would be the case if there were no prepayments on the bets, but there were two zero-coupon loans,
a one-year loan with an issue price of $909 and a five-year loan with an issue price of $505.
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my basis in the first bet would be $1000. If a Democrat won, I would be
paid $5000 and have a gain of $4000. If a Republican won , I would pay
nothing and have a loss of $1000. I would then accrue an additional $422
in income with respect to the second portion of the bet over the next four
years. At the time of the second election, I would have a basis in the bet
of $1333 . If I won , I would receive $5333 and have a gain of $4000. If
I lost, I would have a loss of $1333. As before, the principal weakness of
this approach to taxation is the existence of the timing option. The timing
option inh erent in this approach, however, should not be significantly
greater than the option afforded by two independent bets. 248
Note, however, that the proposed solution imposes a significant
informational burden. It is now necessary to know the odds on the first
two bets at the time the bets are placed. In other words, it is necessary to
know the fair market value or market price for each individual bet. To see
this informational requirement more clearly, consider the following
example.
3. Example 9: Prepayment with Modified Odds.-Consider a
modified series of bets with prepayment. Under the first bet in
the series, I would pay you $1135 for a Republican victory,
and you would pay me $3865 for a Democratic victory
(equivalent to odds of 3.4-to-1). Under the second bet, the
payments would be $1135 and $4198 (equivalent to odds of
3. 7 -to-1). Assuming prepayment, I would pay $1032 for the
first election and $705 for the second election for a total of
$1737. You would then pay me $5000 ($1135 + $3865) and
$5333 for a Democratic victory in the first and second elections, respectively.
The cash flows from the bets in Example 9, including the prepayment, are identical to those from the bets in Example 8. In Example 9,
however, the imputed income would be different, as is shown in Table 2.

248. The value of the timing option is lessened by the inability to trade the bets separately. The
value is increased if selling the two bets together has lower transaction costs than selling them as two
independent bets.
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Table 2: Imputed Income from Series of Bets with Modified Odds
Income
accrued from
first bet

Year

Total income
accrued

Income accrued
from second
bet

1

$103

$70

$ 173249

2

0

78

78

3

0

85

85

4

0

94

94

5

0

103

103

Total Income

$103

$430

$533

Purchase Price

1032

705

1737

I Final

Basis

I

$1135

I

$1135

I

I

In addition, my basis in the first bet as of the first election would be
$1135, instead of$1000, and my basis in the second bet as of the second
election would also be $1135 instead of $1333.
Example 9 demonstrates that, given the amount of the up-front
payment and the payoffs from the bets (the known cash flows), more than
one allocation between the two bets is possible. In fact, an unlimited
number of allocations are possible. The particular allocation in Example
9 was arbitrarily selected so that the amount paid in case of a Republican
victory was the same (as of each respective election date). Obviously,
there is no reason to believe that every pair of bets would meet this
criterion. 250

249. The total first-year income in Table 2 is less than the total first-year income in Table I due
to rounding.
250. More generally, any time there is a single prepayment for two future costs, there is
essentially an infinite set of future values that the prepayment is consistent with. To see this, consider
two payments defining a bet, p 1 and p 2 , where p 1 is to be paid in one year and p 2 is to be paid in two
years. Assuming a discount rate r, the prepayment would be:

Pt

Pz

Po=--+
·
(1 +r)
(1 +r?
Now, assume that the only known numbers are p0 and r. In that case, the above equation
is a single equation with two variables. There are, in general, an infinite number of solutions to such
a problem. In Example 9, it is further assumed that p 1 = p 2 • In such a case, there are now two
equations containing two unknow ns, and a unique solution generally exists.
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Put most simply, the problem is allocating the purchase price of the
pair of bets between the two bets. The correct answer is obtained only
when the allocation is by fair market value. While making a fair market
valuation may not be easy, it needs to be done only once. Moreover, the
valuation will only have to be performed at the time the transaction is
entered into, rather than at later, arbitrary times. Furthermore, the
allocation is no different in kind than the allocation that must be made any
time a person purchases a set of assets for a single price, such as in the
purchase of a business. 251
The previous example demonstrated that when there is more than
one bet and there is a prepayment, it is not possible to determine from the
terms of the bets the correct treatment of the individual bets. As
demonstrated in the following example, the amounts paid for each
individual bet may not represent the correct price for each bet even where
there appears to be no prepayment.
4.
Example 10: Hidden Prepayment.-Assume that the odds
for the next two elections are still 4-to-1 and 3-to-1, respectively. Nevertheless, assume that we agree to bet on both
elections, using the odds of 3.54-to-1 for both bets . In
particular, I agree to pay you $1130 for each Republican
victory, and you agree to pay me $4000 for each Democratic
victory.

While neither of the bets by themselves are fair, the two bets taken
together are fair. In other words, the present value of the expected payoffs
is zero. Essentially, I am agreeing to overpay you for the first election in
exchange for underpaying you for the second election. The correct
treatment of the pair of bets depends on knowing the prices for the two
individual bets. 252 We know that the probability of a Democratic victory

251 . To say that such an allocation has to be performed elsewhere is not to minimize the difficulty
of such an allocation. The allocation of purchase price in the context of a business allocation is a
theoretically simple, but administratively complex area of the tax law . See infra text accompanying
notes 372-79 for further discussion of the difficulty of such an allocation in the context of financial
instruments and of current rules in the tax law requiring similar allocations.
252 . More generally, assume, following supra note 250, that the correct forward prices are p 1 and
p2 • There is essentially an infinite set of pairs of prices p 1' and p 2 ' such that the present value of the
pair {p/, p/} is equal to the present value of the pair {p1 , p 2 }. In particular, any pair {p1 ' , pz'} has
the same present value as {p1 , p 2 }, so long as :

(1 + r)

+

(1 +

r?

(1 + r)

+

The set of solutions to this equation is saved from being infinite only if additional co nstraints are
imposed.
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in the first election is twenty percent. Therefore, the correct price for the
first bet is $1026. 253 The first payment, therefore, should be viewed as
a payment of $1026 for the first bet and a prepayment of $104 for the
second bet. In the case of a Republican victory, therefore, I should have
a loss of only $1026, rather than the full $1130 payment. At the same
time, I should have a basis of $104 in the second bet. During the next four
years, I should have approximately $48 of imputed income on the second
bet.2..'i4 At the time of the second election, I will pay an additional $1130
for a total basis of $1282, the correct forward price for the second bet. 255
Thus, it does not matter whether or not payments are made at the
time that the uncertainties are resolved or in advance of their resolution.
As long as there is more than one uncertainty, it is necessary to determine
the correct forward price for each uncertainty in order to determine the
proper timing of income. 256
VII.

An Application of the Expected Value Approach to Typical
Financial Instruments

The advantages and disadvantages of expected value taxation were
explored in Part VI using a series of hypothetical wagers. In this Part,
expected value taxation is further developed by applying the approach to
a selection of actual financial products. 257

A.

Cash-Settlement Forward Contracts
1.

Description of a Cash-Settlement Forward Contract.-A

forward contract is a two-party executory contract wherein one party agrees
to buy specified property, and the other party agrees to sell such property
at a specified price on a specified delivery date. 258 Payment for the
property is generally made at the time of transfer. 259 A cash-settlement
forward contract is a forward contract that is settled in cash, rather than by
delivery of the underlying good. 260

253 . $1026 is the expected value of the bet.
254. $48 is the amount of interest $104 will earn in four years at 10% compounded annually.
255. $1282 is the expected value of the second bet.
256 . The same result holds true when payments are deferred.
257. The following discussion assumes that the described financial instrument is not a § 1256
contract and , therefore, is not subject to the mark-to-market rules in § !256(a). See I.R .C. § 1256
(1988); see also supra subpart IV(C) (describing LIJe types of instruments subject to § 1256).
258. See generally I THOMAS A. Russo, REGULATION OF THE COMMODITIES, FUTURES, AND
OPTIONS MARKET§ 9.01 (1983).
259. !d. § 9 .02. While payment is generally made at the time of delivery, payment may be made
at an earlier or later point in time. !d.
260. See I.R.C. § 1234(c)(2)(B) (1988). The amount of cash paid is the difference between the
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Proposed Taxation ofa Cash-Settlement Forrvard Contract.- A

forward contract involves only a single contingency, the price of the
underlying commodity on the delivery date. Accordingly, it should be
treated as a single instrument for timing purposes. The second step
requires determining the expected future price of the forw ard. 26 1 There
are at least two approaches for determining an expected fu ture price fo r
timing purposes. First, at least in theory, it would be possible to try to
determine the true expected value of the future price. 262 Second, it
would be possible to use the market forward price. In a competitive
equilibrium in a risk-neutral world, the forward price of an asset must
equal the expected future price. If the forward price for a commodity were
less than the expected future price, an expected profit could be made by
purchasing the commodity forward, taking delivery at maturity, and then
selling the commodity in the spot market. Given the assumption of riskneutrality, such transactions would be carried out until the forward price
was driven up to the expected future price. Therefore, in a risk-neutral
world, the use of either the forward price or the expected future price
would give the same answer.
In a world where people are risk averse (or risk-preferring)
expected future prices will generally differ from forward prices. For
example, a risk-averse potential purchaser of the commodity will be willing
to pay a premium over the expected future price, while a risk-averse
potential seller of the commodity will be willing to sell for less than the
expected future price. Thus, even in equilibrium, forward prices will
generally differ from expected future prices.
Nevertheless, I believe that forward prices are the appropriate prices
to use for purposes of determining expected future prices for tax purposes .
The primary argument in favor of forward prices is administrative.
Determining true expected prices is administratively impractical. Forward
prices provide a reasonable proxy for expected future prices at far lower
administrative cost. 263

co ntract or forward price and the spot price at the delivery date. See I Russo , supra note 258, § 9 .02 .
Fo r example, assume that David has entered into a cash-settlement fo rward contract with BankCo to
purchase 100 ounces of gold at $400 per ounce o n April I, 1992 . On April I, 1992, gold is selling
for $420 per ounce. BankCo would be obligated to pay David $20 per ounce, or $2000. If David
actually wished to purchase 100 ounces of gold o n that date, it would cost him $42 ,000 . Taking into
account his receipt of $2000, however, his net cost would be $40,000 or $400 per ounce, exactly the
cost under the contract.
261. The expected value of a forward contract at maturity is equal to the contract valued at th e
expected price of the underlying commodity. Thus, the expected future value of the contract and the
expected future price of the underlying commodity can be used essentially interchangeably . Cf infra
note 393 (noting that the expected value of an option is not equal to the option valued at the expected
price of the underlying commodity) .
262. Of course, it would be necessary to ask whose expectation: the buy er' s, the seller's, or the
"market's." Presumably, as di scussed above, it should be the market 's expectation that counts.
263 . In a competitive equilibrium, given th e spot price and the cost of ca rrying a commodity,
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A second argument can also be made for using forward prices
rather than expected future prices.
Consider a forward contract to
purchase an asset that is current! y selling for $100 and offers no current
return. Assume that because of the risk characteristics of the asset it is
expected to yield an eighteen percent return at a time when the risk-free
interest rate is ten percent. 264 In that case, the one-year forward price of

forward prices can be determined mechanicaily without regard to expected future prices. The spot price
is the current price for current delivery of the good. The cost of carrying always includes the
opportunity cost of the funds used in purchasing the good on the spot market and also includes such
costs as storage and insurance. Carrying costs are negative to the extent that the good generates a
current return. If the current return is large enough, total carrying costs can be negative and the future
price will be less than the spot price. Markets where the forward price is less than the spot price are
often referred to as being in backwardation. See 2 JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, A TREATISE ON MONEY
142-44 (6th ed. 1960) .
To understand the relationship between spot and forward prices, consider the following
example. Assume that the spot price for silver is $10 per ounce &nd the cost of carrying silver for one
year is $1 per ounce. In equilibrium, it must be the case that the one-year forward price for silver is
$11 per ounce. Should the forward price for silver exceed $11, riskless arbitrage profits could be made
by purchasing silver in the spot market and selling it in the forward market. These purchases and sales
would drive up the spot price and lower the forward price until they met the condition that forward
prices equal spot prices plus the cost of carrying the commodity. Similarly , if the forward price was
less than $11, riskless arbitrage profits could be obtained by selling silver short in the spot market and
purchasing silver in the forward market.
Given the fact that forward prices can be determined mechanically from the spot price and
the carrying costs for the commodity, it might be concluded that forward prices are independent of
expected future prices. If forward prices were independent of expected future prices, the argument for
using forward prices as a proxy for expected future prices would be severely weakened. Fortunately,
the relationship between spot and forward prices does not demonstrate that forward prices are
independent of expectations, but rather that spot and forward prices are not independent of each other.
They are, in fact, both dependent on expectations about the future demand and supply for the commodity.
GERALD GOLD, MODERN COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING 30, 54 (6th ed. 1971). In
equilibrium, if you know the forward price, no additional information about expected future prices can
be gleaned from the spot price and vice versa. Knowing either the spot or the forward price, however,
provides information about expected future prices. See infra text accompanying note 383 for a
suggestion that forward prices may be estimated by use of the spot price plus the cost of carry.
The proof that in equilibrium the forward price of a good must be equal to its spot price plus
carrying costs is an arbitrage proof that requires the ability to transfer the good between periods. Thus,
the forward price of a good cannot be in excess of the spot price plus carrying costs as long as it is
possible to purchase the good in the spot market and hold onto it until the forward contract matures.
If the good in question is gold, an arbitrageur is able to purchase gold in the spot market and hold it
for delivery in the forward market. If, on the other hand, the good is fresh raspberries, it would
generally not be possible to carry the good from the spot market to the forward market and , therefore,
the forward price may exceed the spot price. For example, in August, fresh raspberries may sell for
$1 per pint while at the same time fresh raspberries for December delivery may be $6 per pint (representing the expected cost of importing raspberries from Chile) . See GOLD, supra, at 31-34.
Similarly, the forward price may be less than the spot price plus carrying costs when it is not
possible to borrow the good now for spot delivery. Again, using gold, an arbitrageur is able to borrow
gold for delivery into the spot market, later taking delivery in the forward market to return the
borrowed gold. On the other hand, if it is not possible to borrow the commodity, the forward price
can be sustained at less than the spot price plus carrying costs.
264. See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 18, ch. 8 (describing the relationship between the
riskiness of an investment and its expected return).
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the asset would be $ 110, whi le the expected future price would be $118.
Assuming a fifty percent tax rate, under a mark-to-market system, the
expected tax I iabil ity of the holder of the forward would be $9, fifty
percent of the expected income of $18. O n the other hand, consider the
current market price of the future tax payment-the amount that someone
would currently agree to pay in one year in exchange for the tax liability
of the holder of the for ward contract. The market price for the future tax
payment would have to be $5. If the price were more than $5, it would
be possibl e to make a certain arbitrage profit by selling the tax payment
and purchasing one-half of a forward contract on the asset. 265 Conversely, if the price of the future tax payment were less than $5, the purchaser
of the tax payment could make an arbitrage profit by purchasing the tax
payment and selling one-half of a forward contract. Thus, in a mark-tomarket wo rld, the future tax payments would be priced based on the
forward price for the asset, not the expected future price.266 Therefore,
a mark-to-market system is arguably best approximated using the forward
price rather than the expected future price. Assuming that the forward
contract was entered into at the market forward price, the best estimate for
tax purposes of the expected future value of the forward contract is zero.
Therefore, there should be no accrual of income prior to maturity. At
maturity, the parties should have income and loss equal to the amount
required to be paid under the contract.
3. Example JJ.-Diva enters into a cash-settlement forward
contract with David to purchase 10,000 ounces of silver in two
years at $12 per ounce. When the contract matures, the spot
price of silver is $14.50 per ounce. David pays Diva $25,000 .
Example 11 involves a single forward contract at the market price.
Accordingly, as under current law, there should be no income imputed to
either party prior to maturity. 267 At maturity, Diva should include
$25,000 in income and David should be permitted an equal loss. While the
on-market forward contract in Example 11 offers no anticipated deferral,

265. For example, assume you sold the U!x payment for $6 and purchased one-half of a forward
contract. If the asset price at the end of the year were $125, you would owe $12.50 in U! x payments
and would receive $7.50 under the forward contract, plus $6 for the sale of the U!x payments, for a
toU!l profit of $1. If, on the other hand, the asset price were $90, you would be paid $5 in U!x
payments (i.e., you would pay a negative U!x of $5 , assuming fully deductible losses) , you would pay
$5 under the one-half forward contract and would be paid $6 for the forward sale of the tax payments,
for a toU!l profit of $1.
266. See Jeremy T. Bulow & Lawrence H. Summers, 17ze Taxation of Risky Assets, 92 J. POL.
ECON. 20 (1984).
267. Under current law, no gain or loss would be realized on the forward contract until there was
a sale or other disposition. Cj ANDREA S. KRAMER, 2 FINANCIAL PR ODUCTS: T A.X...AT ION,
REGULATI ON , AN D DESIGN§ 42.1(b) , at 1118-19 (1991).
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it offers unanticipated deferral, and, therefore, the timing option, to ul.e
extent that the forward price varies over the term of the contract.
The timing option is made worse in the case of forward contracts
that can be settled in property. In such cases, because exerci se is not
considered to be a realization event, the forward purchaser can continue to
defer any gain beyond the life of the contract by exercising her right to
settle in the underlying property. 268 The timing option could be li mited
in such cases by treating exercise of the forward contract as a realization
event. 269 Treating exercise as a realization event would require valuing
the underlying property as of the exercise date, but would not requ ire
valuation of the forward contract as such. 270

B.

Cash-Settlement European Options
1.

Description of a Cash-Settlement Option.- A call option is a

contract that gives the holder the right, but not the obligation, to purchase
specified property at a specified price (the "strike price") at a specified
time (the "strike date"). 271 A put option gives the holder the right , but
not the obligation, to sell rather than purchase specified property. 272 As
defined, an option confers a valuable right without any offsetting
obligation, and, therefore, always has a positive value. 273 An option
premium, which is generally paid upon entering into the contract, serves
as payment for this value. 274

268. q id.
269 . Note that § 1256(c) requires gain recognition on exercise of a futures contract subject to
§ 1256(a) . See I.R.C . § 1256 (1988).
270. If the property that is the subject of the forward contract is a publicly traded asset, the
administrative cost of valuing the asset at the time of purchase should be small. If the property is not
publicly trad ed, the administrative cost of valuation could be prohibitive.
271. See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 18, at 485 (defining a call option) . The foregoing is a
description of a European call option. In the case of an American option, the ho lder has the right to
exercise the option at any time until and including the strike date. See infra subpart VII(C) fo r a
discussion of American options.
272. See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 18, at 485-86 (distinguishing call and put options) .
273. The value of the option may be arbitrarily close to zero, but as long as there is the possibility
of price movement, the value should be positive.
274 . See Thomas A. Russo & Marlisa Vinciguerra , Financial Innovation an.d Un certain
Regulation.: Selected Issues Regarding New Product Development, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1431 , 1432 n.2
(1991). In a present value sense, there is no significance to the time the option premium is paid as long
as the amount of the premium is adjusted for the time value of money. In fact, a forward contract is
equivalent to a call option with a zero strike price for which the premium is generally paid at exercise.
The principal effect of shifting the time that the premium is paid is to allocate credit risk between the
parties. If, for example, the premium is payable at the strike date, the option plu s the obligation to pay
the premium can have a negative value. Unless specified otherwise, I assume that any op tion premium
is paid at the time that th e option contract is made.
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2. Proposed Taxation of a Cash-Settlement Option.-As with a
forward contract, an option contract involves only a single contingency, the
price of the underlying good at the exercise date. Accordingly, it should
be treated as a single instrument for timing purposes with the only
realization event occurring at exercise, or exp iration, of the option. The
rnore difficult question is determining whether any expected income or loss
occurs during the term of the option and, therefore, whether any income
or loss should be accrued during the term. An option is fundamentally no
different from the bet in Example 6. 275 In Example 6, one party to the
bet has prepaid its obligation under the bet. Similarly, an option can be
viewed as a bet where one s ide has prepaid its obligation. 276
In Example 6, the amount of the prepayment was equal to the
present value of the expected return from the bet. Similarly, with an
option the premium is equal to the present value of the expected return
from the option. 277 Just as with L~e bet , the payor of the option premium
should accrue income in each period equal to the change in the expected
value of the option, which is assu med to be measured by its forward
price. 278 Given that the carrying cost of an option is generally limited to
the interest cost of the premium, the expected value can be estimated by
assuming that the value of the option increases by an appropriate interest
factor. 279 Similarly, the writer of the option should be entitled to accrue
a deduction over the same period. Any accrual should be added to or
subtracted from basis, and at maturity the purchaser and the writer of the
option should have income and loss measured against their respective
adjusted bases.
275. See supra text accompanying note 230. The finance literature has recognized the equivalence
between an option and many other financial instruments. For example, debt of a corporation can be
viewed as a purchase of the assets of a corporation by the debt holder along with a sale by the debt
holder to the stockholders of a cal! option on the same assets with a strike price equal to the face
amount of th e debt. See, e.g., Cox & RUBINSTEIN, supra note 61, at 376; BREA.LEY & MYERS, supra
note 18, at 582.
276. By "prepaid" I mean only that the payment is made prior to the time that the underlying
contingency is resolved. The fact that the premium on an option is normally paid at the time the
contract is entered into has nothing to do with the question of wh ether the premium is prepaid as the
term is used here .
277. To be exact, the value of an option is equal to its discounted expected future value in a riskneutral world. See John C. Cox & Stephen A. Ross, 17ze Valuation of Options for Altemative
Stochastic Processes, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 145, 164 (1976).
278 . See supra section Vll(A)(2) (arguing that the forward price is the best measure of future
value).
279 . Cj. Committee on Financial Instruments, New York State Bar Ass'n, Repon on Tax
Accounting for Notional Principal Comracts , Tax Notes Today, Oct. 18, 1989, available in LEXIS,
FedTax Library, TNT File (discussing alternative methods of amortizing cap premiums and concluding
that the method recommended in the text is incorrect and that "economic amortization" or "market
accrual" should be used instead) . For a more complete discussion of this point, see infra Appendix
A.
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3.
Example 12.-Diva enters into a cash-settlement call
option with David to purchase 10,000 ounces of silver in two
years at $12 per ounce. Diva pays David $10,000 for the
option. The contract matures at a time when the spot price of
silver is $14.50 per ounce. David pays Diva $25,000. 280

Diva has purchased an asset for $10,000 which she is presumed to
expect to increase in value to $11,000 by the end of the first year and to
$12,100 by the end of the second year. Diva should accordingly have
income of $1000 in the first year and $1100 in the second year. Diva's
basis in the option as of the end of the second year should be $12,100. At
maturity, Diva should have income of $12,900. David's tax treatment
should be the opposite of Diva's.
In general, under current law, both the holder and the writer of an
option have no income or deduction prior to the exercise or expiration of
the option. 281 Thus, under both current law and my proposal there is a
timing option to the extent that the price changes between the time of
purchase and the maturity of the option .282 The difference between the
two approaches is that current law fails to tax anticipated deferral .

4. Cash-Settlement American Options.- The discussion so far has
assumed that the option is a European option, exercisable only at
maturity. 283 To what extent would the analysis change if the option was
an American option, exercisable at any time prior to maturity? 284 To
begin with, it is useful to note that the difference between the two types of
options is less than might appear. One of the standard conclusions of
option pricing theory is that, in the absence of taxation and under certain
reasonable assumptions, an American call option will never be exercised
prior to maturity, and therefore is de facto equivalent to a European call
option. 285 In particular, consider an American option to purchase a
280. $25,000 is the difference between the spot price and the strike price multiplied by 10,000
ounces .
281. See supra note 118.
282. As with a forward contract, the timing option is greatly increased if the call option can be
settled in property rather than cash . In that case, the holder of the option can delay recognition of gain
beyond the maturity of the option by exercising the option and holding onto the underlying property.
See supra note 118 . A put option does not offer the same flexibility, because settlement of a put
involves the sale, not the purchase, of property and will, therefore, generally trigger recognition of
taxable income .
283. European options are more likely to be used as building blocks in certain types of financial
instruments, including interest rate caps, hybrid debt instruments, and convertible debt where the
conversion right can only be exercised at maturity. On the other hand, convertible debt where the
conversion right may be exercised at any time prior to maturity is similar to conventional debt plus an
American call option where the exercise price of the option is the current value of the debt.
284. Similar comparisons could be made between a forward contract exercisable only on a
particular date and a forward contract that could be exercised by one or both parties prior to maturity.
285. See, e. g. , C OX & RUBINSTEIN, supra note 61 , at 141 (" [A]n American call on a stock paying

1992]

Taxation of Financial Instruments

311

specified commodity for a fixed price at any time through time t. Assume
that there are no costs or benefits to owning the commodity other than the
purchase price and the return from sale. 286 In that case, it will never be
optimal (i.e., profit maximizing) to exercise the option prior to maturity. 287
Therefore, under the assumption that the opportunity to exercise the
option prior to maturity has no value, the value of the American call option
should be equal to the value of the equivalent European call option. This
equivalence holds true under both a full accrual and a pure realization tax
system. Under a full accrual system, the holder of an American option
contemplating exercise will have already taken into account any gains or
losses with respect to the option. The holder, therefore, has no incentive
to exercise or not exercise the option based on accrued gain or loss.
Similarly, future gain or loss on either the option or the underlying
commodity will be recognized as it accrues, regardless of the form of
ownership. Accordingly, the prospect of future taxation will not affect the
decision to exercise the option. 288

no dividends should never be exercized prior to the expiration date." (emphasis in original)).
286. Thus, for example, there are no rental receipts, consumption values, or voting rights that
follow from ownership of the commodity. Similarly, there are no insurance or storage costs of
ownership. Under these assumptions, the only reason to exercise the option is to take advantage of
increases in the price of the commodity. Assume also that there are no carrying costs to the option
other than the foregone return on the investment. When these conditions are not met, the value of an
American option exceeds the value of a European option. See generally In Joon Kim, The Analytic
Valuation of American Options, 3 REV. FIN. STUD. 547 (1990) (offering an analytic solution to the
value of an American call option on an asset paying a continuous return).
287. The statement in the text can be proved by the following argument. Assume that the strike
price is p, and that the current price of the commodity is Pc· If Pc < p, it would be cheaper to
purchase the commodity on the open market and therefore the option should not be exercised. Now,
assume that Pc ~ p, . Consider two possibilities. First, assume that the holder believes that Pc will
remain constant or increase in the future. In that case, there is no advantage to exercising the option
and holding the commodity as compared to simply holding the option. In either case, the holder will
ultimately realize the increase in the commodity price. Moreover, by exercising the option the holder
loses the opportunity to earn interest on the strike price and risks losing the additional investment of
p, to the extent that the commodity price declines below p,. By merely holding the option, the holder
captures any increase in the commodity price without bearing the risk that the commodity price will
decline below p,.
In the alternative, assume that the holder believes that Pc will decline in the future. In that
case the holder will be no worse off selling the option than she would be if she exercised the option
and then sold the commodity, because the option value cannot be less than the difference between the
commodity price and the strike price. Thus, it will never be optimal to exercise the option prior to
maturity. And because it is never optimal to exercise the option prior to maturity, there is no de facto
difference between an American and a European option. See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 18, at
526 (noting that "[s]ince an American call option should not be exercized before maturity, its value is
the same as that of a European call, and the Black-Scholes formula applies to both options").
288 . Of course, the decision to invest in the option in the first place or to continue the investment
may well be affected by taxation. The point is that the decision to retain the option rather than
exercising it and holding the commodity is unaffected.
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Similarly, the incentive to exercise or hold a call option will be
unaffected by a realization-based t<Lx system. Neither exercising nor
holding the option will trigger recognition of income under such a system.
Accordingly, while a holder may be encouraged to sell the option to
recognize a loss or to hold onto an option to defer gain, the hol der has no
tax-based incentive to exercise or not exercise the option prior to maturity.
In particular, if the holder wishes to terminate her investment in the option
(or the underlying commodity), she has no tax incentive to exercise the
option and then sell the commod ity, rather than simply selling the option.
Similarly, if the holder wishes to continue her investment and the option
has appreciated in value, she will have no tax incentive to exercise the
option and hold the commodity, rather than simply hold the option. If the
option has depreciated in value and she wishes to recognize the loss , she
can sell the option and purchase the commodity on the market. 289 Thus,
the holder has no incentive to exercise an American call option prior to
maturity under either a full accrual or a realization-based system. 290
Because the value of an American call option is the same as the
value of a European call option under the limiting conditions specified
above and because the two types of options will generally be exercised
under the same set of circumstances, it is reasonable to have the same rules
for taxation of the two options. The utility of this conclusion is, of course,
limited by the underlying assumptions-primarily the assumption that there
is no benefit to direct ownership of the underlying commodity or other
property that is the subject of the option. Obviously, there are many cases
for which this assumption is not true. For example, gold may have a
positive rental value, and corporate shares generally have both dividend
and voting rights . Nevertheless, in a broad class of cases the result
continues to hold. 291

289 . She could also sell the option and purchase a fl~>.v 0pti.on.
290. American and European call options are not of equal value under all conceivable tax systems.
It is likely , however, to hold under reasonable combinations of a full accrual system and pure
realization system. For example, consider a modified realization system under which the exercise of
an option is a realization event. The holder of a depreciated American option could recognize her loss
by exercising the option. At first glance this would suggest that she might choose to do so. She could,
however, also trigger her loss by selling the option and purchasing the underlying commodity.
Moreover, the latter course should be more valuable for the same reasons that it is generally not
optimal to exercise an American option prior to maturity. See supra text accompanying notes 285-87.
291. While under the conditions described above an American call option is equivalent to a
European call option, a similar equivalence does not hold between an American put option and a
European put option. The basis of the equivalence for call options is that it is never optimal to exercise
an American call option before maturity. It may, however, be optimal to exercise an American put
option before maturity. Consider, for example, an American option to sell stock in X for $100 at any
time during the next 60 days. Assume that after 30 days X is bankrupt and its stock is worthless. The
put is worth $100 if exercised at that time. If, on the other hand, the put is held until maturity, the
most it can be worth at maturity is $100. Assuming a positive interest rate, it is more valuable to
exercise the put immediately. See Robert Geske & H.E. Johnson, The American Put Option Valued
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On the other hand, the equivalence of American and European call
options does not hold once the option is combined with other rights or
obligations that cannot be transferred independently because they are part
of the same overall instrument. Consider, for example, a cash-settiement
option to buy one ounce of gold in one year at $100 combined in a single
instrument with a second cash-settlement option to purchase ten ounces of
silver at the same time for $10 per ounce. Assume t!-Jat the options can_i10t
be transferred independently. Under these circumstances it may well be in
the interest of the holder to exercise one option and continue to hold onto
the other. Assume, for example, that the prices of gold and silver are
currently $125 and $9 respectively. Assume further that the holder expects
the price of gold to drop and the price of silver to rise. In that case, it
may well be optimal to exercise the gold option currently while continuing
to hold the silver option. The holder can only do so if the gold option is
an American option. 292
Assuming that under some circumstances American options are
different from European options, the question remains whether there is any
reason to treat them differently for tax purposes. The answer is generally
no. The argument in favor of waiting until a European option is sold or
matures is not based on the holder's inability to exercise the option prior
to maturity, but rather on the difficulty in valuing the option prior to
maturity or sale. Whether or not an American option will be exercised
prior to maturity, in the absence of such an exercise there is no reason to
believe that the valuation question is any easier than with a European
option. 293 Accordingly, absent a premature exercise of the option, there
would not appear to be any reason to accrue income any differently with
respect to an American, as opposed to a European, option. If, on the other
hand, the American option is in fact exercised prior to maturity, that would
appear to represent a good opportunity for realization of any gain or loss,
just as it is appropriate to recognize gain or loss when the option is
exercised at maturity. 294

Analytically, 39 J. FIN. 1511, 1511 (1984) (providing an analytical valuation formula for an American
put option).
292. Even in the case of paired call options (gold and silver in the text), the holder has alternatives
other than exercising one option while continuing to hold the second option . For example, the holder
could sell the pair of options and then enter into a replacement call option for silver. Alternatively,
she could write a cail option on gold . Finally, she could purchase a put on gold. In any case, she will
have achieved the desired result of cashing in on the gain from the gold option while maintaining an
open position in silver. The optimal course may well be determined by relative transaction costs.
293. Both American and European options may be traded under a system in which daily gains and
losses are marked to market. In such a case the valuation problem is solved, and the justification for
not using a full accrual system is seriously undermined. The existence of a mark-to-market trading
system was one of the principal factors that led to the adoption of§ 1256. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM .
ON TAXATION, supra note 64, at 296.
294. In the case of a cash-settlement option, taxing an American optio n at exerci se is
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Fixed-for-Floating Interest Rate Swap

I. Description of a Fixed-for-Floating Interest Rate Swap. -A
fixed-for-floating interest rate swap is a contract between two parties
whereby one party agrees to make periodic payments to a second party (the
"counterparty") equal to a fi xed interest rate (the "swap rate") times a
specified principal amount, and the counterparty agrees to make payments
to the first party equal to a variable interest rate times the same principal
amount. 295 The payments are generally netted. 296 The specified principal amount is used only to determine the amount of the swap payments
and is not actually borrowed or lent. Because the specified principal is
generally used only to measure the parties' payments and is not actually
transferred between the parties, it is often referred to as a "notional"
principal amount and swap contracts are referred to as notional principal
contracts. 297
A swap contract may or may not require an initial payment by
either party. 298 Such a payment is required when the present value of the
expected future payments on one leg of the swap is not equal to the present
value of the expected payments on the other leg of the swap. 299
2. The Economics of a Swap.-Economically, a swap contract is
equivalent to a series of cash-settlement forward contracts on short-term
loans. Consider, for example, a contract to borrow $1000 in one year for

uncontroversial and relatively inescapable. See supra note 119. In the case of an option settled in
property , it would be an acceleration of realization in comparison with current law. For more
discussion of this point, see supra note 282; supra text accompanying note 270.
295 . See Henry T.C . Hu, Swaps, the Modern Process of Financial Innovation and the
Vulnerability of a Regulatory Paradigm , 138 U. PA. L. REV . 333,347 (1989) (describing the swap as
an exchange of cash flows). More generally, an interest rate swap is a contract betwee>! two parties
where each party agrees to pay the other party interest on a specified principal amount c;vec a specified
term according to a specified formula. Id. at 347 .
296. See id. at 348 n.42 (1989).
297. See, e.g ., Prop. Treas . Reg. § 1.446-3 , 56 Fed. Reg . 31350,31350-51 (1991). Interest rate
caps are another type of noti onal principal contract. See infra section VTI(E)(l) (describing an interest
rate cap).
298. A swap that does not require any up-front payment is often referred to as an on-market swap.
A swap that requires an up-front payment is often referred to as an off-market swap. See 26 C .F.R.
§ 1.988-2(e)(3) (1992) (describing an off-market currency swap); Prop . Treas . Reg. § 1.446-3(e)(4)(v)
exa mple 4, 56 Fed . Reg. 31350, 31360 (1991) (showing an off-market interest rate swap).
299. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.988-2(e)(3) (1992). For example, assume that the market rate for a fiveyear annual-pay LIB OR (London Interbank Offered Rate) swap is 10%. In other words, market
participants are willing to enter into swaps where they will pay LIBOR times a notional principal
amount in exchange for 10% times the same noti onal principal amount. If a party wished to enter into
a swap at 9% she would be required to make an up-front payment equal to the present value of 1%
(10% minus 9%) of the noti onal principal amount per year for five years. Similarly, if she wished to
enter into a swap at 12 %, she would receive an up -front payment equal to the present value of 2 % of
the noti onal principal amount per year for five years.
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a term of one year at an interest rate of ten percent. Such a contract is
simply a forward contract for a loan with a forward price of $100 (or ten
percent). 300
Consider now a cash-settlement version of the above
301
contract.
Assume that at the time of settlement, the rate for one-year
loans is eleven percent. In that case, the forward borrower would need an
additional one percent over and above the contract rate of ten percent in
order to borrow the funds in the market. The amount payable under a
cash-settlement forward contract would, therefore , be one percent times the
stated principal amount of the contract or $10. The receipt of the $10 is
sufficient to permit the forward borrower to obtain a market loan at eleven
percent or $110, while paying a net interest cost equal to the contract rate
of ten percent or $100. 302 The payment of $10 under the cash-settled
forward contract, however, is exactly the same payment that would be
required under an equivalent one-period swap contract. Thus, a one-period
swap contract is functionally indistinguishable from a cash-settlement
forward contract at the swap rate. Similarly, a multiperiod swap contract
(i.e., a standard swap contract) is functionally indistinguishable from a
series of cash-settlement forward contracts each at the swap rate.
The fact that the swap rate is constant means that the parties have
agreed to a constant forward price (i.e., interest rate) for the series of
short-term loans. Assuming that the term structure of interest rates is not
fiat (i.e., that interest rates on short-term loans are different than interest
rates on long-term loans), a constant swap rate means that the parties have
agreed to overpay for certain loans in exchange for underpaying for other
loans. Thus, for example, consider the interest rates shown in Figure 1.

300. For simplicity, I ignore the difference between a payment made at the beginning and the end
of the loan period.
301. A cash-settlement contract is a contract that is settled in cash, rather th an by delivery of the
underlying good (here the use of the money). See supra section VII(A)(I).
302. The discussion in the text ignores the difference between the risk of changes in market
interest rates and the risk of changes in the borrower's credit worthiness. A forward loan contract
would generally transfer both risks to the forward lender, while a cash-settlement forward loan contract
would only transfer the risk of changes in market interest rates. If the forward borrower's
creditworthiness deteriorates during the interim period, its net cost of borrowing would be expected to
increase. Of course, the forward borrower can eliminate the risk of a decline in its creditworthiness
by entering into a separate forward borrowing contract at a variable rate (i.e., a market rate to be
determined at the time of borrowing). One of the advantages of having swap and forward interest rate
markets is that it enables such a separation of credit and interest rate risks.
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Figure 1: Comparison of Swap and Forward Rate Curves
The curve marked Yield Curve is a hypothetical zero-coupon yield
curve. 303 The curve marked Forward Rate Curve represents the associated forward rate curves. 304 The forward rates range from approximately 10 percent to approximately 16.5 percent. Thus, if the parties
entered into a series of forward borrowing agreements , each at the
respective market rate, the forward contracts would call for interest rates
beginning at approximately ten percent in one year and increasing to
approximately sixteen percent for the final loan in ten years. On the other
hand, if the parties wished to have the same rate for all of the forward
agreements, in order to maintain the same overall cost of the loans they

303. For example, the point at the coordinates (4, 10 .9) indicates that a four-year zero-coupon bond
would yield 10.9 %. A zero-coupon yield curve differs from an ordinary yield curve in that each point
represents the yield on a zero-coupon bond, rather than a coupon-paying bond. The yield curve is often
referred to as the term structure of interest rates. See BURTON G . MALKIEL, THE TERM STRUCTURE
OF INTEREST RATES : EXPECTATIONS AND BEHAVIOR PATTERNS 1-2 (1966) (describing the "functional
relati onship among yields of securities which differ only in their term to maturity" as "the term
structure of interest rates," and stating that the yield curve is the most widely used graphic device for
examining this relationship). The steepness of the yield curve has been exaggerated for clarity of
presentation.
304. That is, the set of forward rates on one-year loans consistent with the yield curve. For
example, the point at the coordinates (3,14.0) indicates that the three-year forward rate for a one-year
loan is 14 .0%. See Appendix B for a discussion of the relationship between the yield curve and the
forward rate curve .
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would set a rate at the level such that the overpayment in the early years
(along with interest on such overpayment) would offset the underpayment
in the later years. In other words, the rate would be selected such that the
present value of the overpayments is equal to the present value of the
At such a rate, each of the individual forward
underpayments. 305
contracts would generally be priced off-market. Only the package of
forward contracts taken as a whole would be a market transaction. Thus,
the market swap rate is essentially an " average" of a series of off-market
forward rates. 306 In this example, the swap rate is approximately fourteen percent.

3. Proposed Ta.xation.-As discussed above, a swap is similar to
a series of cash-settlement forward contracts. 307 As such, it is appropriate to treat each forward contract as generating a separate realization
event. Thus, for example, gain on the one-year forward contract should
be recognized at the end of the first year; gain on the two-year forward
contract should be recognized at the end of the second year; and so forth.
The complication arises in determining the amount of gain with respect to
each forward contract. As long as the term structure of interest rates is not
flat, each of the forward contracts will have been priced off-market. 308
In order to determine the amount of gain with respect to each component,
it is necessary to know the price of that component. To the extent that the
swap rate differs from the market forward rates, any underpayment or
overpayment should be treated as an amount paid with respect to other
periods. The parties should not have any income or loss from such
payments on future or past forward contracts at the time of payment on
presently matured forward contracts. In addition, because such overpayment and underpayment are essentially loans, the parties should be
required to accrue income or expense with respect to the resulting
loans. 309 In essence, such a swap contract presents the same issues as
305. See infra Appendix B (deriving an exact formula to determine the appropriate rate).
306. More precisely, in a competitive equilibrium, the swap rate is a weighted average of forward
rates .
307. See supra text accompanying notes 300-04.
308. This discussion assumes the parties have agreed to a single swap rate for the entire term of
the contract.
309. The principal on this mini-loan should not be confused with the underlying notional principal
amount for the swap contract. The principal amount on the mini-loan is the accumulated difference
between the swap rate and the market forward rate multiplied by the notional principal amount.
The use of the term "loan" is meant to help clarity the fact that the income flows from the
swap contract. It is not meant to suggest that some portion of the swap income or expense should be
characterized as interest income or expense for federal income tax purposes. The desirability of such
a characterization depends on a multitude of factors beyond the scope of this Article .
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does the series of off-market bets in Example 10, and should be taxed in
the same manner. 310
It should be noted that the proposed treatment of swaps is inconsistent with the current tax treatment of long-term fixed-rate debt. Just as a
swap is equivalent to a series of cash-settlement forward contracts for
short-term debt, fixed rate debt is equivalent to a series of noncashsettlement forward contracts on short-term debt. Thus, for example, tenyear debt at eleven percent can be viewed as a one-year loan followed by
a series of nine forward contracts for additional one-year loans, each priced
at eleven percent. Viewed in such a fashion, it becomes obvious that, in
general, each of the individual short-term obligations is mispriced because
the contract rate is not the series of market forward rates, but rather a
blended rate for the package. 311
4.
Example 13.-Diva enters into a two-year interest rate
swap with David. Under the terms of the swap, Diva agrees to
pay David the swap rate (a fixed rate) times a notional principal
amount of $1000 at the end of each year in exchange for a
payment of the prime rate (a variable rate) times the same
amount. At the time that they enter into the contract, prime for
one-year loans is ten percent, the one-year forward rate for
prime is eleven percent, and the two-year forward rate is twelve
percent. 312 Given current spot and forward interest rates,
Diva and David set a swap rate equal to 11.47 percent. At the
end of the first year, prime is 11.2 percent and Diva makes a
net payment of $2.70.313 At the end of the second year,
prime is 11.8 percent and David makes a net payment of $3.30.

Under expected value taxation, in order to determine the timing of
income on the swap contract it is first necessary to determine the market
forward interest rates, here assumed to be eleven percent and twelve
percent for the first and second years, respectively. Based on the forward
rates, the swap agreement would be treated as requiring a payment of
eleven percent for the first year along with an advance payment of 0.47

310. See supra section VI(B)(4).
311. See Joseph Bankman& William A. Klein, Accurate Taxation of Long-Term Debt: Taking into
Account the Term Structure of Interest, 44 TAX L. REV. 335, 335-36 (1989) (noting that the current
taxation of long-term debt is inconsistent with the term structure of interest rates); see also Bruce
Kayle, Where Has All the Income Gone? The Mysterious Relocation of Interest and Principal in
Coupon Stripping and Related Transactions, 7 VA. TAX REV. 303, 324-32 (1987) (discussing the
potential mismeasurement of holders' income from stripped bonds) .
312. The forward rates are equivalent to rates on two-year and three-year fixed-rate loans of
10.50% and 11.00%, respectively.
313. $2.70 is the difference between the swap rate and prime, multiplied by the notional principal
amount.
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percent for the second year. At the end of the first year Diva would,
therefore, be treated as having received a payment of $2.00 under the first
forward contrace 14 and as having made an advance payment of $4.70
under the second forward contract. 315 Accordingly, despite the fact that
Diva will have made a net payment of $2.70, she would have taxable
income of $2.00. She will also have a basis of $4.70 in the remaining
swap contract.
Based on the forward rate of twelve percent for the second period,
Diva expects to receive a payment with respect to the second forward
contract of $5.30 at the end of the second year. 316 Therefore, Diva
should accrue an additional $0.60 in income during the second year. 317
Diva's basis in the swap at the end of the second year would, therefore, be
$5.30. 318 Upon receipt of the final cash payment of $3.30, she would
have a taxable loss of $2.00.

5. The Treatment Under Current Law.- Under the proposed
notional principal contract regulations, both parties to the swap would be
treated as having taxable income or loss in each period equal to the amount
they pay or receive in that period. 319 Under the regulations, therefore,
Diva would have a deduction at the end of the first year equal to the $2.70
that she paid and would have income equal to the $3.30 that she received
at the end of the second period.
6. Resolving the Discrepancy Between the Proposed Taxation of
Swaps and the Taxation of Fixed-Rate Debt.-As noted, the treatment of
swaps under the expected value approach is inconsistent with the treatment
of long-term fixed-rate debt. 320 Given that it is unlikely that the treat-

314 . $2.00 is the product of the notional principal amount times th e difference between prime
(11.2 %) and the forward rate (11.0%).
315. $4.70 is the product of the notional principal amount times the difference between the swap
rate (11 .47%) and the forward rate (11.00%).
316. $5.30 is the product of the notional principal amount times the difference between the forward
rate for the second period (12.00%) and the swap rate (11.47%) .
317. $0.60 is the difference between the expected value of the contract at the end of the year and
her basis at the beginning of the year. $0.60 is also approximately her basis ($4 .70) times the forward
rate of 11 percent. The difference between $0.60 and $0 .52 (11% x $4 .70) is caused by a round-off
error in the selection of the swap rate. The precise swap rate is closer to 11 .4739%. At that rate, her
basis after the first year would be $4.74 and the expected value at the end of the second year would
be $5 .26. The difference of $0.52 between these two figures is equal to her basis of $4 .74 times the
forward rate of 11 percent.
318 . $5.30 is the sum of the prepayment ($4 .70) plus the amount accrued during th e second year
($0.60).
319. Prop. Tress. Reg.§ 1.446-3(e)(3), 56 Fed . Reg . 31350,31356-59 (1991).
320. See supra text accompanying note 311.
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ment of long-term debt will be changed, consistency suggests that the
expected value approach is inappropriate as applied to swaps. 321
In most cases, it is probably preferable to tax swaps consistently
with long-term debt. For example, consider two persons, the first of
whom borrows $100 million at ten percent, and the second of whom
borrows $100 mill ion at LIB OR and enters into a swap with respect to
which she pays ten percent and receives LIBOR on a notional principai
amount of $100 million. Given that the two persons have entered into
economically similar arrangements, in general they should be taxed
similarly. The need to tax the two parties similarly implies that the correct
way to tax the swap is to simply account for the payments under the swap
as they are paid (or accrued).
Even, however, where a swap is paired with a borrowing, there is
a difference between the fixed-rate borrowing and the variable-rate borrowing plus a swap. In the case of the fixed-rate borrowing, a borrower
who wishes to take advantage of a decrease in interest rates to recognize
a loss on the borrowing must go through the cumbersome and expensive
process of refinancing her debt. On the other hand, in the case of the
variable-rate borrowing plus a swap, the borrower need only close out the
swap and enter into a new one. In other words, the existence of the swap
market greatly enhances the timing option available to long-term borrowers.322
Putting aside the timing option, there remains a critical difference
between a fixed-for-floating interest rate swap and a fixed-rate debt
instrument. Accepting that fixed-rate debt is taxed incorrectly, most people
would agree that the discrepancy is not sufficiently serious or subject to
abuse to warrant fixing. 323 As with many examples of mismeasurement
in the income tax, complacency turns to concern when the taxpayer

321. On the other hand, a treatment of swaps that is consistent with the treatment of long-term debt
is inconsistent with the treatment of a series of properly priced independent forward contracts. Because
each forward contract would generally be off-market, each would involve an up-front payment, the sum
of which would be zero. Regardless of whether interest was imputed to each off-market contract, the
amount of gain or loss recognized on each individual contract as it matured would be different than the
gain or loss recognized for a swap under the treatment of Prop . Treas. Reg. § 1.446-3, 56 Fed. Reg.
31350, 31351 (1991) (treating parties to a swap as having taxable income or loss in each period equal
to the amount they pay or receive in payment). Therefore, consistency alone cannot be the
determinative factor.
322. The enhanced timing option may be reduced somewhat by the rule that makes both parties
to a swap recognize income at the time of an assignment. See id . § 1.446-3(e)(6), 56 Fed. Reg. 31350,
31353 (1991); see also supra text accompanying notes 155-61 (discussing the effect of the notional
principal contract regulations on the timing option); supra note 223 (explaining the value of the timing
option where both parties face the same marginal rate, but one party is indifferent to the occurrence
of a realization event).
323. See, e.g., Kayle, supra note 311, at 314-15 (arguing that administrative advantages of single
rate convention outweigh mismeasurement of income).
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leverages her investment in the mistaxed item. 324 Thus, for example,
market discount is generally not taxed currently, but there are special ruies
governing leveraged investments in market discount bonds. 325 Similarly,
in certain circumstances , leveraged investments in long-term fixed-rate
bonds cause concern. Another example of the concern with leveraged
investments is the case of real estate mortgage investment conduits
("REMIC"). A REMIC is a tax-created vehicle for investments in real
estate mortgages. 326 In general, the assets of a REMIC consist of a pool
of mortgages and the interests in a REMIC consist of debt and a residual
ownership interest. 327 Economically, the residual interest can be viewed
as owning a highly leveraged investment in mortgages. 328 In other
words, a REMIC can be used as a convenient device for a leveraged
investment in certain long-term fixed-rate debt. If long-term debt were
taxed correctly, this would present no problem. Since, however, long-term
debt is taxed incorrectly, the taxable income of the residual interest can be
significantly different from its economic income. 329 As a result of this
disparity between taxable and economic income, the tax law has developed
an elaborate set of special rules for taxing residual interests and has effectively mandated that a broad class of leveraged investments in mortgages
must be carried out in the REMIC form. 330

324. See supra note 81 (listing a variety of Code sections limiting leveraged transactions); cf
Daniel N. Shaviro, Selective Limitations on Tax Benefits, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1189, 1214-18 (1989)
(arguing that leveraged transactions are inherently abusive).
325. Compare I.R.C. § 1276 (1988) (providing that gain on the disposition of a market discount
bond will be treated as ordinary income to the extent of the accrued market discount) with id. § 1277
(providing that the net direct interest expense incurred on debt to purchase or carry market discount
bonds shall be deductible in the current taxable year only to the extent it exceeds the market discount
allocable to the current taxable year).
326. See I.R.C. §§ 860A-860G (1988) (creating REMICs); Kayle, supra note 311, at 346-54
(discussing the REMIC legislation). See generally ]AMES M. PEASLEE & DAVID Z. NIRENBERG,
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF MORTGAGE BACKED SECURITIES (1989).
327. See I.R.C. § 860D (1988) (defining a REM IC). The debt-like interest in a REMIC is called
a "regular interest" and the residual ownership interest is called a "residual interest." !d. § 860G(a)(l)(2) .
328. See Kayle, supra note 311, at 348 (stating that "the income of the residual holder is
calculated as if it owned the REMIC's assets and the regular interests in the REM1C represented its
debt").
329. Assuming an upward sloping yield curve, the taxable income of the residual holder will
generally exceed economic income in the early years of the REMIC and will be less than economic
income in the later years. The disparity between economic and taxable income is often referred to as
phantom income. See, e.g., PEASLEE & NIRENBERG, supra note 326, at 175-81 (explaining the source
of phantom income) .
330. See I.R .C . § 860E (1988) (regulating taxation of excess inclusions); id. § 770l(i) (providing
that multi-class mortgage pools not qualifYing for REMIC status are to be taxed as corporations). The
problem of excess inclusions is usually thought to be one of !ranching debt, that is dividing long-term
debt into short-term, medium-term, and long-term debt. Tranching debt simply involves taking a
blended rate and substituting the co rrect market rates for the various terms that make up the blended
rate. See Kayle , supra note 311, at 342 (discussing how collaterized mortgage obligations (CMOs)
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The danger that REMICs pose to the tax system is that they
simplify the process of creating leveraged investments in long-term debt.
Nevertheless, with a REMIC both the long-term debt (the mortgages) and
the leverage supporting the long-term debt (the regular interests), really
exist. Interest rate swaps go a step further. An interest rate swap, in
essence, creates a fully leveraged investment in long-term debt without
having to actually create either the long-term debt or the leverage.
Consider, for example, a taxpayer who wishes to purchase $100 million
worth of fixed-rate debt, borrowing $100 million at a floating interest rate
in order to make the purchase. The cash flow from such a transaction is
identical to the cash flow from an interest rate swap under which the
taxpayer receives a fixed rate of interest and pays a floating rate of interest.
The difference is that the back-to-back loans require actual loans, while the
swap requires merely a notional principal amount. As a practical matter,
it is vastly easier to enter into the swap than it would be to enter into the
back -to-back loans. 331
Interest rate swaps thus make it very easy to take advantage of the
incorrect taxation of debt. As a result, it is not safe to conclude that
because the tax system has always lived with the mistaxation of long-term
debt, it should ignore the mistaxation of interest rate swaps. This does not
mean that every interest rate swap should be taxed " correctly" according
to an expected value approach. It is, however, important to be aware of
the extent to which the taxation of swaps varies from their correct taxation
and to be prepared to prevent abuses based on that variance. 332

consist of several classes of debt, known as "tranches"). Ironically, rather than moving in the direction
of taxing the fixed-rate debt correctly, Congress enacted a scheme designed to make sure that the
holders of fixed-rate mortgages (including both the regular and residual interests) continue to be taxed
on an incorrect basis. In other words, Congress attempted to ensure that REMICs could not be used
as a vehicle for fixing the mistaxation of debt.
331. One reason that the swap is easier to emer into than the back-to-hack loans is that the swap
subjects the parties to less credit risk. While a swap entails credit risk to the extent thai either party
may be obligated to make net interest payments , the back-to-hack loan potentially entails risk of t.'le
principal and the gross interest payments. Also, the transaction costs of the swap are likely to be
lower.
332. To some extent, the regulations provide rules designed to limit such abuses. In particular,
Prop. Treas. Reg.§ 1.446-3(e)(4)(ii), 56 Fed. Reg. 31350,31359 (1991), provides that if a taxpayer
hedges a notional principal contract, the "Commissioner may require that amounts paid to o r received
by the taxpayer under the notional principal contract be treated in a manner that is consistent with the
economic substance of the transaction as a whole." Also, Prop. Treas. Reg. § !.446-3(f), 56 Fed.
Reg. 31350, 31361 (1991), provides that if (I) a taxpayer enters into a transaction that is not a
customary commercial transaction; (2) the general rules would produce a material distortion of income;
and (3) the taxpayer would not have entered into the transaction but for that material distortion, then
the Commissioner may exercise his discretion to depart from the general rules as necessary to clearly
reflect the income from the transaction.
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Interest Rate Caps
1.

Description of an Interest Rate Cap. -An interest rate cap is

an agreement to make periodic payments equal to a specified principal
amount times the excess, if any, of the level of an interest rate index over
a specified rate. 333 In exchange for the promise to pay such excess
interest costs, the purchaser of a cap is generally required to make an
initial payment. 334
The initial payment is referred to as a cap
premium. 335 Thus, for example, the purchaser of an annual-pay five-year
LIBOR cap at ten percent with a notional principal amount of $1 million
would have the right to receive the excess, if any, of LIBOR over ten
percent times $1 mill ion once per year for the next five years. Assume
that at the end of the first year, LIBOR was nine percent; at the end of the
second year, LIBOR was twelve percent; and at the end of the following
three years, LIBOR was 9.5 percent. Under the agreement, the purchaser
would receive nothing in the first year, $20,000 in the second year, and
nothing for the remaining three years.
2. The Economics of an Interest Rate Cap.-An interest rate cap
is the equivalent of a series of cash-settlement options on fixed-rate
loans. 336 The cap premium is the sum of the option premiums for each
option in the series. To see that the amount payable under a cap agreement
is equal to the amount payable under a series of cash-settlement options,
consider an option to borrow $1 mill ion for one year at ten percent. If at
maturity interest rates are less than ten percent, the option would expire
worthless. If the option were settled in cash, no payment would be made.
On the other hand, if interest rates are greater than ten percent, the option
would be exercised. If the option were settled in cash, a payment would
be made in an amount equal to the excess of the cost of the loan over the
cost of a ten percent loan. That payment would be equal to the principal
of the loan times the excess of the market interest rate over the option
rate. 337 Assume that the market rate was twelve percent. In that case,

333. See New York State Bar Ass'n, supra note 279 (describing interest rate caps) .
334. See id.
335. While cap agreements generally provide for the cap premium to be paid at the time the
contract is entered into, as with an option, there is no intrinsic reason that payments could not be made
over time.
336. As with interest rate swaps, interest rate caps generally protect against changes in market
interest rates, but not against changes in credit risk. See supra note 302 .
337. For simplicity of exposition, it is assumed that interest on a loan is payable in advance.
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the payment would be $20,000, 338 exactly the payment under the cap
agreement described above. 339

3. Proposed Taxation.-A straightforward application of the rules
developed above suggests that for purposes of determining the timing of
taxable income a cap should be divided into the individual options of which
it is constructed. In order to do this, the cap premium must be allocated
among the options in proportion to their fair market value. Each individual
option should then be taxed as follows:
(1) No gain or loss should be recognized upon receipt of the
premiUm;
(2) The holder of the cap should accrue income over the I ife
of the option equal to the increase in the expected value of
the option;
(3) The holder's adjusted basis in each option should be
equal to her share of the initial premium plus any accrued
income; and
(4) The holder of the cap should have income (or loss) at
the time of exercise of each option equal to the amount of
the payment under the cap minus her adjusted basis with
respect to that option.

4. Example 14.-Diva. enters into a two-year interest rate cap
agreement with David. Under the terms of the agreement,
David will pay Diva the excess, if any, of prime over eleven
percent times a notional principal amount of $5,000 at the end
of each year for two years. Diva pays a premium of $128.10.
At the end of the first year prime is ten percent, and, accordingly, David makes no payment. As of the end of the second
year prime is fourteen percent, and David makes a payment of
$150. 340
For federal income tax purposes, the cap should be divided into two
components, a cash-settlement option for the first period and a cashsettlement option for the second period. To properly measure gain or loss
on each option, the premium of $128.10 must be divided between the two
options. Assume that the fair market value of the individual options is
$45.45 and $82.64 for the first and second option, respectively. 341

338.
rate.
339.
340.
341.

$20,000 is the principal amount times the difference in the market interest rate and the cap
See supra text accompanying note 334.
$!50 is the notional principal amount times the difference in the prime rate and the cap rate .
Options are typically valued using variants of the Black-Scholes option pricing formula. See
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Accordingly, Diva is treated as if she purchased two separate options, a
one-year option for $45.45 and a two-year option for $82.64.
The one-year option is expected to be worth approximately $50 at
the end of the first year. 342 Accordingly, Diva should accrue income of
$4 .55 during the first year with respect to the first option. As of the end
of the first year, the first option expires worthless and Diva has a loss of
$50.343
The two-year option is expected to be worth $90.91 and $100 at the
end of the first and second years, respectively. Accordingly, Diva will
accrue income of $8.26 in the first year 344 and $9.09 in the second
year. 345 Diva's basis in the second option at the end of the second year
will, therefore, be $100. Upon receipt of the $150 option payment, Diva
will, therefore, have income of only $50.
Table 3: Taxation of Diva for Interest Rate Cap

[Q
End
of
Year

8Gdl

3

4

1st
Option
Expected
Income

1st Option
Basis

2d
Option
Expected
Income

$4.55

$(50.00)

$8.26

2

I

$(50.00)

I

$17.35

6

7

8

2d
Option
Basis

Net
Income
Before
Cap
Receipt

Cap
Receipt

Net
Income

$(37.19)

$0.00

$(37.19)

(90.91)

150.00

59.09

$(128.10)

1 $150.00

$
(100.00)

9.09
$4.55

5

1

$(100.00)

II

I

$21 .90

I

Table 3 shows the income flows under the analysis presented above.
Columns 2 through 5 show the accrual of expected income and the writeoff of basis in each year for each of the separate imbedded options.
Column 6 contains the sum of columns 2 through 5. Column 7 shows the
payment received under the cap, and column 8 gives the total net income
for each year.
In lieu of imputing income to each unexpired option and then
permitting an increased basis write-off, the same amount of net income
could be produced by treating the holder of the cap as being taxable on any
payments received under the cap (here $0 and $150) and permitting the

Appendix A for a description of the Black-Scholes formula and its application to this example.
342. This assumes that the value of the option is expected to grow at 10%. See infra Appendix

A.
343. Her initial basis of $45.45 plus her accrued income of $4 .55.
344. $8.26 = $90.91 - $82.64.
345. $9.09 = $100.00- $90.91.
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holder to amortize the cap premium according to a prescribed schedule.
The appropriate amortization for the cap in Example 14 can be seen in
column 6 of Table 3. Under the approach described above, in the first
year Diva has income of $4 .55 and $8 .26 from the first and second options
and a basis write-off of $50 from the first option. Her net deduction
before cap receipts is , therefore , $37.19. In the second year she has a net
deduction before cap receipts of $90 .91 . Together, these amounts equal
her premium of $ 128.10. 346 Thus, alternatively, she could simply be
permitted to amortize $37.19 of her basis in the first year and $90.91 in
the second year.
While the amortization approach wo rks in Example 14, it does not
work in all cases. In particular, the amortization approach fails when the
amount of income accruing with respect to options for later years exceeds
the amount of premium allocable to the options maturing in the early
years .347 Nevertheless, such an amortization approach may be a reasonable compromise solution.
Note also that the suggested amortization method differs from the
amortization that would be permitted simply by reference to the amount
paid for each option ($45 .45 for the first option and $82.64 for the second
option). The difference between these two approaches can be explained by

the fact that the latter approach fails to take into account the increase in
value in the second option during the first year. 348

346. These computations ignore the timing differences between amounts accrued during the year
and write-offs at the end of the year.
347. Consider a simple example in which the option premium with respect to the first year is $10
and the option premiums with respect to the second and succeeding years total $200. Assume that
interest rates remain bel ow the cap rate at all times, so there are no further payments under the cap.
In the first year, the purchaser of the cap should have inco me of approximately $1 from the first option
and $20 from the later options (assuming a I 0% growth rate) and a write-off of $11 from the expiration
of the first optio n. The purchaser's net income for the first period is $10 ($10 = $1 + $20- $11).
Under an amortization approach, the closest approximation would be to permit zero amo rtization,
giving the purchaser of th e cap net income of zero. Any additional amortization would simply permit
the purchaser to take a loss where, in fact, he had net income. Thus, under these circumstances , there
is no amortization schedule that will correctly match the income flow from the cap contract.
348. The court in Citizens & S. Corp. v. Commissioner, 91 T .C. 463 (1988), ajf'd per curiam,
919 F .2d 1492 (II th Cir. 1990), made essentially the same mistake in determining the amortizati on of
core deposits. See id. at 473 (permitting an amortization deduction for core deposits equal to the
present value on the acquisition date of the expected cost savings for the taxable year without regard
to changes in value of cost savings in other taxable years); see also George Mundstock, Eleventh
Circuit Ajfim1s Accelerated Depreciation of Land?, 47 TAX N OTES 737, 738 (May 7, 1990) (arguing
that "the Tax Court's approach ignores the increase in value of future cost savings and therefore
radically exceeds econo mic depreciation"). The amortization method proposed in the text is different
than the amortization method prescribed in the proposed regulation . See Prop . Treas. Reg . § 1.4463(e)(2)(ii).
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5. Treatment Unde r Current Law.- Proposed Treasury Regu lation
section 1.446-3(e)349 provides rul es for taxing both the periodic payments
made under an interest rate cap and the cap premium. Under the
regulations, periodic payments are taken into acco unt over the period to
which they relate. 350 In general, non periodic payments, such as a cap
premium, must be recognized over the term of the contract " in a manner
that reflects the economic substance of the contract. " 351 In the case of
a cap, the cap is considered to be equival ent to a series of cash-settled
option contracts. 352 Accordingly, the premium must first be all ocated
among the individual options. The portion of the premium allocated to
each separate option is then recognized during the period in which that
option expires. 353 The difference between the approach taken in the
proposed regulations and expected value taxation is that the regulations fail
to take into account the expected increase in value of each option as it
matures .
E.

Hybrid Debt Instruments

1. Description of a Hybrid Debt Instrument.- The term "hybrid
debt instrument" is used in this Article to refer to a combination of a
conventional debt instrument and one or more other derivative products,
such as forwards or options. 354
2. Proposed Taxation.-For purposes of determining the correct
timing of income, a hybrid debt instrument should first be divided into the
noncontingent debt instrument and the various derivative products of which

349. Prop. Tress. Reg.§ 1.446-3(e) , 56 Fed . Reg . 31350,31355-61 (1991) .
350. !d.§ 1.446-3(e)(2)(ii), 56 Fed. Reg. 31350,31356 (1991) .
351. !d . § 1.446-3 (e)(3) (ii)(A), 56 Fed. Reg . 31350,31357 (1991).
352. !d.§ 1.446-3(e)(3)(ii)(C), 56 Fed . Reg . 31350,31357 (1991).
353. !d. The regulati ons deal with the administrative problem of valuing the separate options in
two ways. First, the regulations provide that the option pricing used by the parties to determine the
total amount paid for the cap or floor will be respected, if reasonable. !d. Second, the regulations
provide that the Commissioner may publish a revenue procedure providing an alternative method for
valuing the options. !d.§ 1.446-3(e)(3 )(ii)(D)(2), 56 Fed. Reg. 31350,31357 (1991). The Treasury
published a sample revenue procedure in th e preamble to the regulati ons. Under the sample revenu e
procedure, the cap premium would be all ocated based on the term of the interest rate cap and th e excess
of the cap rate over the current interest rate. See Regulations Under Section 446 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986: Application of Section 446 with Respect to Notional Principal Contracts, 56
Fed. Reg . 31350, 31352-53 (1991). Presumably the allocati ons provided in the revenue procedure
would be based on the Black-Scholes option valuation formula and Service estimates of interest rate
variance. See Appendix A for more information on the Black-Scholes formula.
354. Traditionally, the term "hybrid securities" has been used to refer to securities that combine
features of debt and equity. See, e.g., HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF
CORPORATIONS § 162 (3 d ed. 1983) (defining hybrid securities as combinations of deb t securities and
shares) .
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it is composed. Second, the issue price of the entire instrument should be
allocated among the pieces in proportion to their respective fair market
values. Income should then be accrued in the usual fashion with respect
to both the debt instrument and each of the derivative products. Gain or
loss should be recognized with respect to each derivative product
whenever its value is determined.
The proposed approach is close to the approach that has been
adopted by the Treasury Department in the recent modification to the
proposed original issue discount rules (the "Paragraph (g)" rules). 355
There are, however, at least a couple of differences. First, having
bifurcated the issue price of the hybrid debt instrument into an issue price
for a noncontingent debt instrument and a price for one or more derivative
products, the Treasury fails to take the next step of accruing income on the
issue price of the derivative products, thereby providing anticipated deferral
with respect to the instrument as a whole. 356
Second, the Treasury has limited the application of the Paragraph
(g) rules to debt instruments that: (1) provide for noncontingent payments
equal to or greater than the issue price; and (2) provide for one or more
contingent payments determined, in whole or in part, by reference to the
value of publicly traded stock, securities, commodities, or other publicly
traded property. 357
3.
Example 15.-Consider a ten-year debt instrument that
provides for ten percent interest on a $1000 face amount, but,
in lieu of the payment of $1000 at maturity, the holder will be
paid five times the price of an ounce of gold. Assume further
that the ten-year forward price for gold is $200 358 and that
the instrument is issued at par. Finally, assume that at maturity, the price of gold is $110 per ounce.

The instrument is a combination of a ten-year, ten percent debt
instrument with a $1000 face value issued at par and a singie ten-year
prepaid forward contract. Assuming the holder purchased the debt at
issuance, the holder should be taxable on the ten percent coupon on an

355. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.12 75-4(g), 56 Fed. Reg. 8308, 8310-11 (1991); supra text accompanying note 95.
356. Prop. Treas . Reg.§§ 1.1275-4(g)(4),-4(g)(5), 56 Fed. Reg. 8308 , 8310-11 (1991).
357. /d. The Commissioner is permitted to apply the new rules to a debt instrument that otherwise
meets the requirementS"of Paragraph (g) (I) even when the issue price of the instrument exceeds the total
noncontingent payments by an insubstantial amount. /d. § 1.1275-4(f)(l), 56 Fed. Reg. 8308, 8310
(1991). The application of the Paragraph (g) rules is also limited to debt instruments issued for cash
or publicly traded property. /d.§ 1.1275-4(g)(l), 56 Fed. Reg. 8308,8310 (1991).
358. This example assumes that there is a ten-year forward market. The informational problems
in this approach are discussed more fully below. See discussion infra Part VIII.
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annual basis. At maturity, the holder should have a basis of $1000 in the
instrument. Upon payment of the $550 redemption price, L1e holder
should have a loss of $450 .359 The issuer's tax treatment should mirror
the holder's.
The taxation of hybrid debt instruments under current law depends
on whether they come under the Paragraph (e) or Paragraph (g) niles. 360
Under the Paragraph (e) rules, the instrument would be divided into its
contingent and noncontingent components, and the entire issue price would
be allocated to the noncontingent payments. 361
The noncontingent
components, consisting of the interest coupons, would then be analyzed
under the general OlD rules. 362 Under those rules, the noncontingent
debt instrument would have both an issue price and a stated redemption
price at maturity of $1000. 363 Accordingly, it would have no OlD and
there would be no accrual of income under the noncontingent instrument.
The effect of this result is to treat all coupon payments as nontaxable
returns of principal. Upon maturity, any payment made based on the price
of gold would be treated as contingent interest. 364 The holder, therefore,
would have no income until the end of the tenth year, at which time he
would have income of $550.
Under the Paragraph (g) rules, the issue price would be allocated
between the contingent and noncontingent payments in proportion to their
respective fair market values. 365 The noncontingent payments consist of

359. The example was chosen so that the issue price would equal the expected redemption price
valued at the forward price. If, for example, the forward price of gold was only $100, the instrument
would have been treated as if it had a stated redemption price at maturity of,only $500 and was,
therefore, issued at a premium. In that case it would have had a yield to maturity of approximately
6.25%, and each payment of $100 in stated interest would be treated as partially interest and partially
a return of principal. Any difference between the "expected" payment of $500 and the actual payment
would be treated as gain or loss at the time of payment.
360. See supra text accompanying note 95. As described, the instrument would come under the
Paragraph (g) rules. The analysis is presented under both sets of rules for purposes of comparison.
If the instrument in the example had a coupon rate under 10% or a term under 10 years , the amount
of the noncontingent payments would be less than the issue price and the Paragraph (f) rules would
apply. Prop. Treas . Reg.§ 1.1275-4(g)(l),56 Fed. Reg. 8308,8310 (1991). But see id. § l.i2754(f)(l), 56 Fed . Reg. 8308, 8310 (1991) (stating that the Commissioner can apply Paragraph (g) if the
difference between the noncontingent payments and the issue price is insubstantial). In either case, the
discussion assumes that the instrument would be treated as debt. The original issue discount rules apply
only to debt obligations and do not seek to define the term. !d. § 1.1275-4(a)(l), 56 Fed. Reg. 8308,
83 I 0 (1991) .
361. See supra text accompanying notes 98-100.
362. !d.
363. The issue price would be the issue price of the entire instrument which is by hypothesis
$1000. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1275-4(e)(1), 51 Fed. Reg. 12022, 12090-91 (1986). The stated
redemption price at maturity would be the sum of all of the payments under the noncontingent
instrument which would be the ten interest coupons of $100 each.
364. !d.§ 1.1275-4(e)(3)(i), 51 Fed . Reg. 12022, 12091 (1986).
365. !d.§ 1.1275-4(g), 56 Fed. Reg . 8308, 8310-11 (1991).
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ten annual payments of $100. The fair market value of such a stream of
payments is approximately $6 14. 366 The fair market value of the right
to receive fiv e times the price of gol d in ten years is equal to the present
value of fiv e times the forward price of gold, 0r $386. The instrument
would therefore be bifurcated into an installment obligation with an issue
price of $614 and a prepaid forward contract with an issue price of $386.
Income would accrue with respect to the installment obligation under the
normal constant-yield OlD rules. 367 No income would accrue w iu1
respect to the forward obligation?68 At maturity, the holder would have
additional income of $1 64. 369
Table 4 shows the income that would be accrued under each of the
three methodologies discussed above. Column 2 shows the accrual of
income under the expected value approach. Columns 3 and 4 show the
accrual of income under the Paragraph (e) rules. As discussed above, no
income would accrue with respect to the noncontingent bond because it
would have an issue price of $1000, equal to its stated redemption price at
maturity, and , therefore, be treated as having no original issue discount.
All of the income on the bond would be treated as accruing on the
contingent portion, and that income would accrue only at maturity when it
became noncontingent. Columns 5 and 6 show the income that would
accrue under the Paragraph (g) rules. As discussed above, the noncontingent portion would be treated as having an issue price of only $614 and
would therefore accrue $386 of original issue discount over its life. The
contingent portion would accrue no income until maturity and would then
have income of $614 (the $1000 payment minus the issue price of $386).
As can be seen by inspection, the Paragraph (g) rules are much closer to
the expected value rules than are the Paragraph (e) rules, but still provide
for substantial expected deferral of income.

366 . The noncontingent payments are eq uivalent to a ten-year annuity or installment obligatio n.
Th e present value of such a stream of payments assuming a I 0% discount rate is $614.
367. Prop . Treas. Reg .§ l.1275-4(g) (3), 56 Fed . Reg . 8308,8311 (1991).
368. ld. § 1.1275-4(g)(4), 56 Fed. Reg. 8308 , 8311 (1991) .
369. $164 is the difference between th e payment received under the forward contract and the
amount allocated for its purchase.
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Table 4: Hybrid Instrument Income Accrual
1

2

3

4

5

6

Year

Expected
Value

Paragraph
(e) Nonco ntingent

Paragraph
(e)
Contingent

Paragraph
(g) Noncontingent

Paragraph
(g)
Contingent

1

$100

$0

$0

$61

$0

2

100

0

0

58

0

3

100

0

0

53

0

4

100

0

0

49

0

5

100

0

0

44

0

6

100

0

0

38

0

7

100

0

0

32

0

8

100

0

0

25

0

9

100

0

0

17

0

10

100

0

0

9

0

(450)

0

550

0

164

Maturity

I

Total

VIII.

I

$550

I

$0

I

$550

I

$386

I

$164

I

Information Requirements

The expected value approach to taxing financial instruments requires
two sets of information: (1) the fa ir market value of each component of the
instrument; 370 and (2) the expected future value of each component, both
measured at the time the transaction is entered into.
The fair market value of each component is required in order to
allocate the cost of the instrument among the various components. 371
Obviously, the task of determining the fair market value can in some

370. When there is only a single component such as a single option or forward contract, there is
no need to separately determine the fair market value of any components . It may still be necessary to
determine the overall fair market value of the instrument when it is exchanged for property. See I.R.C.
§ l273(b)(3) (1988) (determining the issue price of debt instruments issued for publicly traded
property); id . § 1274(b)(3)(A) (setting the issue price for debt instruments issued for other types of
property).
371. Allocating too much ofL'Je issue price to short-term compo nents of the instruments will cause
income to be deferred. Correspondingly, allocating too much of the issue price to long-term
components will cause income to be accelerated. See supra text accompanying notes 308-09 (describing
the problems of misallocation).
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instances be quite difficult.
Nevertheless, it is generally feasible,
particularly if taxpayers are given reasonable latitude in estimating fair
market value. 372 Moreover, it is a task that is already deeply imbedded
in the tax law. Any time that a taxpayer purchases a bundle of assets for
a single price, it is necessary, at least in theory, to separately allocate the
cost of the acquisition among the assets purchased. 373 For example, in

372 . It is of some help in allocating payments that, in general, the two sides of a financial
transacti on will have adverse interests. The holder of the instrument will ordinarily prefer to allocate
as much dS possible of the issue price to the short-term components of the instrument so as to max.imize
the portion of the early returns to the instrument that are characterized as return of capital as opposed
to interest. Correspondingly, the issuer will ordinarily prefer to minimize the allocation of the issue
price to the short-term components so as to front-load income. Of course, this analysis assumes that
both sides of the financial transaction are taxable at the same rate. If one of them is nontaxable, the
assumption of adverse interests no longer holds. See supra text accompanying note 193. Moreover,
even if they are both taxable, but at different rates, they can both be made better off by misallocating
the issue price and adjusting the total issue price to compensate the loser for the misallocation.
The proposed notional principal contract regulations provide an example of the latitude that
can be given to the parties to a financial contract. Under the regulations, the parties to an interest rate
cap are required to allocate the cap premium over the term of the cap agreement. The regulations
provide that "the option pricing used by the parties to determine the total amount paid for the cap or
floor will be respected, if reasonable." Prop . Treas. Reg. § 1.446-3(e)(3)(ii)(C), 56 Fed . Reg. 31350,
31357 (1991). On the other hand, the proposed regulations also demonstrate the weakness of the
assumpti on that the parties have adverse interests. If one of the parties is a dealer electing mark-tomarket treatment under§ 1.446-4, the allocation will have no effect on its tax liability and, therefore,
neither party will have an incentive to correctly allocate the cap premium. !d. § 1.446-4, 56 Fed. Reg.
31361 (l991).
A second example of regulations providing latitude to parties in the allocation of purchase
price is the investment unit rules under l.R.C. § 1273 (1988). Under those rules, if neither the debt
instrument nor the property right making up an investment unit are publicly traded, the issue price of
the debt instrument is determined by discounting the payments under the instrument at a rate agreed
to by the parties. The rate must be based on yields of other recent debt instruments issued by the same
issuer or of comparable debt instruments of other issuers. Prop . Treas. Reg. § 1.1273-2(d)(2)(iv), 51
Fed. Reg. 12022, 12062 (1986).
373 . See, e.g., I.R.C . § 338 (1988) (providing that a corporate purchaser of the stock of a target
corporation is permitted to elect to treat the target as a new corporation that purchased all of the assets
of the target corporation and must then allocate the purchase price among all of the assets of the target);
id. § 1060(a) (requiring that a purchaser of a trade or business allocate basis among the assets
purchased); id. § 1273(c)(2)(B) (requiring that the issue price of an investment unit must be allocated
to each element of the unit on the basis of the relationship of the fair market value of such element to
the fair market value of all elements in the unit); Treas. Reg. § 1.1234-2(d) (as amended in 1980)
(stating that the grantor of multiple options is required to allocate the premium received among the
options granted on the basis of the relative fair market value of such options at the time of their
issuance or on any other reasonable and consistently applied basis that is acceptable to the
Commissioner); Williams v. McGowan, 152 F.2d 570, 572 (2d Cir. 1945) (holding that the seller of
a business must allocate the purchase price among the individual assets sold); Rev. Rut. 78-182, 1978-1
C .B. 265 (providing that the writer of a put and call for a single premium must allocate the premium
between the put and call).
In fact, even when a taxpayer purchases what appears to be a single asset, the taxpayer may
have to allocate the purchase price to different parts of the asset. For example, if a taxpayer purchases
a plot of land and later sells part of the land, the purchase price must be allocated between the part sold
and the part retained, based on their respective fair market values at the time of purchase. Treas. Reg.
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the case of a purchase of a business, the purchaser must allocate the
purchase price among the assets, both tangible and intangible, of L"le
business being acquired .374 As a result, allocating a total price among
the various components of a purchase is familiar to taxpayers, the Service,
and the courts .
More specifically, in the context of financial instruments , taxpayers
are required to allocate the issue price of an investment unit among the
parts of the unit. 375 The recent proposed changes to the original issue
discount rules extend this treatment to certain financial instruments where
the different elements are imbedded in a single instrument. 376 The
expected value approach merely extends this rule more generally to
financial instruments. 377
Finally, it is important to note that precision is not required in
allocating the issue price any more than precision is required in the myriad
other circumstances in which it is theoretically necessary to know the fair
market value of some item or to allocate a total price by fair market value.

§ I .61 -6 (as amended in 1960) (requiring allocation of basis upon the sale of a portion of land).
Similar issues are raised, for example, when a person purchases property with debt. In th at case, th e
total consideration must be allocated between the purchase price (principal) and interest. l.R.C. § 1274
(1988).
374. See l.R.C. § 1060(a) (1988) ; supra note 373.
375. See l.R.C. § 1273(c)(2)(B); supra note 373.
376. Prop. Treas . Reg .§ 1.1275-4(g), 56 Fed . Reg . 8308,8310-11 (1991) .
377. Allocating the purchase price of a financial instrument among its components assumes, of
course, that it is possible to identify the various components. At least two conceptually separate
difficulties arise. First, as a practical matter, it may be extremely difficult to identify the separate
elements of a financial instrument . For example, consider a covenant to a debt instrument that restricts
the corporation's ability to pay dividends if earnings fall below a specified level. In theory, the value
of the covenant could be separately identified and accounted for. As a practical matter, it is unlikely
to be worthwhile to do so.
Second, as a theo retical matter, in general there will not be a unique way of dividing up a
financial instrument into components. Consider, for example, a debt instn1ment with an imb edded
forward. Obviously, the debt instrument could be div ided into a pure debt instrument a nd a forward.
On the other hand, a long forward position is equivalent to the purchase of a call option combined with
the sale of a put option. Thus, the instrument could be divided up into a debt instrument plus a call
plus a put. More generally, there are broad equivalences across different types of financial instruments.
For example, as between buying or selling an asset, buying or selling a call on the asset, buying or
selling a put on the asset, and borrowing or lending, any one of the four can be created with
appropriate combinations of the three others. See, e.g., BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 18, at 488-90.
One of the consequences of the expected value approach is that the taxation of the instrument should
be as similar as possible however the instrument is constructed or deconstructed.
The flip side of the fact that there are multiple ways to deconstruct an instrument is that there
are multiple ways to actually enter into any given economic arrangement. See supra note 189. T o the
extent that, for example, creating a synthetic ca ll involves continuous trading in the underlying good ,
absent a mark-to-market system, a synthetic call will inevitably be taxed differently than an actual call
option (the synthetic call will be effectively marked to market by virtue of the constant trading and the
realization doctrine, while unanticipated gains and losses on the actual call will be deferred).
Nevertheless, absent mark-to- market taxation, l believe that expected value taxation provides the best
general principle to determine taxation of fin ancial instmments.
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In particular, when the expected future value of a component is known or
can be estimated, its fair market value can be estimated by discounting the
future value back to the present. 378
Once the issue price has been allocated among the various components, it is necessary to determine the expected future value of each such
component. In theory, this requirement would necessitate knowing the
expected future value at each point in time. Thus, for example, if the
instrument has a two-year life, it would be necessary to know, as of the
creation of the instrument, the expected value for each day in the two-year
period. As a practical matter, however, it would be far simpler and
without serious loss in accuracy to simply determine the expected future
value at maturity and to assume a constant yield growth. This calculation
is precisely how the OlD rules work with a zero-coupon bond. 379
As discussed above, the expected future value should be based on
an objective market valuation, not on the subjective expectations of the
participants to the transactions. Thus, just as the current fair market value
of each component should be based on what a willing buyer would pay a
willing seller, the expected future value is best measured by what a willing
buyer would promise to pay a willing seller in the future. In other words,
the best measure of the expected future price is the forward price for the
instrument. 380
Unfortunately, in many cases forward markets for the underlying
goods will not exist, or will not be sufficiently established to provide
reliable prices. 381 It may, however, often be possible to estimate a
hypothetical forward price, even when no actual forward market exists.
In general, in a competitive market in equilibrium, the forward price for
a good is equal to the spot price plus the cost of carrying the good. 382
Thus, even when there is no forward market, it may be reasonable to

378. Obviously, a key question is the choice of a discou!lt rate . Here again, it should be
emphasized that precision is not of paramount importance. For example, I.R.C. § 1274 (1988) permits
the determination of the issue price of a bond issued for nonpublicly traded property to be determined
based on the average rate of government securities with comparable maturities. On the other hand,
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-3(e)(3)(ii)(D)(l), 56 Fed. Reg. 31350, 31357 (1991), uses the overpayment
rate established under I.R.C. § 6621(a)(1) (1988) (using the federal short-term rate plus three
percentage points) to amortize nonperiodic swap payments . Finally, Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.12732(d)(2)(iv), 51 Fed. Reg. 12022, 12062 (1986), uses a discount rate agreed to by the parties (subject
to certain guidelines) to allocate issue price of an investment unit.
379. See supra text accompanying note 93 (discussing-the OID rules).
380. See supra section VII(A)(2).
381 . One of the reasons for the development of new financial products is to help bridge the gaps
between existing financial markets . For example, the maximum term of LIBOR futures on the
International Monetary Market at the Chicago Mercantile Exchange is approximately six months. See
WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 1991, at C-16 (reporting LIBOR futures quotes). Interest rate swap contracts,
however, routinely extend well beyond this period.
3 82. See supra note 263.
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estimate forward prices by reference to spot prices and an estimated cost
of carrying the underlying commodity. 383
As compared to a full accrual system, the information requirements
for the expected value approach may be either more or less burdensome.
U nder a full accrual system, valuation of the entire instrument is required
as of the end of each accrual period. Under the expected value approach,
more information is required initially because each component of the
instrument must be separately valued and the expected future values of each
such component must be estimated . On the other hand , after the initial
valuations , no further valuations are required as the instrument
matures. 384
Although the information requirements of a full accrual system are
the single most persuasive argument against its adoption, full accrual
accounting has also been criticized on other grounds, including liquidity
problems and the resulting fluctuations in federal tax revenues. 385 On
these grounds, the expected value approach is clearly superior. Regarding
liquidity, an investor in a financial instrument taxed under the expected
value approach would know the taxation of the instrument prior to her
investment, and would presumably be able to plan around any liquidity
problems. With respect to fluctuations in federal revenues, revenues under
the expected value approach should prove no more volatile than revenues
under the existing approach to financial instruments.
IX.

Conclusion

The current taxation of financial instruments is unsatisfactory. It
has developed as a hodgepodge of often inconsistent rules that frequently
fail to tax financial instruments correctly, providing taxpayers with myriad
opportunities to manipulate their income and to defer gains. It has long
been recognized that the ideal solution would be to mark all such
instruments to market on a periodic basis, thereby correctly taxing all
parties on their income. For a variety of reasons this solution is likely to
be adopted only slowly.
Absent mark-to-market accounting, this Article suggests the need
for a uniform framework to be used to develop rules for consistent

383. See supra note 263 .
384. Values are required when a contingency is resolved. Ordinarily, the resolution of a
contingency involves a cash payment and valuation should not present a problem. In some cases, when
the resolution of the contingency triggers a transfer of property or a future payment, valuation will be
an issue . In particular, if, for example, income is to be recognized upon the exercise of an option
settled in property, valuation may be an issue.
385. See H.R . REP. 432 , 98th Cong. , 2d Sess . 1254-57 (1984), reprinted in GRAETZ, supra note
48, at 933-36 .
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treatment of such instruments . In particular, the Art icle suggests that an
appropriate set of timing rules would: (1) divid e complex financial
instruments into individual components consisting of a s ingle contingency;
(2) accrue income with res pect to each such component based on the
expected future value of th e co mpo nent determined as of the time the
instrument is created; and (3) tax the parties to the transaction on gain or
loss whenever such a contingency is res olved. While in many circumstances the direct app lication of these proposed mles would be difficult, it is
hoped that they will provide a generalized framewo rk against which rules
dealing with specific instruments can be tested.

!
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Appendix A: The Amortization of an Option Premium
In the body of the Article I argue that, in general, an option should
be taxed as if the value of the option is expected to increase over time. 386
"n1is point is not uniformly accepted in the tax literature. 387 One way to
demonstrate that the market expects the value of an option to increase is to
consider the forward price for an option. For example, an option that
matures in two years and a day is currently selling for $100 . Consider a
forward contract to purchase the option in two years. Assuming an interest
rate of ten percent, the forward price for the option must be $121. This
can be proved by a standard arbitrage argument. Assume, first, that the
forward price is $120. In that case, I could write an option currently for
$100, buy an option forward for $120, and invest the $100 in a two-year
zero-coupon bond. At the end of two years, the bond would pay me $121.
I would use $120 to purchase the option. I would then be long and short
in the same option, which would effectively cancel, and I would have $1
left over. Such arbitrage transactions would be continued until the spot
price for the option was bid down and the forward price bid up. Conversely, if the forward price was in excess of $121, the arbitrage function
could be similarly performed by borrowing money, buying options i.n the
spot market, and selling options forward.
Thus, the forward price of an option is equal to the spot price plus
the carrying cost-primarily the interest cost of carrying the premium. 388
Given that the forward price is in excess of the spot price when the option
is purchased, it is anomalous to argue that the holder of the option should
be entitled to amortize her purchase price.
The confusion may arise out of the notion of the "time value of an
option." This expression refers to the fact that, all else being equal, the
value of an option increases with its term (i.e., the length of time between
the purchase and exercise dates). 389 This is true because of the interaction of two factors: (1) the volatility in the price of the underlying asset;

386. See text accompanying note 279 . The caveat, "in general" is very important. Consider, for
example, an option to purchase a $100,000 face, self-amortizing 30-year mortgage bearing a market
rate coupon at any time over the next 30 years for $80,000. Initially, the option should be worth at
least $20,000, the difference between the face of the mortgage and the strike price . Over time,
however, as the mortgage pays down, it must be the case that the option becomes less valuable. In
particular, consider the value of the option immediately before the final payment is made on the
mortgage. The option must then be worthless .
387 . See, e.g., New York State Bar Ass'n, supra note 279 (discussing alternative meth ods of
amortizing cap premiums and concluding that the method recommended in the text is incorrect and that
an alternative method, which they refer to as "economic amortization," should be used).
388 . See supra note 263.
389. See Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities, 81
J. POL. ECON. 637, 638 (1973).
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and (2) the asymmetric nature of an option .390 The longer the term of
the option, the more opportunity for the price of the underlying asset to
reach extreme values. The value of the option, however, is asymmetric
around these values. In other words, at the maturity of a call option, if the
price of the underlying asset is very high, the option is very valuable,
increasing on a dollar-for-dollar basis with the price of the underl ying
asset. If, however, the price of the under! ying asset is very low , the option
is already worthless and suffers no decline in value as the value of the asset
drops. As a result, at any given point in time th e value of a long-term
option is greater th an the value of an otherwise identical option w ith a
shorter term. 391 Consequently, it is possible to draw the erroneous
inference that the value of the long-term option is expected to decline over
time. As the arbitrage argument above demonstrates, this conclusion is not
accurate.
Another way to approach the same question is to look at the basi c
valuation formula for an option, the Black-Scholes option pricing formula:
V

=

_l_[p X N(x) - S X N(x - aVt)]
(l+rY

where:

x =

log(P/ S) +

a/t

Ia{t
2

P = the forward price of the good, S = the strike price, r = the discount
rate, a = the standard deviation of price changes, N(x) = the cumulative
normal distribution function, s = time between payment and exercise, and
t = time between entering into contract and exercise. 392 Notice that time
enters into the valuation equation in two ways. First, as s, time appears
in the term, 11(1 + r)' (the "discount term"), and second, as t, time appears
in the remaining term (the "value term") . The value term provides an
estimate of the value of the option at maturity, while the discount term
adjusts the value back to the time of payment. 393

390 . !d. at 638-39.
391. /d. at 638. While this sta tement is generally tru e, it is not always true. T o see this result,
consider a commodity whose price is fixed at $100. Consider two options, one to purchase the
commodity for $90 in one year and the other to purchase the/commod ity fo r $90 in two years . The
value of the two-year option would simply be the present value of $10, the difference between the
option price, $100, and the strike price, $90 . Assuming a 10% di scount rate, the tw o-year option
should be worth approximately $8.26 ($8.26 = ($100- $90)/(1 . 1)'). Similarly, the value of th e oneyear option would be $10, discounted by only one year, or approximately $9.09. Thus, when there
is no price volatility, the value of a short-term option exceeds the value of a long-term op tion. /d . at
638-39 .
392. The Black-Scholes formula originally appeared in Black & Scholes , supra note 389.
393 . The value of an option at any time is equa l to its discounted exp;:cted futu re va lue in a risk-
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Consider now a contract to purchase the option at some point in the
future. Assuming that prices for the future purchase are set at time zero,
the value term will be unchanged. In other words, it will still be based on
current values of P, S, cr, and t. The discount term, however, is a function
of the time between payment and maturity of the option. Therefore, the
later that payment is made, the smaller s and the greater the discount term
and, correspondingly, the value of the option.

neutral wo rld. See Cox & R oss, supra note 277. A possible source of error in working with options
is to confuse the expected future value of an op tion with the future value of the option given the
expected future price. Because the value of an option is a nonlinear function of price, these two
numbers are not the same. See Black & Scholes, supra note 389, at 638-39 . For example, consider
a good that can have three possible prices , $7, $10, and $13 , each with equal probability. The
expected future price of the good is $10 , the average of the three prices. Consider, however, an option
to purchase the good at $10. If the future price is the expected price of $10, the option will be
worthless. The expected future value of the option, however, is not zero. If the price is $13, the
option will be worth $3, while if the price is $10 o r $7, the option will be worthless. Therefore, the
expected value of the option is $1. q. New Yo rk State Bar Ass'n, supra note 279 (discussing a
"static" mark-to-market approach); K.Jeinbard, supra note 196, at 950-52 (analogizing caps to optio ns
in that both share in the up-side but not the down-side risks).
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Appendix B: Forward Interest Rates
To prevent the possibility of arbitrage, forward interest rates must
bear a specific relationship to the term structure of interest rates. In other
words, given any particular term structure of interest rates, there is only
one set of forward rates that is consistent with that term structure. 394 To
see this relationship, define ri.J as the zero-coupon interest rate which
applies at the present time to a borrowing from time i until time j. For
example, :-0 . 1 and r0 .2 are the current (time=O) interest rates for a oneperiod and a two-period borrowing, respectively. Similarly, r 1 ,2 is the
current interest rate available for borrowing from time 1 until time 2. In
other words, r 1 •2 is the forward interest rate for a one-period borrowing
starting one period in the future. The assertion that the term structure of
interest rates implies a set of forward interest rates is equivalent to the
assertion that given {r0 •1 , r 0 •2 , • • . , r 0 ·"' • . . }, it is possible to determine
all remaining interest rates, ri.J·
The formula for the equilibrium forward rate from period i to
period} (j>i) is: 395

r 1,)
..

(1

+

=

[ (1 +

r0 .;

.)i] u ~

i)
-

ro.Y

1.

Thus, for example, if the one-period spot rate, r[O,l], is 6.0% and
the two-period spot rate, r[0,2], is 6.5%, the forward rate for a one-period
borrowing beginning in one period is 7. 0%:
7.00%

=

1.0652 - 1.
1.06

To see that 7.0% must be the current forward rate, consider what would
happen if the forward rate was in excess of 7.0%. For example, assume
the forward rate is 8. 0%. It would then be possible to conduct the
following arbitrage operation. First, borrow $94.34 for two periods (Loan
#1). At the spot two-period rate of 6.5%, you will be obligated to repay
$107 in two years. Second, lend $94.34 for one period at the spot oneperiod rate of 6.0%, receiving back $100 at the end of the first period
(Loan #2). Finally, enter into a forward contract to lend $100 between

394. See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 18, at 570 (showing that forward rates are "implicit"
in the term structure); SARKIS J. KHOURY, SPECULATIVE MARKETS 217-21 (1984) (showing the
relationship between forward rates and the term structure).
395. See WILLIAM F. SHARPE & GORDON J. ALEXANDER, INVESTMENTS 93-94 (4th ed. 1990).
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periods one and two at the forward rate of 8. 0% (Loan #3). Your net cash
flows from this transaction will be as follows (in dollars):

I

T ime !!Loan 1

94.34

0

--

1

I

2

II

(1 07 .00)

I

Loan 2

I

(94.34)

I

0

(100.00)

I

108.00

Net

I

0

--

100.00
--

Loan 3

I

1

I

I

In other words, you will have a guaranteed income of $ 1 at the end
of two periods. Similarly, if the forward rate is less than the equilibrium
rate of 7. 0%, you can make a certain arbitrage profit by lending for two
periods at the two-period rate and borrowing at the spot rate and the
forward rate. Similar arbitrage arguments can be used to prove the general
equation for forward rates given above .
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Appendix C: Further Comments on the Treatment of Uncertainty Under
the OlD Rules
As noted in the body of the Article, the original issue discount rules
generally ignore contingent payments until they become fixed. Once a
contingent payment is fixed it is generally immediately taken into taxable
income. 396 If, however, such a fixed payment is not due for at least six
months, the present value of the now-fixed contingent interest is taken into
income and additional interest income is accrued based on the difference
between the present value of the payment and the amount of the future
payment. 397
In general, the contingent interest rules have the effect of deferring
the accrual of expected income. 398 When the contingency relates to a
future event, however, the accrual of income can be accelerated. Consider
again Example 3A. 399 In that example, Diva pays David $100 today in
exchange for either $100 or $142 in two years, the amount to be determined by an immediate flip of a coin. Assume that David's obligation to
Diva is a debt instrument covered by the OlD rules. Under the OlD rules,
the transaction would be bifurcated into a noncontingent debt instrument
issued for $100 with a stated redemption price at maturity of $100, and a
contingent debt instrument providing for a payment of either zero or $42
at maturity. 400 The noncontingent instrument would have a zero yield
and, as a result, there would be no income imputed to the holder of the
instrument. 401
The treatment of the contingent debt instrument is more
complicated. Under the regulations, the parties are treated as if the
borrower had issued a separate debt instrument on the date the amount of
the payment becomes fixed, maturing on the date that the payment is
due. 402 The stated principal amount of this separate debt instrument is

396. Prop. Treas. Reg.§§ 1. 1275-4(e)(3)(i), -4(f)(2), 51 Fed. Reg. 12022, 12091-92 (1986); id.
§ 1.1275-4(g)(2), 56 Fed. Reg . 8308, 8310-11 (1991); see supra text accompanying note 106. If the
instrument is governed by the Paragraph (f) rules, a portion of the now-fixed contingent payment may
be treated as a return of principal.
397. Prop. Treas. Reg.§§ 1.1275-4(e)(3)(ii), -4(f)(2)(v), 51 Fed. Reg. 12022, 12091-92 (1986);
id. § 1.1275-4(g)(4)(ii), 56 Fed. Reg. 8308, 8311 (1991). If the instrument is governed by the
Paragraph (f) rules, a portion of the present value of the now-fixed contingent payment may be treated
as a return of principal.
398. See supra text accompanying note 109 .
399. See supra text accompanying note 28.
400. Prop. Treas. Reg.§ 1.1275-4(e)(l), 51 Fed. Reg. 12022, 12091 (1986). The application of
the Paragraph (e) rules assumes that the contingency is not determined in whole, or in part, by
reference to the value of publicly traded property. !d. § 1.1275-4(g)(l), 51 Fed. Reg. 12022, 12094
(1986).
40 I. See supra text accompanying note I 08.
402. Prop. Treas. Reg.§ l.l275-4(e)(3)(ii)(A), 51 Fed. Reg. 12022, 12091 (1986).
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the amount of the payment that has become fixed (either zero or $42 in our
example).'~m
An amount equal to the is sue price of the deemed debt
instrument is then accounted for as if an amount of interest equal to the
issue price had been paid by the borrower to the lender as interest on the
date that the amount of the payment became fixed. 404 The issue price of
the deemed debt instrument (and, therefore, the amount of interest treated
as paid) is determined by discounting the fixed payment at the applicable
federal rate determined as of the time of the original debt issuance. 405
Thus, assume that after paying $100 in exchange for the promise to be paid
either $100 or $142 in two years, Diva wins the coin toss and David
becomes obligated to pay $142. Under the proposed regulations, Diva
would be treated as having immediately received $35 in contingent
interest. 406 Furthermore, Diva would be required to accrue an additional
$7 of OlD over the remaining two-year period . The following table
compares the amount that the holder of such a debt instrument would be
required to accrue under the contingent interest rules to the amount such
a holder would accrue under a full accrual regime:

Time of accrual
Immediately after the coin toss

Income under
contingent
interest rules

Income under
full accrual
regime

$35

$17

During the first year

3

12

During the second year

4

13

As can be seen from the above table, in this example the contingent interest
rules overaccrue, rather than underaccrue income.
The deferred contingent interest rules do not always overaccrue
income. The problem is that the rules require the immediate accrual of all
previously contingent interest at the time that the interest becomes fixed,
without regard to the period to which such interest relates. In general, to
the extent that the newly fixed interest relates to prior periods, the rules

403 . /d .
404. !d.
405. /d .§ 1.1275-4(e)(3)(ii)(B), 51 Fed . Reg. 12022, 12091 (1986). It is not clear from the text
of the regulation what date is used for determining the applicable federal rate . The choice of date is,
however,madeclearbyExample3 intherules. Seeid . § 1.1275-4(e)(4),51 Fed . Reg. 12022,12091
(1986) (discounting all payments under the separate debt instrument at the rate in effect on the date the
debt instrument was issued).
406. The calculation assumes the applicable federal rate is 10 %.
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properly require its accrual. Conversely, to the extent that the newly fixed
interest relates to future periods, the rules improperly require its accrual.407
The OID rules have a couple of other features worth noting. While
the OID rules do not generally accrue income based on expected amounts
of future payments, the rules do require the accrual of income based on the
expected time of future payments in at least two circumstances. The first
concerns debt instruments subject to puts by the holder or calls by the
issuer. Consider first a call on a debt instrument issued at a discount. In
light of the existence of the call, it is not known when the instrument will
be retired and, therefore, it is not possible to compute a yield or the
amount of discount allocable to each period. The regulations solve this
problem by assuming that the call will be exercised (or fail to be exercised)
at such time so as to minimize the yield paid by the issuer. 408 Similarly,
in the case of a put by a holder, the regulations assume that the put will be
exercised (or fail to be exercised) at such time so as to maximize the yield
received by the holder. 409 If in fact the call or put is exercised at other
than the assumed time, adjustments are made at that time. 410
In other words, the regulations take the approach of treating the
instrument as if it provided for certain timing of payments, even though the
actual timing of payments is uncertain. Conceptually, this is no different
from treating contingent payments as if they were fixed and making
adjustments when the assumption turns out to be untrue. An even more
sophisticated example of the same overall approach can be found in section
1272(a)(6), which deals with the timing of income in the case of debt
instruments whose payments may be accelerated by reason of prepayments
of other obligations securing such debt instruments .411 For example,
consider a pool of thirty-year mortgages that serve as collateral for debt
that is issued at a discount. The debt has a nominal term of thirty years,
but is prepayable as the individual mortgages are prepaid. Under section

407. To see this distinction, compare the following two debt instruments, both with ten-year terms
and no noncontingent interest. Assume that the first instrument provides that at the end of each year,
L~e interest rate for the prior year will be determined by reference to a nonqualified interest index (i.e. ,
un index that would not qualify as an objective interest index within the meaning of Prop. Treas. Reg.
§ l.l275-5(b), 51 Fed. Reg. 12022, 12094 (1986)), and that such interest will be payable at maturity.
Assume that the second instrument provides that a week after issuance, an interest rate will be set on
the bond. Once set, interest will be payable annually at the fixed rate.
In the first example, the fixing of the contingent interest relates to the already elapsed year
and is properly accrued under the rules. In the second example, the fixing of the contingent interest
relates to interest that has not yet accrued and should not be taken into income until such time as it has
properly accrued.
408. Id. § l.l272-l(f)(4)(iii)(B), 51 Fed. Reg. 12022, 12052 (1986) .
409. Id. § 1.1272-l(f)(4)(iii)(A), 51 Fed. Reg. 12022, 12052 (1986).
410. /d.§ 1.1272-l(f)(4)(iv), 51 Fed. Reg. 12022, 12052 (1986).
411. I.R.C . § 1272(a)(6)(C) (1988) .
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1272(a)(6), the accmal of discount in each period would be computed by
reference to an assumed prepayment rate for the pool of mortgages
determined as of the time of the issuance of the debt and the actual
prepayment behavior to date. 412 Thus, section 1272(a)(6) can be viewed
as a highly sophisticated approach to estimating the timing of income and
adjusting the estimates as facts prove to be inconsistent with the initial
assumption.

412. !d. § 1272(a)(6)(A)-(B).
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Appendix D: The Treatment of Correlated Events
In general., this Article recommends dividing a finan cial instrument
into components, each with a single contingency, and taxing each
component based on the expected future value of the contingency. While
this approach clearly makes sense when the contingencies are independent,
it is less obviously correct when the contingencies are co rrelated. In
Example 7, which deals with a bet on the next two presidential elections,413 I suggested that one approach was to value the second contingency at the time the first contingency was resolved based on the conditional
probabilities determined at the time the contract was initially entered into.414 That approach was rejected based on its additional information
requirements, namely the conditional probabilities. In this Appendix, the
question of the correlation between contingencies is explored further in a
more ngorous manner.
Consider two bets concerning events a and b, which may or may
not occur at time t 1 and time t2 , respectively. 415 At t0 , the probability of
the events are p 0 (a) and p0 (b), respectively. If events a and b are
uncorrelated, the probability of event b occurring will be unaffected by
whether or not event a occurs. In other words:
Pt(b Ia)

= Pt(b I -a) = p/b ).

Assume now that events a and b are correlated so that:
Pt(bla).,:: p/b).
Consider the extent to which this information should be used at different
points in time.

Time
t

=

t0

Discussion
The initial estimate of the probability of event b should
take into account all information that is available at t 0 ,
whether or not event b is correlated with event a. 416
Thus, whether or not the events are correlated, the
procedure at t 0 should be the same, i.e., the best
estimate should be made of the probability of event b.

413. See supra text accomoanying note 239.
414. See supra text accompanying note 242.
415. The term tn will be used to refer to the point in time where time is equal ton.
416. By the term "all information," I really mean all reasonably available information, taking into
account the transaction costs of obtaining the information.
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This is the period from when the bet is entered
into until the outcome of the first event is known.
By observing the behavior of event a during this
period , we would obtain more information about
event b. Hence, it would be possible to update
our probability estimates and accrue incom e
accordingly. To do so would , however, be inconsistent with our general decision to avoid updating
our information about event a. If we had an
updated estimate of p(a) , the first step should be to
adjust the accrual of income with respect to event
a, not event b . Moreover, it is not necessarily the
case that it is easier (i.e., cheaper) to obtain
updated information about event a than it would be
to obtain such information about event b. 417
Given that it would be more accurate to directly
update the estimate of the probability of event b ,
the fact that such a course of action has been
rejected suggests rejecting the indirect updating of
the estimate.
At t = t 1 , the occurrence or nonoccurrence of
event a is known with certainty.
It would
therefore be possible to determine either:
p,(bJa),
the probability of b given the now known value of
a and all other information known at time t 1 , or:
Po(b l a),
the probability of b given the known value of a,
but otherwise taking into account only information
known at t 0 .
As for the first alternative, it is exactly the
same as p,(b) (the probability of event b given all
information known at t 1) , because all of the information known at t 1 includes the outcome of event
a. The alternative of periodically re-evaluating
p(b) has , however, already been rejected.
The second alternative , adjusting the accrual
of income with respect to event b based on the
initial probability of event b conditioned on the

417. Although this may often be the case beca use event b is, by hypoth es is, furth er in the future
than event a .

Texas Law Review

348

[Vol. 71 :243

outcome of event a , takes into account o nly information known as of t 0 plus the known outcome of
event a. It is, therefore, not inconsistent with the
overall approach. On the whole, however, this
adjustment seems to reach an undesirable level of
complexity, although it may be reasonable under
some circumstances. This possibility, which I will
refer to as adjusting for related outcomes, is discussed more fully below.
This is the period between the outcome of event a
and the outcome of event b. Whether or not the
estimate of the probability of event b was adjusted
at time t 1 , the correlation between events a and b
should have no further relevance after time t 1 •
Accordingly, there is no reason to vary the general
rule that probabilities will not be updated until the
underlying contingency is resolved.

t = t2

Event b is no longer contingent.

As discussed above, a case can be made for adjusting the estimate
of the expected value of a future event based on the resolution of intermediate contingencies and their expected interactions as determined at the
initiation of the transaction. In general, however, such an approach is
unlikely to be cost effective. The most significant problem is that it would
require determining the conditional probabilities at the initiation of the
transaction. Such a determination is likely to be much more difficult than
determining unconditional probabilities. In particular, while reasonable
estimates of unconditional expectations can frequently be inferred from
market prices, it is unlikely that estimates of conditional probabilities will
be so determinable.
More broadly, there is no intrinsic reason why updating expected
values based on conditional probabilities would have to be limited to events
that are themselves connected with the financial instrument. For example,
consider a six-month forward contract on corn and assume that the key
determinate of the price of corn in six months is the amount of rainfall
over the next three months. In particular, assume that in February the
August forward price for corn is $2.00 per bushel, but that if there is less
than one inch of rain in April, all else being equal, it is expected that
August corn will be $3.00 per bushel. Finally, assume that there is in fact
less than one inch of rain in April. A possible approach would be to
revalue the forward contract on May 1 assuming that nothing else has
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changed other than the low rainfall. While it might enhance accuracy to
adjust for such extrinsic outcomes, it is unlikely that it would be worthwhile to do so.
The failure to adjust for extrinsic outcomes, however, suggests an
additional problem with updating based on intrinsic outcomes: the taxation
of any component of a financial instrument would then become dependent
on the other components of the instrument. For example, the taxation of
the corn forward in the previous example would depend on whether or not
it was tied to a separate bet on the amount of rainfall or perhaps a bet on
wheat prices (assuming that wheat prices are themselves correlated with
rainfall). 418
For all of the above reasons, I would reject using conditional
probabilities to update estimates of future contingencies. Accepting this
conclusion as a general rule, the question remains as to whether there are
special cases where there is so much information contained in either
intrinsic or extrinsic events that it seems foolish to ignore such information.
Such a case is presented when the two events are perfectly correlated,
either negatively or positively. 419
The problem of perfectly correlated events can be demonstrated by
a simple example. Consider a jar with two balls, one red and one white.
Assume that one ball will be removed at t 1 and the other ball will be
removed at t2 . Consider a pair of bets where the first bet pays $100 if the
red ball is removed at t 1 and the second bet pays $100 if the red ball is
removed at t 2 • Ignoring the time value of money, each bet should be worth
$50. 420 Assume that you have paid $100 for the pair of bets and that the
white ball is drawn at t 1 • Since your basis in the first bet will be $50, you
will have a loss of $50 on the first bet. Economically, however, your loss
of $50 on the first bet is exactly offset by your certain gain of $50 on the
second bet. 421 It would seem undesirable to permit the loss on the first
bet without taking into account the certain gain on the second bet. A
solution to this dilemma is to re-evaluate the expected outcome of the
second bet based on the first bet, in other words, to use the conditional
probabilities. A simpler approach, however, is to simply observe that the
second bet is no longer contingent once the first bet has been resolved.

418. If probability were updated based on intrinsic outcomes, it would no longer be true that the
timing of income with respect to a financial instrument is independent of whether or not the instrument
is bifurcated into its component parts. See supra subpart V(A).
419. By a perfect positive correlation I mean that the occurrence of event a implies the occurrence
of event b. Perfect negative correlation means that the occurrence of event a implies the nonoccurrence
of event b.
420. There is a 50% chance that the red ball will be drawn at t 1 • The value of the first bet is
therefore .5 times $100, or $50. The argument is exactly the same fort,.
421. You will receive $100 when the second ball is drawn and you have a basis in the second bet
of $50.
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Thus, under the general rule that income is recognized when contingencies
are resolved, a gain of $50 should automatically be recognized with respect
to the second bet without any need to formally consider conditional
probabilities. 422 Similarly, if a red ball is drawn at t 1 , a loss should be
permitted with respect to the second bet, now a certai n loser.

422. This result is achieved under the OlD contingent interest rules , which require immediate
recognition of the present value of resolved future contingencies. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.12754(e)(3 )(ii), -4(f )(2)(v), 51 Fed. Reg. 12022, 12091 (1986); id. § I . 1275-4(g)(4)(ii), 56 Fed. Reg. 8308,
8311 (1991).

